


The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL



MAY 1946



President and Artilleryman
(See Inside Cover)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1946

Dear Colonel Armstrong:

I am honored that the Executive Council of the Field Artillery Association has elected me Honorary President of our Association. I accept with pleasure.

It may interest artillerymen to know that I have been a member of the Field Artillery Association for over twenty-five years. And may I add that I have noted, with gratification, that in recent months a new vigor has been instilled in our Journal.

I wish you every success in furthering the high purposes of our Association - an activity that, to borrow the words from its Constitution, "contributes to the good of our country".

Sincerely yours,


Colonel, Field Artillery Reserve

Colonel DeVere Armstrong, FA
Secretary-Editor and Treasurer
The Field Artillery Association
1218 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D. C.



*Announcement is made with pride and
pleasure of the election of the
Honorable Harry S. Truman President
of the United States and Colonel, Field
Artillery Reserve, as Honorary
President of the United States Field
Artillery Association.*



A
Greeting
to
Artillerymen
from our
Chief of Staff

THE PRESIDENT of the United States has greatly honored the Field Artillery, and the Army, by accepting the position of Honorary President of the Field Artillery Association. Please accept my warm congratulations.

The Field Artillery had a tremendous job to do in World War II, and it performed magnificently. The speed, accuracy, and devastating power of American artillery won confidence and admiration from the troops it supported and inspired fear and respect in the enemy. It played a major role in the incomparable team that smashed two of the greatest military machines in history. There is no doubt that the Field Artillery Association contributed substantially in building the professional standards and esprit de corps which resulted in the outstanding performance of our artillerymen in battle.

The coming years will offer a renewed challenge to the Association, a challenge which I know will be met in full and admirable fashion.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read "Weyand". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Chief of Staff

A YEAR HAS PASSED

VICTORY came in Europe one year ago this month. Acutely aware of this anniversary and of the great joy and perhaps even greater disillusionment that followed in the wale of complete military victory, the FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL—uncertain of the most fitting note to strike on VE-Day's first birthday—is content merely to republish this bit of verse (by "Mailed Fist" in the January 1946 issue of the Journal of the Royal Artillery) as a tribute to those who slugged long and hard on the "forgotten front" in Italy.—Editor.

CASSINO

On the 8th of May, 1945

Upon the gaunt, scarred, rock-encrusted hill,

All that is left of that fair Monastery surveyed

*The valley of the crystal flowing stream
Skirting the shattered ruins of the town.*

The river's banks were rent by force of war,

Thus order the shell-torn fields of green and gold

The vagrant Gari spreads her cooling touch,

Restoring life, where once death seared his way.

From Monte Trocchio, whence critwhile we watched

Across Cassino on to Cairo's height,

A nightingale flew down into the plain,

And lit upon a flowering Judas tree

He sang, as twilight stole across the vale,

Then of a sudden in one glad acclaim

A wondrous choir of philomel took up his song.

To them had come the word, I know not how,

That, in the fullness of one year of strife,

Victory had crowned the effort that was born

And weaned upon the gallantry of men

Beside Cassino on the road to Rome.



The FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL



"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

VOL. 36

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NO. 5

- Cover: The Honorable Harry S. Truman, President of the United States.
- Frontispiece: A Greeting to Artillerymen from the Chief of Staff.

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COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONG

Editor

MAJOR ROBERT F. COCKLIN

Associate Editor

LENNA PEDIGO

Business Manager

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EDITOR'S "CREED"

THE SPECIFIC WAYS AND MEANS OF best furthering the high objects of our Association (see bottom page 285) vary continuously with the passage of time. As Editor, I deem it not only my privilege but also, and more important, my duty boldly to support editorially those policies that will, in my judgment, contribute most to the "good of our country." A number of these are set forth below. These convictions are mine, and mine alone. Emphasized is the fact that their being listed here will stand as no bar, whatsoever, to the publication by me of reasoned articles expressing contrary views. In fact, therein lies the greatest value and strength of our JOURNAL — to provide a meeting ground for the free expression of ideas in the changing present.

Readers will note that my "creed" gives relatively minor emphasis to even the major problems confronting us as artillerymen. This is intentional. I am convinced that, *from a timing point of view*, the improved and as-yet-unthought-of artillery techniques of an atomic age are "little things" relative to the "big things" now pressing urgently upon us. Can we but straighten out the big things, the little ones will arrange themselves as a matter of course.

THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL will continue to welcome and to publish varying types of articles of exclusively artillery interest. Also most welcome, however, are articles of broader perspective. Editorially, I shall continue to stress what I feel are the "big things."

Democratic Army. The fulfillment of the democratic ideal within the Armed Forces of the United States, to the maximum degree consistent with ordinary *horse-sense*, is a charge and a trust weighing heavily upon every commissioned officer, regardless of the color of his uniform or the size or shape of his insignia. To accomplish this in our Army requires continuing and penetrating self-criticism. Much of this is needed right now. The officer-enlisted man relationship, for example, *may* require re-examination. Perhaps even the salute, too—fine custom and *privilege* of soldiers, that most of us consider it to be. Denounced flatly, however, are the "common pot" blatherings of certain disgruntled former service

men. Condemned, at one and the same time, is the abuse by any officer of the sobering responsibility of his position of leadership. The Army needs good leaders and a good discipline—a discipline no different fundamentally, from the good discipline of the home or the church or the efficient business establishments throughout our land. Good leaders have good discipline. *We'll have neither, if we sovietize the Army.*

Joint-mindedness. Every technique — and there are many—must be exploited to develop joint-minded air, ground and naval officers. No other single factor is more vital to the future security of our nation. Essentially, this is a *state of mind* and not something to be accomplished merely by drawing up a new organization chart. Unfortunately for all, joint-mindedness suffered a setback by the recent head-on collision of the War and Navy Departments over the merger.

Forthright Articulateness. The Army has a bumbling record in the increasingly important field of public relations. Every leader knows that the American soldier responds willingly and selflessly *if he understands what is being done and why it is being done*. Our soldiers are from and of the American people who will also "play ball" if they know what is being done and why it's being done. It is essential therefore, that the Army and every soldier in it develop a *more forthright*—yes, even *aggressive*—*articulateness* in our relationships with the American people. The United States Army is one of our oldest and finest social institutions. For myself, I am most proud to be a soldier—and am much more proud of the high ideals and distinguished history of our Army. These sentiments we soldiers must pass on both to our men and to our people. By no other *positive* means can we protect the interests of national security against its enemies—the apathetic majority and the wishful (and/or treacherous) thinking minority. Certain vicious elements of the latter group are highly vocal and highly organized for un-American purpose.

Tradition. I agree entirely with General Blakeley's statement on page 268 that "battles are won by young soldiers who have pride in their units and in themselves." In the recent wartime years there have been what may properly be labeled as an outrageous

disregard of the *stimulating potency of tradition* to soldiers and soldiering. Muffed badly during the war, it is imperative that the loose ends now be gathered up and nourished carefully by every commander, high and low.

General Staff. The principle of the general staff—the *brass*, if you will—is absolutely sound. It must be strengthened and improved. Kicked considerably during the war, circumstances beyond the control of the Army, and not the principle, were to blame. Although we *had* to try to do so, we must not be confused by the unalterable fact that *general* staff officers could not, and cannot, be made in a few weeks or a few months. Take an example, related to the preceding point. A *real* general staff officer would never have permitted the 6th FA Bn (born in 1798 and having, perhaps, the most distinguished battle record of any American artillery unit) to fight World War II other than side by side with the 5th and 7th FA Bns in the 1st Infantry Division, where it fought in World War I. Again—and along the same general line of thinking—when will we artillerymen be rid of this word *group* (suggestive, to me, of field day at a boarding school) and go back to *regiment*, which has a ring unmatched by any other word in the military vocabulary?

Selection "Out" not "Up." The development and preservation of efficient and fearless leaders and leadership within the Army requires vigorous and vigorous procedures for selection *out* of the Service. not promotion by selection *up* within the Service. Despite the obvious theoretical advantages, promotion by selection up is the quickest and surest road to developing a corps of "yes" men. We have too many already. No active officer would identify himself with this type of editorial if his promotion depended, in any way, upon not offending or annoying a superior.

"Branchless" Army. Of doubtful soundness is the accelerating trend to the view that we should rip off our branch insignia and become "ground" soldiers. There is a real meaning and a worthwhile caution in the adage, *jack of all trades and master of none*. A good combat team results, I think, when a good artilleryman supports a good doughboy. Although I would argue against it, perhaps we Regulars can handle this "branchless" business. I believe, however, that it is an unsound concept for the much larger—hence, in this sense, more important—group, the Non-regular Components. Such unhealthy

branch "consciousness" as there was in the pre-war days was the product of certain over-all circumstances (small isolated stations, inadequate appropriations; etc.) and *not the logical derivative* of a branch system. (I had been commissioned eleven years before I ever *saw* a division.) The artillery never has pretended—and never will pretend—to be other than a *supporting* arm.

Officer Procurement. Plans for officer procurement for the post-war Army should include an expanded "Thomason Act" principle (for ROTC graduates and National Guard candidates) and should retain the OCS principle (for enlisted men). The War Department should beat down with solid logic (see *Forthright Articulateness*, above) what I consider to be the shallow thinking nonsense that no candidate is suitable for commission if he has not served one year—or three months or three weeks or three years, for that matter—as an enlisted man.

Integrated Guidance. No element was more decisive than artillery in winning the great land battles in World War II. It was the same story in World War I—and in every other war in modern times. Regardless of the size or the shape of our weapons-to-come, we must not forget these lessons of the past in planning for the future. Hence, I repeat again my firm conviction that the over-riding current artillery requirement is the early establishment, both at home and abroad, of a *suitably integrated artillery guidance*—give it any name you will—appropriate to and consistent with artillery's great battle role. Impressive, as I have said before, are the related facts that (a) the Russians and the British had it in the war just won and will have it again, and (b) the United States lacked it along with the Germans and the Japs.

One Artillery. The merger of the Field Artillery and the Coast Artillery Corps appears inevitable. This is sound. It is my earnest hope that the merger of the U. S. Field Artillery and Coast Artillery Associations may follow promptly thereafter.

Repeated in closing, for the sake of emphasis, is the fact that the listing here of my own strong convictions will stand as no bar to the publication by me of reasoned articles expressing contrary views.



Colonel, Field Artillery



INFANTRY DIVISION IN EUROPE

By Major General H. W. Blakeley, USA

ONE OF the most outstanding artillerymen of World War II, General Blakeley's distinguished career is a model, worthy of emulation by young officers who aspire to prepare themselves for the heaviest and most sobering responsibility an officer can have thrust upon him—the command of soldiers on the field of battle.

Commissioned a second lieutenant of Field Artillery in 1917, General Blakeley is a graduate of the Field Artillery School, the Command and General Staff School, and the Army War College. He has had two tours as an instructor at Fort Sill (one in Gunnery and one in Tactics) and has been an instructor at the Command and General Staff School. All the rest of his service has been with troops—actually with troops, not the constructive "duty with troops" of pre-war days.

When the 5th Armored Division was activated in 1941, General Blakeley was transferred to it from the 6th Field Artillery which he then commanded. After six months as commander of the 5th Armored Division Artillery, he was promoted to the grade of brigadier general and assigned to command Combat Command A. After about two years as a tanker, he was shifted to the 4th Infantry Division as Division Artillery Commander, and went to England with it in January, 1944. He landed on Utah Beach on the morning of D Day, and was the only general officer to serve throughout the European campaign with the 4th Infantry Division. He succeeded to command of the division in December, 1944. The 4th Infantry division was in action almost continuously from D-Day to VE-Day; it made the initial assault on Utah beach and had sustained 5,400 battle casualties by the time it entered Cherbourg three weeks later; it was the center infantry division in the Break-through at St. Lo; it (with the 2d French Armored Division and FFI forces) liberated Paris; it fought through the Siegfried Line twice; it spent a bloody but successful month

A critical analysis by a veteran commander of certain aspects of the infantry division, as organized and employed in Europe. He pulls no punches and strikes hard for the powerful intangibles in soldiering.

BOARDS OF officers are investigating everything everywhere. The best minds in the Army are working on the technical and tactical improvements that we should make in the light of our war experience and the potentialities of the atomic bomb and of guided missiles. Obviously it would be presumptuous for any one individual to think he has the right answers to these problems, but I do have some opinions based on service in the European Theater with the 4th Infantry Division, and my excuse for airing them is a letter from the Editor of the JOURNAL asking for an article "on the World War II infantry division—an article that avoids getting lost in a lot of T/O & E detail." The

editor's warning is a good one.

The tables should, of course, be as sound as we can make them, but they are only a framework. Neither in peace nor in war will we have the exact number of men, or men with the exact qualifications, or the exact equipment prescribed in tables. Nor will a table fit all conditions. The details are not as important as we sometimes make them. In general, ours were good. In fact, they would have been better if they had been let alone.

DIVISION STRUCTURE

Although I feel that certain organizational changes should be made in our infantry division, I have no major

in Hurtgen Forest, and moved to Luxembourg for a "rest" only to have the German attack that started the Battle of the Bulge hit it a few days after it took over a "quiet" sector. It held the south shoulder of the Bulge, participated in the American counteroffensive, and pursued to the Rhine, and, later nearly to the Austrian border. It had a total of 34,000 casualties, nearly 22,000 of them battle casualties.—*Editor.*



quarrel with the general division structure.

The infantry set-up in the infantry division is, I think, basically sound. Three regiments are about all that a division commander can supervise adequately. A four-regiment organization sounds well,—the division is "heavier," has more "staying power," "saves overhead," but in practice, as experienced in Europe, there would have been fewer divisions, all four regiments would have been committed on even wider fronts than divisions did have, and control would have been very difficult. A brigade organization creates another echelon of command with resultant delay.

Within the infantry regiments, the cannon company was a mistake. We tried most of the solutions of the use of this misfit,—its field manual role (with a light self-propelled howitzer, the company would have been useful), as a fourth battery in the direct support light artillery battalion, and as a rifle company. Changes now being made in the infantry regiment organization take care of this and are along sound lines, but of five combat experienced senior infantrymen whom I asked for suggestions, four listed one additional change—the re-establishment of regimental bands. For reasons brought out at a later point in this discussion, I concur in this suggestion.

DIVISION ARTILLERY

Having been an artilleryman for over 25 years and writing, as I am, for an artillery journal, I'm sure that few will object if I enthuse a bit over the part played by American Artillery in the historic battles in Europe. It did an outstanding job. Not a few commanders have observed the primary difference between the American and German Armies, the difference that spelled victory for one and defeat for the other, was the relative quality of their field artillery. Ours was superior; theirs was inadequate. Two of the major developments in Germany between World War I and World War II were the simplification of lateral observation methods, and the development of fire direction particularly in regard to the rapid massing of fires. The German officers who were from time to time

visitors or students at Sill took these improvements home, but they were not well applied in combat. The only notable job that I saw German artillery do was several shoots by a battery of 210-mm howitzers, using map data corrected, on the town of Zweifall. They were perfect.

For six months (from about 15 September 1944 to about 15 March 1945) the weather earned honestly a rating of the "worst imaginable." This handicapped observation, particularly air and sound and flash. By use of much ammunition, however, the artillery got results that were satisfactory, I believe, to the supported infantry except in the matter of countermortar fire. We made an early start in educating both artillerymen and infantrymen in getting direction by mortar crater study. Later, in September 1944, we had a board of officers and one attached battery work with us on countermortar methods including short-base sound. In general, the answer is to use all means of getting information, get it to infantry battalion command post where the infantry battalion commander can decide whether he'll go after the mortar or mortars with his men, or his weapons, or whether he wants the artillery, through the liaison officer with him, to get on the target. It is not, in my opinion, a job for a separate staff section.

SP Artillery. Our three organic light battalions (the 29th, 42d and 44th) and one attached armored field artillery battalion (the 65th) were equipped with self-propelled 105s (M-7) for the invasion. We had long training with them and they were highly satisfactory. The 29th lost one whole firing battery on the way in to Utah beach on D-Day when the LCT carrying it was sunk. Four new M-7s were landed and issued to the battalion on, I think, D+3. Because of the shortage of personnel and other equipment, the battalion commander divided these guns between his two remaining batteries and they functioned as six-gun batteries through the major part of the Normandy campaign. In October, 1944, because of shortage of M-7s for the armored divisions, we were required to change over one light battalion to truckdrawn 105s. The 29th was selected. About three weeks later I visited each gun

section of the 29th and personally asked the chief of section which he preferred, the M-7 or the towed gun. Every one of the twelve sergeants preferred the M-7. In November, 1945, I asked Lt. Col. Joel F. Thomason, who had commanded the 29th through most of its training, the entire European campaign and its return to the States, for his opinion as to the six-gun battery and the self-propelled mount. Incidentally, I know of no officer with more practical experience in these two subjects or who is a more competent battalion commander. The following are extracts from his reply:

"I favor a six-gun battery for organic light artillery of an infantry division. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion operated in combat with two six-gun batteries for approximately thirty days. During this period positions offered no problems and the battery commanders experienced no difficulty in control. Since in combat we always used telephone communications between the post of the executive and gun sections, firing control by the executive was not impaired. Also when guns need maintenance, one gun can be called out without seriously affecting the fire power.

"Since the greatest part of the fire power of an infantry division is in the artillery, an increase of two guns per battery would greatly increase the fire power of the division. With a plentiful ammunition supply, lives of men would be saved. An increase of 50% in a battery's fire power can be made with only an increase of approximately 15% in personnel and without placing any additional burden on communications, fire direction, etc., which would be the same whether the firing batteries had four or six guns. An eighteen-gun battalion TOT would carry the same suddenness as the twelve-gun battalion with 50% more power. Massing of an eighteen-gun battalion would offer no problem, whereas the massing of two battalions does offer a problem. The many advantages and few disadvantages indicate that we should change to six-gun batteries.

"The 29th Field Artillery Battalion was organized with towed guns; however, we had SP guns (M-7) from September 1942 until October 1944. Based on combat experience in Europe where



Riflemen of the 4th Infantry Division work their way into a German town.

roads and bridges offered no problems, I favor SP artillery for direct support battalions for the following reasons:

1. Better cross-country mobility and excellent traction and flotation.
2. Combat occupation of position and march order much faster, ammunition, etc., readily available.
3. Ammunition carrying ability of M-7 and trailer facilitates the stripping of a battalion to a small compact fighting group for breakthrough tactics (approximately 150 rds. per M-7 and trailer). A stripped battery is excellent for a rapidly moving situation.
4. Foxhole for squad can be rapidly constructed under M-7.
5. Ammunition easily protected on carriage and tarpaulin, up out of mud.
6. Howitzer better protected from mud and dust.
7. SP gun can rapidly move to nearby point of advantage in event of tank threat. Also better for close in fighting with .50 caliber MG mounted on carriage.
8. Troops favor SP howitzer 100%. A morale factor.
9. AA protection on march and in position better with .50 cal. MG readily available.

10. It is imperative for artillery to be equipped with M-7 for amphibious operation."

Whether four-gun or six-gun batteries are adopted, we should have two medium battalions organic in the division artillery. In Europe, we always had at least one medium battalion attached and always needed at least one. Every time a new battalion was attached there was a period of comparative inefficiency before we got it into the team. During the two brief periods that our infantry was out of combat and not moving, our artillery went in at once to reinforce the fires of other units, so there would have been no loss of the services of the second medium battalion had it been divisional.

I have heard even more organic artillery being advocated, but there is no point in getting beyond the number of battalions that one headquarters can handle efficiently. It is also important to remember that the artillery does damage with shells, not tubes. With three light and two medium battalions, all six-gun batteries, we would have enough tubes for the "normal situation" (admitting that that is a vague phrase) in terms of time-on-target hammer blows, frontage, or ammunition supply.

Fire Direction. Our fire direction technique worked better in combat, I think, than the most optimistic artillerymen had expected. It was common-place in slow-moving situations like Hurtgen Forest to put ten or more battalions on a target promptly and accurately on request. Invariably, these were time-on-target shoots. The time could of course, be done by synchronizing clocks, but we much preferred and normally used a party hook-up. Each battalion reported the mean time of flight of its batteries, the division fire direction officer gave "load" and, when all had reported "ready," announced that he would count in reverse beginning with, usually, a number about 5 seconds greater than the greatest time of flight down to the least time of flight. Each battalion fire direction officer gave fire when his time of flight figure was reached. The time lag from division artillery to gunner was about equal in all units. The results were excellent. One corps artillery commander (I think it was General Helmick of the V Corps) said that "a spread of over three seconds in the arrival of first volleys on a target is inexcusable." Whoever said it, I agree.

Conduct of Fire. There was a tendency for young and inexperienced field artillery officers to abandon all methods of conduct of fire except the so-called air-ground. This of course passed the buck back to the fire direction center where personnel were safer, more comfortable and, the observer hoped, more competent than he. That he could not be sensing the direction, let alone the error, of the shot didn't lure him into some other method. Our officers in the next war will be equally inexperienced, and the tendency to try to use one method in all situations plus the remarkable success of the fire direction center method of control point to a simplification of the observer's job, but one that puts more emphasis on getting (and how to get) brackets in deflection and range. Another "must" is to get Army, Navy and Marine Corps gunnery procedure as nearly alike as conditions and equipment permit.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

With minor exceptions, the organic facilities available to the division for

communications, maintenance and supply were satisfactory. They require hard work and constant supervision, whether in maneuvers or in war.

In February, after our second trip forward through Bastogne and St. Vith, the roads from the rear almost ceased to exist and we were twice supplied by large air drops near Bleialf, Germany. We made one mistake in connection with the first dropping ground. It was selected by an Air Force liaison officer, and our staff representatives approved. It was along a reasonably good road, well forward but defiladed from enemy ground observation. The drop was successful except that no one had realized that the descending parachute loads would take out all of the overhead telephone wires strung along the road. It sounds dumb, but it happened.

Staff Rank. At the start of this Article, I said that our tables of organization would have been better if we had left them alone. One change with which I disagree was the promotion of division G-3s to colonel. The tendency is for division commanders, under combat pressure, to deal directly with G-3s (which is correct), and to fail to get from and give to the other G's complete information. There is where the chief of staff should keep watching that all phases of a situation have been covered. He should out-rank his assistants, and no raising of the status of the G-3 is desirable.

Rank in corps and army staffs is generally too high. The more rank a staff officer has the more he is tempted to command. The only justification I see for full colonels on corps staffs in nearly all positions for which lieutenant colonels are provided in division staffs is that they need to be officers with more experience and their seniority entitles them to higher rank. In practice, this was far from what happened. Alert, intelligent juniors got to be full colonels without any command experience worthy of the name. This didn't add to the morale of lieutenant colonels commanding battalions, or, for that matter, of colonels commanding infantry regiments.

Antitank Sections. The addition of an antitank section to division and corps artillery headquarters was, I think,

another mistake. The antitank problem is a twenty-four hour a day command problem. A commander needs the twenty-four hour a day assistance of his staff, particularly of the 2 and 3 sections, to handle it. The antitank sections, as set up just before D-Day, were not large enough for continuous service. In most division artillery headquarters, the personnel went into the fire-direction center roster and did very little antitank work except to make out reports required by the corps antitank section. The corps sections, as far as I observed them, absorbed some excellent artillery personnel who naturally published long estimates and reports which in general duplicated the G-2 and G-3 publications with special attention, of course, to enemy tanks and our antitank and tank destroyer organizations. I don't remember any case in which they served a purpose commensurate with the personnel and supplies used. Incidentally, we served in seven different corps while we were in Europe.

TD and AAA. An organic AA battalion with self-propelled, dual purpose weapons is desirable, and a group of two tank battalions for both

attack and antitank roles should be organic within the infantry division.

There should be no tank destroyer organizations. The tank destroyer program fulfilled its purpose in devising means and methods of meeting tank attacks but the tank destroyer doctrine was based on three assumptions which were not necessarily true. These assumptions were:

1. Greater mobility of tank destroyers. (This is a variable as new types of tanks and tank destroyers are developed. It may be true if tank destroyers are kept light.)

2. Greater gun power. (A tank can have as powerful armament as a tank destroyer.)

3. Greater visibility. (As much can be seen from the open turret of a tank as from a tank destroyer. When personnel are forced down by enemy fire, more can be seen through a tank periscope than can be seen from the floor of a tank destroyer.)

The tank destroyer units did a magnificent job, considering that they were not only used as tank destroyers but as tanks, field artillery, assault guns and cavalry. Both tanks and tank destroyers were misused terribly on many occasions.



Troops of the 4th Infantry Division attempt to move forward and are pinned down by German fire from within the town of Libin, Germany.



Three commanders of the 4th Infantry Division. Major General William O. Barton (left) commanded the Division for approximately two years, relinquishing command to General Blakeley (right) in December, 1944. Medal of Honor winner in World War I and former artillerymen, Major General George P. Hayes (center) commanded the 10th Mountain Division in Italy, and relieved General Blakeley as commander of the 4th Infantry Division in December, 1945.

The high rate of casualties among infantry officers and consequent rapid promotion brought officers to the command of infantry battalions without there being time or opportunity to train them in the proper use of supporting troops. They handled their infantry well. They had learned in the hard and practical school of combat. They generally lacked, however, any adequate picture of how to use supporting tanks, and when a tank or tank destroyer unit was attached it often suffered unnecessary losses. The attachment was usually correct, but the infantry commander too often failed to organize properly a base of fire and a maneuvering force, or fire and movement, or overwatching — whichever you prefer to call it.

Training. Our training was adequate and realistic, both in the United States and in England. As it turned out, we had more training than was necessary in protection against chemicals. If we hadn't, we should have needed it in all probability, as soon as the Germans discovered our deficiency. We used very little of the survey training that we had spent so much time on, but it gave excellent background for the correct use of maps. The one major shortcoming in training was the failure to get across the importance of care of the feet in winter and to emphasize sufficiently the insidious way in which *trench foot* can make a man a casualty before he is hardly aware of any trouble with his feet.

Standards of training and discipline were high in our division under my predecessor, Maj. Gen. William O.

Barton, and I made every effort to maintain those standards. The average soldier is a better soldier and a happier one when he is in an outfit that has high standards. Naturally, he will gripe about extra work and "spit and polish," but let him get transferred to a sloppy outfit and he'll fight to get back to the outfit where he felt pride in himself and his organization. The uniform, which I shall discuss later, did very little to help his pride. His equipment did, particularly after he saw some of the foreign equipment.

Accuracy, particularly in artillery training, should and did come before speed, but we should establish standards of speed for all crew-served equipment. The Gunnery Department at Sill made some excellent studies in 1929 when Major (now General) Devers was Director of the Department. The results were published in an article by 1st Lt. (now Brig. Gen.) Edwin L. Siber in the May-June (1929) issue of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL. Similar but more extensive studies with our present equipment and methods should be initiated.

VITAL INTANGIBLES IN SOLDIERING

I believe that our most serious error in the United States Army in this war was not doing enough to develop in our young soldiers (officers included) pride in their units and, incidentally, in themselves. The most deeply felt esprit comes, of course, from success in combat, but success in combat also comes from high esprit. This is a tremendous subject; a subject to which many fine officers have given careful

thought—long before this war came about, during the war, and right now—and a subject upon which reams have been written. I make no claim to having the full answers, but at least no petitions, telegrams or advertisements of protest came out of units of the 4th Infantry Division. The Army did a great job in Europe, but I cannot but believe that it booted something vital somewhere along the line. Hence, I set forth my strong feelings on several things that I believe are *vital intangibles* in soldiering.

Road to Morale. The Army approach to the morale or esprit problems (whatever you prefer to call it) should be on the basis that the Army's standards—mental, moral and physical—are high and higher than the average in civilian life. Most young American will respond to an honest presentation of such standards and an appeal to live up to them. That the soldier should know what he is fighting for, be treated justly, and be as well fed, clothed and sheltered as the military situation permits goes without saying, but more than that is required. The oft quoted definition of morale, "When every man knows that he is the best soldier in the best squad in the best platoon in the best company in the best regiment the best division of the best army of the best country in the world, Mister that's morale," is sound. The *New York Times* recently quoted the above definition, editorially, and continued:

"The application of that definition suggests that an important factor in satisfactory states of mind in the rank is pride of unit. That has been the experience, for example, of some of our allies. The traditions of the Guard regiments or some of the county regiments, in England and Scotland, for example, of Princess Patricia's in Canada of the Burma Rifles, have contributed to maintaining the sort of esprit de corps that makes soldiers give a good account of themselves even under unsatisfactory conditions.

"Because of our tendency to minimize the importance of the armed services in times of peace we are less rich in such traditions in this country. The notable exceptions, such as the Marine Corps, the First Division, or the Eighty-second Airborne—to choose at random—point to the importance of that pride factor

in the value of the troops. In an immense army, such as that which was assembled for this war, it is manifestly impossible to put every man into an outfit that has a cherished name and a proud record. Most of the soldiers served under number combinations that were meaningless until valor had been proved. But in our smaller peacetime army it will be possible to carry on the names and traditions of units whose proved record is an honor to their country and an inspiration to their ranks. The Army authorities can do that."

Unfortunately, under the hysterical pressure which has resulted in a disruptive demobilization, the Army authorities have *not* been able to do that. Some of the oldest and most distinguished infantry regiments of the Regular Army, regiments whose colors bore battle streamers for battles of the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish American War and World Wars I and II, have been inactivated after more than a century of continuous service. To say that they may be reactivated some time in the future and that, therefore, no damage is done, is unrealistic. A regiment is more than a number.

We recognized this before the war, of course. In all good units, recruits were told of the history, traditions and special distinctions of their outfits—often by the commanding officer himself at a formation in which the recruit was shown the unit's color or standard with the unit's coat-of-arms embroidered in it. The meaning of the symbols was explained to him. He probably wore some part of the coat-of-arms on his distinctive insignia and saw it on bugle tabards and, in mounted outfits, on saddle cloths. He also wore a U. S. band the insignia of his arm or service on his uniform.

But when he was about to go overseas, to depart on his great adventure, all his symbols that identified him as part of his unit, his signs that he was one of a special group, were ordered removed from his uniform — even his shoulder patch. As soon as he arrived in the overseas theater he was surprised to be told, in many cases, to put it on again, but his regimental or battalion insignia had been taken away from him. Then came entrance into combat. Now he had nothing in the way of insignia to mark him as a United States soldier—not even

a U. S. or a military button. Unless he was a medico, there was nothing to indicate his arm or service. Later, he could sometimes wear his shoulder patch and sometimes he couldn't — an involved matter of ripping off and sewing on.

The uniform then, contributed little, in the European theater at least, to the soldier's pride in his unit. The need of concealing from the enemy the identification of units must be considered, of course, but only at times. I believe that the soldier's combat uniform should include a national symbol (the U. S. or the American coat-of-arms), insignia of his arm or service (such as the crossed cannons or colored stripes, patches or piping) and a distinctive insignia of his regiment or battalion. We have all of these, of course, with the peacetime uniform. We had none in combat. The unit insignia should be removable so that they can be removed when secrecy is really necessary. It can be done as quickly as bumper marking on vehicles can be painted over or covered.

So little attention had been paid to maintaining a uniform which had any uniformity that it was impossible, after

D-Day, either in Germany or the United States, to turn out troops for a ceremony in any one uniform. Men had battle jackets or blouses (coats) and at least three kinds of field jackets. Officers had trousers of all shades from light grey to dark green, and (again at least) three kinds of overcoats, not to mention perhaps ten kinds of raincoats. This weird mixture was not caused primarily by supply shortage, but by failure to prescribe a uniform without "optional" items. The final blow to pride in uniform was when items of it were issued to captured prisoners, and, if newspaper accounts are to be believed, General Yamashita was hanged in the American uniform in which our soldiers had fought after having his Japanese uniform taken away as part of his disgrace.

Entertainment. Prior to combat and in breaks in combat, we spent much time, money and energy on shows, dance music, and movies which did more to make the soldier homesick than to raise his fighting spirit and his self-respect as a soldier. I am not condemning entertainment, but it is not, as some tried to make it, the number one source of morale. In the early stages of the draft,



"A strong believer in the value of ceremonies properly employed." General Blakeley attaches combat infantry regiment streamers to the colors of the 8th, 12th, and 22nd Infantry Regiments.

when the entertainment offered by some traveling camp shows was of a type which can only be called filthy, the result on morale was depressing.

Martial Music and Ceremonies. I am a strong believer in the value of ceremonies properly employed — meaning exactly performed, at reasonable intervals of time, with troops well and uniformly turned out, on suitable terrain, with good music and with a maximum of spectators. A sloppy ceremony is much worse than none. Ceremonies have equal value during intervals in combat and in peacetime garrisons in adding to the soldier's pride in himself and his unit. The division band is an unsatisfactory source of music for such ceremonies. Martial music for the combat troops, not concerts at division headquarters, is what military bands are for, and a division band does not, and cannot, get around enough. The 4th Infantry Division had a splendid division band overseas. It was normally at the rear echelon of Division Headquarters, and did some guard duty there, helped with mail distribution, and occasionally got within hearing distance of a fighting soldier. The same number of men divided among the three infantry regiments would have given each a band of about twenty pieces which would have been able to play a battalion along a road occasionally, or for a medal presentation ceremony. They would have helped solve the regimental CP guard problem when the going was tough. After VE-Day, we nearly wore the band out trucking it around our large occupation area for reviews incident to medal presentations and for a few retreat parades. Back in this country, we organized field music (drums and bugles) in each infantry regiment and the division artillery. It was surprising how much they were used even in preference to the excellent division band. The answer was, I think, not primarily a matter of convenience or quality, but rather of pride in their own outfit's music.

Unit Publicity. Restrictions in naming units in the press and in broadcasts were unnecessarily enforced long after the unit's presence in the theater was known

to the Germans. In some cases the regiments of a division could not be mentioned after the division itself could. It was hard to believe that the Germans didn't know what regiments were in a given division. General Patton's Third Army had a much more liberal policy in reference to mention of units than did the two other armies in which we served. Every combat soldier knows that the most casual reference to even a division in a month-old States newspaper was handed around by the men of that division until it was worn out.

Awards. The unfortunate effect of a too liberal policy in regard to service ribbons hardly needs discussion. Decorations and service medals awarded, as the British awarded them, under such restrictions that a man is naturally proud of them as an indication of his valor, outstanding merit or long and arduous service are of inestimable value. When, however, a man who was drafted in 1941, never wore chevrons but kept out of trouble, and perhaps served the whole war in a supply depot near his home town is entitled to four ribbons (good conduct, American defense, American theater and World War II victory) the pride that a combat soldier takes in his ribbons is seriously reduced.

Military Justice. The grave problem of handling of offenders against discipline, particularly deserters, in combat needs the best attention the Army can give it. A man who deserts not only takes away his own services, but he adds to the burden of the remaining men of his unit who must do his work, his guard duty, his patrol; he makes necessary military police to apprehend him and guards and transportation to get him back to his unit; he takes officers and stenographers for the court, officers as defense counsels and judge advocates, and worst of all, he often takes witnesses and transportation from troops in combat for at least a day, usually more when preparation of charges and conduct of investigations are considered. A partial solution would be to set up general courts under corps control with officers on them who had no other duties. This would take some of the burden from division commanders who even in combat could not avoid taking time and

energy, which could ill be spared from fighting their divisions to confer with subordinate commanders, the staff judge advocate and division psychiatrist. Perhaps a deputy corps commander could act as reviewing authority.

The press in America, as evidence by recent editorial comments on Army justice, has no concept of the cost in lives and shattered bodies of good soldiers that was paid because of the few worthless quitters who made other pay in blood for their selfish and self awarded trips to Paris, Brussels or similar spots where they lived as criminals — even stealing and selling the very food and gasoline that was going forward to the fighting soldiers. There were, of course, border-line cases where no medical or mental abnormality could be found, but the soldier nevertheless lacked the stamina and moral courage to keep going and simply failed to advance or trumped up an excuse to go back to an aid station and then hide somewhere until the fight was not so hot. In cases of this type, it was my experience that courts and reviewing authorities were very lenient. In cases of the other type, education of the press and public seems to be indicated.

Foremost Lesson. In summary, let me emphasize that these comments are based only on the experience of one division in one theater. Experience confirmed that our training, organization and equipment were generally sound that indicated changes were made promptly — sometimes too promptly that we failed to strike hard enough for the *vital intangibles in soldiering*. The next war may be primarily one of atomic bombs and guided missiles which may end the war in a few days as Douhet thought the airplane would. By their basic characteristics, however these weapons can never be close support weapons, and ground soldiers supported by ground weapons in all probability must eventually fight their way in and occupy the enemy country or, God forbid, defend the continental United States against the enemy who seeks to occupy after his strategic bombings. It will still stand, as a foremost lesson of all military history, that *battles are won by young men who have pride in their units and in themselves*.

Let's Use

FORWARD OBSERVATION

By Lt. Col. Ulrich G. Gibbons, FA

OUR initial combat reports of this war touched off a controversy which has lost none of its intensity with consequent campaigns — the merits and place of forward observation methods of fire adjustment as compared with the older more conventional ones. Reports that up to 95% of observed fires in combat were adjusted by FO methods seemingly attacked the basic principles of artillery adjustment. Add the fact that this new method also attacked traditionalism, a potent though none too logical force in all armies, and frequently the result was automatic antagonism instead of realistic evaluation and criticism. The popular illogic of unsound extension has been employed to reach the conclusion that the unsoundness of the FO principle for all types of adjustment makes the use of FO methods equally undesirable. The closed mind approach has produced another fallacy, that proper principles of adjustment inexorably require formal conduct of fire methods. This is traditionalism at its worst; it is arguing that because we have in the past arrived at a desirable end by complex means (a necessary evil) we should continue to do

so, even though a simpler means is at hand. Here it is:

Safe and Sure. The basic principle of conduct of fire is adjustment by bracketing the target in successively smaller brackets until effect is obtained. Accompanying this principle is the corollary that a positive bracket can be established only by line shots (terrain sensings excepted), which leads to the necessity for factors— r/R , S , and d . The method is somewhat cumbersome and requires considerable mental gymnastics on the part of the officer firing, but it has been the only sure method of securing effect on a distant target.

The Book Says. FM 6-40 says that forward observation methods should be used if the officer firing is (1) so close to the target that his factors (r/R and d) vary extremely from round to round, and (2) his observation of the target area is so good that he can make accurate estimates of range and deflection errors. The underlying principle of this method is that the observer attempts primarily to estimate how much his rounds are off

the target. Incidentally, he uses yards instead of mils and sensings instead of commands, but those differences are really incidental and superficial.

No End in Itself. Now the limitations of the FO principle are very real, and criticism of the principle as applied to distant targets is very sound, but extension of that criticism to include condemnation of the superficial differences is illogical. To link bracketing methods indissolubly with S , r/R , and d , and to say that since we need one we must also have the other, is false logic. Formal conduct of fire is only a means to an end—bracketing the target—and we must be careful not to glorify it as an end in itself. The officer conducting fire in combat is beset with many distractions and hardships (including imminent death) and if it is possible to simplify and speed his adjustment (bracketing) we should not hesitate to do so.

Can Use Help. Forward observation methods (not principles) are a real help to the FO. By using yards (whether sensings or commands is immaterial) he can dispense with remembering elevation and c , because the FDC does that work for him. To the FO in the infantry lines, under mortar, artillery, and even aimed small arms fire, it seems a very fair division of labor for the Bn FDC or the battery executive (quiet and undisturbed in defilade thousands of yards behind the front) to give him some help in mental gymnastics. He can concentrate completely on the target,

This picture was taken somewhere south of Cherbourg in Normandy by LIFE photographer. Frank Scherschel, early in July, 1944. Major General H. W. Blakeley, then Artillery Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, is shown with Lt. Col. Gibbons (center) and Major Bruce January, a member of the First Army Artillery Section. Graduating from West Point in 1939, Colonel Gibbons put on the ivy patch of the 4th Infantry Division soon thereafter and did not take it off until a few months ago when he returned to West Point as an instructor. In Europe, Colonel Gibbons served as Division Artillery S-3 and as battalion commander of a direct support battalion.



his adjustment is speeded up, and he probably gains in accuracy.

No Conflict in Principles. True, if he is to adjust on distant targets by bracketing, he must use factors to keep himself on the line; every experienced shot does so. Using FO methods in lateral fire, he announces compensating deflection or range sensings after a line shot to bring his next shot back to the line and establish a certain bracket. He is employing the principle of formal conduct of fire but using the mechanics of FO methods because they make his job easier. In all probability a high percentage of the FO adjustments in combat were accomplished by just that method. The 95% figure mentioned in the first paragraph does not reflect a conflict so much in principles as in methods.

Guesswork? The basic contention between FO and conduct of fire methods, therefore, is not mils vs. yards, but bracketing vs. guessing. The important consideration is, how does the officer firing approach his problem? Is he going to guess how far off his rounds are, or is he going to make certain by bracketing? If we can establish in his mind the necessity for the latter, the means he uses are immaterial. In fact, yards are better—for him—so let the mils go.

PROCEDURE

To reduce this method to a science, we can derive the necessary factors in terms of yards.

AXIAL FIRE

To get on the line: Use small r and the mil relation to determine deviation on yards, and sense accordingly in deflection.

SMALL T

1—To get on the line: Same as axial.

2—To stay on the line: Use S expressed in terms of yards. The factor is derived as follows:

$$S (\text{mils}) = \frac{1/10 T}{R}$$


To express S in yards, use the mil relation and large R

$$S (\text{yards}) = \frac{1/10 T}{R} \times R = T/10$$

LARGE T

1—To get on the line:

a. When T is very large (800 mils or more) nearly all the actual range error is apparent as deviation. See figure below:



As angle T increases, dx approaches the value of h , so that for practical purposes, when T is large the observer can get on the line by determining dx (multiply deviation by small r) and sensing accordingly in range.

b. When T is between 300 and 800 mils (the more normal case) the deviation observed is only a small portion of the actual range error. Therefore a factor must be derived. Call it x .

In the figure-above, $\sin T = dx/h$

Solving for h , $h = dx/\sin T$

Inspection of a table of natural functions of angles expressed in mils will reveal that between 0 and 800 mils the sine of an angle very nearly equals 1/1000 of the angle.

Expressing this approximation in an equation for angle T .

$$\sin T = T/1000$$

Substituting in the equation for h ,

$$h = dx/T/1000 = dx \times 1000/T$$

Let x represent the factor $1000/T$, and we have the equation

$$h = dx \times x$$

Or, in words—the sensing required to get on the line is obtained by multiplying the deviation observed (expressed in yards) by the factor x . It is to be noted that this factor x is the same one used below to stay on the line.

2—To stay on the line:

a. Bracket the target for deflection in multiples of a hundred yards. A compensating range change per hundred yards' deflection change must be derived. Call this factor x .

b. By definition, S is that deflection change required to keep a shot on the line when a hundred yard range change is made. Stated conversely for large T , a

deflection change of one S requires range change of 100 yards to keep the shot on the line.

c. If a deflection change of 100 yards instead of one S is made, a different, greater range change must be made. This range change is x . (See a, above).

d. If S is expressed in yards, there are $100/S$ S 's in a hundred yards' deflection change.

e. Similarly, the range change x required to compensate for a hundred yard deflection change is $100/S$ (yds) times 100 yards (100 yards being the range change for a one S deflection change) or $x = 100 \times 100/S$ (yds) = $10,000/S$ (yds)

f. From the small T formula derived above: S (yds) = $T/10$

g. Therefore: $x = 10,000/T/10 = 100,000/T$

h. x above is expressed in yards. To express it in hundreds of yards, divide by 100: $x = 100,000/100T = 1000/T$

To summarize the factors required:

Axial: r to get on the line

Small T : r to get on the line; $T/10$ to stay on the line

Large T : r to get on the line when T exceeds 800 mils; r and x to get on the line when T is less than 800 mils; x to stay on the line.

Try It and See. It may be pointed out that the above factors, based solely on T , eliminate one of the factors formerly required but often difficult for the observer to obtain—large R . The present artillery observer who shoots 90% of the fires is not one at an OP, but the observer who travels, eats, and lives with the infantry. Traveling with the infantry rifle company on the battlefield, he has no room for plotting scales. Even his map is an abbreviated affair which he can stick in his shirt to keep dry. Such a size map is usually all target area, or at best the artillery position area is folded underneath, so that determination of large R is never easy and sometimes impossible. (Try spreading out 5,000 yards of 1/25,000 map to determine R , with a burp gun spraying from the next patch of woods.) Moreover, the artillery observer living with the infantry company has good contact with the infantry but

much less contact with his artillery battalion. Consequently, he quite frequently shoots a battery the location of which has changed since he last knew about it. Large R is a complete unknown to him. By eliminating the necessity for it, we have simplified his problem.

Of the remaining factors—small r and T —the first presents no problem. The second, the observer can usually estimate or shoot in with sufficient accuracy to make his factors work. Using the following procedure, he can determine his T from the first two rounds fired in any given position of observer and guns:

1. After the first round lands, sense for range only, using a multiple of 100 yards.

2. When the second round lands, measure the deviation between the two rounds.

3. Express this deviation in yards, using the mil relation and small r .

4. Multiplying this deviation in yards by 10 and dividing by the range bound commanded (expressed in hundreds of yards) gives the angle T in

that portion of the target area.

Derivation:

$$d \text{ (mils)} = 1/10T/r$$

$$T = 10 \, dr$$

dr is simply d expressed in yards,
or, from figure above, dx

$$T = 10 \, dx$$

Now the d , above, is by definition the deviation observed for a range bound of 100 yards. Therefore, if a range bound of more than 100 yards is made, we must divide the deviation observed by the range bound (as in 4, above) to secure the value d for the equation. To express the whole procedure simply, T equals 10 times the deviation observed for a 100-yard range change (deviation being expressed in yards). We have now reduced all factors the observer needs for adjustment to ones which he can determine solely by the use of his eyes and his field glasses. Large maps and bothersome scales are eliminated. After the initial target designation, he can keep his attention concentrated where it belongs—the target area.

Q.E.D. In summary, the principle of bracketing the target still remains the basic one in artillery adjustment. The cumbersome method of conduct of fire is not a basic principle, however, but only a means to accomplish bracketing. Acknowledging the limitations of the FO adjustment principle, we can still apply the method advantageously to all types of fire adjustment. Deriving an appropriate set of factors, we end up with a technique which retains the basic principle and accuracy but logically removes mental gymnastics from the holocaust of the front line infantry area to the comparative peace and quiet of the artillery position area. And the factors themselves are easier and more practicable for the observer to determine.

AIR OP CAUSES TROUBLE

Extract from History of the German Air Force in Italy

As German troops on the ground were finding the Allied air-controlled artillery extremely trying, Commander-in-Chief SW was continually urging offensive action against the artillery spotters. The GAF as consistently pointed out the uselessness of shooting down such aircraft, often at the expense of a fighter, since they were immediately replaced. Whereas the exact location of Allied spotters around the bridgehead was conveyed by telephone, from the Commanding General's headquarters to the relevant fighter unit, at least 25 minutes would elapse before a fighter arrived on the scene, by which time the spotter had either already completed his mission or had moved off to another area. Furthermore, it took an experienced pilot to bring down these spotters, which kept at between 300 and 2,000 feet. Avoiding as far as possible the concentrated light AA which the Allies put up, he had to approach at low level so as to have the spotter silhouetted against the sky, and open fire as soon as he came within range of his quarry. No maneuvering was possible, and there was no question of a second chance.

On occasion advanced GAF mobile fighter-control points sent out "spoof" messages suggesting impending fighter activity, which would cause the artillery spotters to be recalled, or put them off their stroke. Nevertheless 15 Me 109's were lost, with 7 pilots killed, for the shooting down of 8 Allied spotters.



Artillery forward observers of the 4th Infantry Division call for and correct fire missions in a forward observation post in the Prum Valley, Germany.

DENNIS' COURT-MARTIAL

—A Short Soldier Story

BY COL., R. E. ANDERSON, FA

IN THE days of prohibition, enlisted men drank as much as the officers or anyone else. They simply had to be careful where and when they drank, especially if they expected to drink enough to do them any good—enough so they could forget their troubles, do a little swashbuckling, singing, and perhaps a little clean fighting, without getting caught and sent to the guardhouse.

The safest place for a beer party, therefore, was off the post. At West Point, Dennis Maher, a very convivial individual, was always ready for a party of any kind. One Sunday

Known affectionately as *Marty* by uncounted thousands of officers and graduates, Sergeant Martin Maher has served at West Point for over fifty years. He probably knows more Army officers than any other person, in or out of the Army. Retired in 1928 after more than thirty years' service. Marty continued on thereafter as an employee of the Army Athletic Association, with duties unchanged—namely, the custodian of the cadet gymnasium and assistant instructor in swimming. He is still very much on the job, and—himself, the hero of a thousand anecdotes—Marty still holds all records for side-splitting yarns about West Point, "me brothir Dinny," and every prominent graduate of the last half century. Yes, Marty Maher has become as much a part of the West Point tradition as Benny Havens or Flirtation Walk.—*Editor*.



afternoon Dennis was instrumental in

arranging a party that had all the earmarks of being safe. They would borrow a boat from the Engineers and cross the Hudson River to Constitution Island, taking with them great quantities of beer. Or, better yet, Dennis decided, they would invite the sergeant from Engineers to go along and let *him* get the boat.

Most of this worked out as planned, but the trip over by a group of sober men in a boat was not the same as the trip back by a group of men full of beer! Corporal Shane became obsessed with a sense of reincarnation, and that, coupled with an easily understood association of ideas, persuaded him that the appropriate thing to do was to portray Washington Crossing the Delaware. As they neared the West Point shore, Shane gravely arose, and, as he started to cross his arms, fell noiselessly into the Hudson. The other men did not realize the unfortunate denouement of Shane's tableau until almost too late. Shane was pulled from the water, but in such bad shape that a pulmotor was needed in bringing him to. The entrance of the hospital crew into the picture made an official matter of the incident and the inevitable investigation came along.

The result was that Dennis, who was the senior sergeant, was tried by court-martial on various charges, one of which was that he had made no effort to save a fellow soldier from drowning.

At the trial, it developed that Dennis' defense against the latter part of the charge was that he could not do anything toward rescuing the man because he could not swim. The Judge Advocate was indignant at this line of defense and felt that it was an easy matter to refute Dennis' statements by bringing Dennis' own brother, Marty, on the stand to testify to the fact that Dennis *could* swim. The following is the testimony given by Sergeant Marty Maher, after he had been sworn:

Q. State your full name, rank, organization and station.

A. Martin Maher, Sergeant, Service Detachment, West Point, New York.

Q. Do you know the accused? If so, state who he is.

A. Yes sir. Sergeant Dennis Maher, Service Detachment, West Point, New York.

Q. How long have you known the accused?

A. Thirty-one years, sir.

Q. Is the accused any relation to you?

A. Yes sir, brother.

Q. Do you know if your brother can swim?

A. No sir, I do not.

Q. You state that you have known this man for 31 years and that you are his brother, and still you do not know if he can swim?

A. Yes sir. That's correct, sir.

Q. What is your duty at West Point?

A. I am in charge of the Cadet Gymnasium.

Q. Is there a swimming tank in the gymnasium that you take care of?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What are the dimensions of this tank?

A. It is a very fine tank, sir, about fifty yards long and twenty yards wide

Q. How deep is this tank?

A. It varies from about two feet at the shallow end to fourteen feet at the deep end.

Q. Did you ever see your brother in this tank?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How long at a time have you seen your brother in this tank?

A. Oh, up to three hours at a time sir.

Q. What part of the tank have you seen your brother in?

A. All parts of the tank, sir.

Q. Now, Sergeant Maher, you are willing to state that the tank is about twenty yards by fifty yards and varies in depth from two feet to fourteen feet and that you have seen your brother in all parts of the tank for as long as three hours at a time, and are you still willing to state, under oath, that you do not know if your brother can swim.

A. Yes sir. That's correct, sir.

Q. Sergeant Maher, will you please state to the Court how this can be possible — how you can possibly justify such a statement under oath?

A. It's very simple, sir. You see, Dennis is not always a sergeant. He is quite often reduced to grade of private and you see, sir, the only time I ever saw Dennis in the tank was when it was empty and he, as a private, was scrubbing the bottom of it.

* * *

VERDICT: *Not guilty*.

Artillery Conference at the Field Artillery School

COMMITTEE studies and recommendations which will have an important bearing on future developments in artillery were completed at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on March 29th. Artillerymen from both hemispheres (see cuts and roster of conferees accompanying this article) attended the two-week sessions of the Artillery Conference, which was sponsored by Army Ground Force Headquarters.

Headed by General Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, the conferees included over twenty general officers and approximately one hundred representatives from Army installations in all theaters, as well as foreign officers and representatives of the Navy and Marine Corps.

The first week of the conference, March 18-23, was devoted to field demonstrations of artillery materiel, operational technique, and to scientific lectures and discussions. The second week, March 25-29, was devoted to committee study, summarizing results and conclusions growing out of the conferences and demonstrations.

The conference was opened Monday, March 18, by Major General Louis E. Hibbs, commandant of the Field Artillery School, who observed that the gathering would be the source of "valuable evaluations of combat experience and recommendations which will have a great bearing on the decisions made by the War Department on questions affecting organization and equipment of field artillery in the post-war Army."

The first of a series of practical demonstrations was conducted Tuesday, March 19th, by the Department of Gunnery, headed by Colonel Lewis E. Griffing. Four targets were designated, all of them deep caves blasted out of solid granite and similar in style to the Japanese caves encountered by our troops in the Pacific.

Pin-point shooting by forward observer methods was employed to close the mouths of the caves by shattering the rock about the entrances. The latest self-propelled artillery weapons were used in this

This "reporter" type account of the recent Artillery Conference at the Field Artillery School will be followed, in an early issue, by an objective appraisal of the purposes and accomplishments of the Conference. Credit is due the Public Relations Office at the Field Artillery School not only for the contents of this article but also for the accompanying pictures.—Editor.

demonstration, including the highly mobile 155-mm howitzer, the 155-mm gun, the 8-in howitzer and the 240-mm howitzer. (See cut.) Neither the 8-in nor 240-mm self-propelled howitzers saw combat service in World War II.

Wednesday morning's program opened with a lecture on "Jet and Rocket Propulsion: Guided Missiles" by Dr. H. J. Stewart of the California Institute of Technology. Later the same day Colonel J. P. Eckert discussed the general activities of the Field Artillery Service Test Section, Army Ground Forces Board No. 1, which is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. (See page 210, THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, April, 1946, for an article discussing the organization of the three Army Ground Forces Boards.) Other speakers

included Colonel T.B. Hedekin, who discussed "Rocket Development," and Lieutenant Colonel G. G. Garton, who spoke on "Test of Guns and Carriages." Both officers are from Army Ground Forces Board No. 1. Wednesday afternoon's demonstrations included the use of the V-T (proximity) fuze, and illustrated revised forward observer procedure.

Thursday morning's lecture program was led off by a discussion of electronics by Dr. W. A. McNair of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. He was followed by General Devers, Army Ground Force Commander, who greeted the conferees and outlined certain current Army-wide developments of interest to artillerymen. In the afternoon, the role played by aircraft in artillery operations was highlighted in several demonstrations. Among other things, the Brodie device, by means of which the famed artillery "grasshopper" planes can take off from the decks of seagoing LSTs or from jungle areas without ground contact, was shown to the visiting officers and its purpose, employment and installation were discussed. (See page 201, THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, April, 1946.)

Other aerial applications to artillery which were demonstrated included: emergency resupply by liaison type aircraft;

Wire laying by helicopter was one of the new developments demonstrated to the Conferees. The latest self-propelled weapons were also displayed and fired. Shown here, from front to rear, are the self-propelled 240-mm and 8-inch howitzers and the 155-mm gun.





Major General Louis E. Hibbs (left), the Commandant of the School, greets General Jacob L. Devers, Army Ground Force Commander, and Major General Clarence R. Huebner, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Army Ground Forces, at Post Field.

dropping of illuminating flares from liaison aircraft for night observation; wire laying by liaison aircraft and by helicopter; air fire power, as shown by 16 "P-51s" and 6 "A-26s" strafing, rocket firing, precision bombing and skip bombing.

In the concluding demonstration on Thursday's program, aircraft gave the artillery and infantry a "lift" in softening up the resistance area for the main ground attack in a demonstration of air-ground force liaison.

A parachute rifle company, supported by two 75-mm field artillery sections,

simulated an attack designed to neutralize hostile resistance, paving the way for the landing of a regimental combat team. A total of 250 parachutists, members of a School Troops battalion from the Airborne School at Fort Benning, participated in the demonstration which brought to the conferees the latest techniques employed in such coordinated efforts. The Ninth Troop Carrier Command from the Greenville Army Air Base carried the parachute and glider riflemen and artillery pieces into the demonstration, utilizing four Douglas C-47 and eleven

Curtis C-46 transport planes and two CG-4A gliders.

The carrier command also demonstrated its technique of making "snatch" pickup off the ground of a glider bearing simulated wounded.

Friday morning television equipment and its application for artillery purposes was demonstrated. Conferees observed activities on a screen in a closed room while a plane transmitted objects and shell bursts on the ground from the target area. The use of radar in the adjustment of artillery fire, location of hostile artillery pieces and detection of vehicular movement was also demonstrated. Friday night the conferees were shown illuminating flares, illuminating shells and "artificial moonlight" searchlights for night observation. Saturday afternoon's session featured discussion, display and firing of new types of weapons, small arms, mortars, rockets, recoilless and self-propelled.

The second and concluding week of the conference, March 25-29, was devoted entirely to committee study, presentations, round table discussions and the preparation of final committee reports on artillery organization, equipment, new developments and techniques.



Group picture of the Conferees taken on the steps of McNair Hall.

ROSTER OF CONFEREES AND COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

Present for short periods during Conference

Gen. Jacob L. Devers
Maj. Gen. Elbridge G. Chapman
Maj. Gen. R. L. Frederick (CAC School)
Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor
Col. John A. Dabney
Col. Chas. R. Revie
Col. Robert H. Van Volkenburgh

Coordinating Committee

Brig. Gen. Edward S. Ott
Col. Alfred E. Kastner
Col. Cornelis de W. Lang
Col. Dale E. Means
Unassigned to Committees
Maj. Gen. Geo. P. Hays
Maj. Gen. Louis E. Hibbs
Maj. Gen. Stafford LeR. Irwin
Brig. Gen. Chas. G. Helmick
Brig. Gen. Guy O. Kurtz
Col. Carlos C. Brewer

Organization Committee

Brig. Gen. Chas. E. Hart (Chairman)
Col. Robert H. Adams
Col. James F. Ammerman
Col. Harold T. Brotherton
Col. Kermit LeV. Davis
Col. Wm. P. Ennis
Col. Robert F. Hallock
Col. Lukas E. Hoska
Col. George M. Jones
Col. R. Ramey
Lt. Col. Wm. W. Beverley
Lt. Col. Robert F. Cassidy
Lt. Col. Halstead C. Fowler
Lt. Col. J. N. Green
Lt. Col. Stacy W. Gooch
Major James B. Green
Major W. R. Orr

New Developments Committee

Brig. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey (Chairman)
Col. W. S. Alexander
Col. Chas. C. Brown
Col. E. L. Brudick
Col. John P. Eckert
Col. Bryan Evans
Col. Louis T. Heath
Col. Thomas B. Hedekin
Col. Maurice K. Kurtz
Col. Walter T. O'Reilly
Col. Peter S. Peca
Col. Thomas L. Sherburne
Col. Galen M. Taylor
Lt. Col. J. R. Brindley
Lt. Col. D. T. Slaughter
Lt. Col. Robert H. Van Volkenburgh, Jr.
Major R. H. Kabe
Major Harold V. Mackey
Capt. Donald R. Lyon

Technique Committee

Brig. Gen. James F. Brittingham (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. Wm. N. Gillmore
Brig. Gen. Harlan N. Hartness
Col. Stanley Bacon
Col. J. A. Bemis, USMC
Col. Wm. C. Bullock
Col. Rex E. Chandler
Col. Hugh Cort
Col. Theodore L. Futch
Col. Haydon Y. Grubbs
Col. Wm. C. Huggins
Col. Russell L. Mabie
Col. James R. Pritchard
Col. J. S. Theimer
Capt. J. M. Taylor, USN
Lt. Col. Paul Clark
Lt. Col. J. F. Eason
Lt. Col. Frederick W. Hasselback
Lt. Col. Walter E. Kraus
Lt. Col. Joseph R. Reeves
Lt. Col. Claude L. Shepard
Lt. Col. Lewis D. Vieman
Lt. Col. D. M. Weller, USMC
Major C. A. Ott

Equipment Committee

Brig. Gen. Wyburn D. Brown (Chairman)
Col. Louis V. Hightower
Col. Ralph R. Mace
Col. R. J. Meyer
Col. Norman E. Poinier
Col. Geo. D. Wahl
Col. Wm. R. Woodward
Lt. Col. G. M. Brown
Lt. Col. Robert M. Burnett
Lt. Col. Emmette Y. Burton
Lt. Col. Geo. G. Garton
Lt. Col. J. C. Rosborough
Lt. Col. Alexander J. Stuart
Lt. Col. L. P. VanCourt
Major Harold M. Brown
Capt. H. F. Goetz
Capt. R. W. McCartney

British Army

Maj. Gen. Otto M. Lund
Col. G. Cole
Col. Peter Gregson
Col. H. A. Maconochie
Brigadier Jack Parham
Lt. Col. P. Tower

Canadian Army

Brigadier J. P. Morrison
Col. J. S. Ross
Major J. W. McClennan



OF MORE THAN PASSING INTEREST

Happy Birthday. The 5th FA Bn, oldest Army unit on active status, celebrated its 170th birthday on 1 March. Organic to the 1st Infantry Division, the 5th FA Bn is now in Germany.

Mike and Ike. Optional at present, by 30 June 1948 officers and enlisted men alike will wear the battle jacket and slacks now worn by enlisted men. Insignia of rank, alone, will differentiate officers from enlisted men.

CAC School to Move. Orders have been issued for the movement of the Coast Artillery School from Fort Monroe, Virginia, to Fort Winfield Scott, California.

Down the Totem Pole. The field grade demotion program is in full swing, with the first 500 colonels now being reduced. Officers are being demoted according to date of temporary rank, commencing with the most junior. Non-regulars declining to accept the reduction will be declared surplus and will be separated from the Service. Regulars declining the reduction revert at once to their permanent rank.

Loved and Left Unhappy. At least 8,000 war brides and children of American servicemen are stranded overseas and cannot be brought to the United States unless or until the husbands and/or fathers concerned make written request for transportation.

Extension Courses. The FAS has instituted a new Department of Extension Courses. Unlike pre-war days, the School will not only prepare the courses but will also administer them. Three sub-courses have already been prepared, and 43 more are expected to be added within the next 18 months. An enrollment of 11,000 artillery extension students is contemplated during the fiscal year 1946-47. Initial courses are expected to be ready for students by 1 July.

Buzz Bomb Test. A number of German V-2 rocket bombs are now undergoing test by the Ordnance Department at White Sands, New Mexico. Experimental firing will extend over a period of two months. No visitors, without prior clearance from Hq, AGF.

Night Ride Through Krautland with Artillery Pointing the Way

By 1st Lt. Milton M. Meisels, FA

THE LONG heralded drive to Cologne had gathered momentum. Duren had been captured; the armor had shaken loose from the Ruhr river bridgehead, swiftly crossed the Erft Canal, and as the shadows lengthened on 2 March 1945, the tanks of the Third Armored Division were snuggled up amongst the houses of Fliesteden (see map, opposite page), a cobbled hamlet about 15 kilometers from Cologne. The enemy's line had been pierced in many places. His communications had been rendered chaotic and the outlook from his point of view was definitely unfavorable.

Perilous Mission. That was the situation when the late Lt. Col. Prentice (Iron Mike) Yeomans¹ called an officers' meeting in back of a barn just south of Fliesteden, around which the tanks and vehicles of his 83d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion were deployed. Maps were quickly passed around and the rotund and effervescent Colonel Yeomans was obviously keenly aware of the successes of the last few days and the importance of the mission he was about to assign to his outfit.

"Gentlemen, our mission tonight is to capture Pittsburgh, which you can see from your maps is only 3 kilometers from the Rhine river."

The sound of the word *Pittsburgh* gave more than one officer a sudden nostalgia, but a glance at the map showed that this was only the code name for Hackhausen, a small village by the side of a forest about 8 kilometers deep in enemy territory.

Colonel Yeomans continued. "As far as we know the Krauts haven't got much out there. The towns of Stommeln, Pulheim, and Sinnersdorf haven't been taken yet, and there may or may not be strong garrisons in those places. The order of march will be Able Co.,

followed by Baker and Dog Cos. Only the tanks will make the attack while the rest of the vehicles will remain in Fliesteden. Drivers will stay with their vehicles; the rest of the men will go dismounted. The route of advance will be cross-country most of the way. Our mission is to cut through to Hackhausen, which will put us astride the Krauts' line of supply and cut off a large number of them. Remember the mission, and try to avoid getting into any unnecessary skirmish with enemy forces which may appear in the vicinity of those towns along the way.

"Everybody pick up his map and follow the planned route. The first intermediate objective is *Ref. Pt. 27*, which lies about halfway between *Brooklyn* and *Hoboken*, where the railroad and highway 1 converge. Able Co. will take this point and Baker Co. followed by Dog Co. will move out immediately from there towards *Ref. Pt. 59*, which is large farmhouse on highway 2 about midway between *Brooklyn* and *Boston*. Able Co. will fall into the rear of the column and Dog Co. will head for *Ref. Pt. 47*, which is a small estate called Mutzerath. From 47 Able Co. will again take the lead with *Ref. Pt. 63*, the Hasselrath estate, as the objective. Then Baker Co. will take the lead all the way to *Pittsburgh*. Give the woods to the north a wide berth and

A graduate of the University of Wisconsin, Lieutenant Meisels was inducted into the Army as a Private in June, 1942. He received his commission via the OCS route in January, 1943, trained with the 8th Armored Division in the United States, and went overseas as a replacement officer in the summer of 1944. In combat, he served as a tank forward observer in the 83d Armored FA Bn and was attached to the reconnaissance elements of the 3d Armored Division during its last two campaigns. Lieutenant Meisels was awarded the Silver Star, the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart.

there may be some trouble getting across Pletsch creek, but there should be a way. Use your own judgment about going into *Pittsburgh*; either go into straight up the road or enter westward from the fields. The executive offices² will be in direct charge of the operation, and the time for crossing the IP, which is the main crossroads in Fliesteden, is 2030. Are there any questions?"

The assembled officers remained silent. These men of the reconnaissance well knew the perils of a night foray into Krautland. With tanks, the division band might just as well come along too. The chances of moving undetected seemed remote with these asthmatic monsters coughing and spitting all the time. And it was a well-known fact that tanks draw fire like syrup draws flies. Thus it was that there was not undue enthusiasm among the junior officers for this clandestine mission.

Plenty of Ammo. Finally a question was asked. "What about the artillery, sir?"

"We have the 83d Armored Field Artillery Bn. in direct support. The Battalion Commander³ tells me that there is plenty of ammo on hand. There will be a regular artillery observer attached to each company, with a tank of his own. I want these observers to shoot, shoot, and shoot. We're going to have strong artillery support."

"What is going on around us, Colonel?"

"The situation, as the papers like to say, is fluid. The Fourth Cavalry is on our left. They'll clean out the woods to the north and work toward *Chicago*. Where their leading elements are at this moment, I cannot say. On our right are the big task forces of the Third Armored Division which have Cologne as their objective. Our mission is really a reconnaissance in force to provide flank protection for the big drive on Cologne. If there are no further questions we'll call the meeting over and good luck to you all."


The officers quickly folded up their notebooks, scanned their maps for a moment, and strode off to relay the "poop" to their men.

Snafu at IP. Twilight was fading into darkness as the first tanks rumbled ominously down the main street of

¹Killed in action during the last days of the war while leading the 83d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion on the approaches to Dessau.

²Lt. Col. (then Major) William A. Bradley.

³Lt. Col. Robert Harvey



Fliesteden with the heavily-laden foot soldiers ambling along on both sides, with that singular American gait. It was at that moment that the words of Robert Burns, about the "well laid plans of mice and men," were never more clearly illustrated. There was snafu at the IP. Instead of turning left at the IP, as per directions, the column continued straight ahead on the road to Cologne. It is not the purpose of this article to place the responsibility on anyone, but it may be said to the credit of the men that a jeep was dispatched forward, that the column was turned around, and that the advance north on highway 3 was accomplished without the loss of too much time.

At approximately *Ref. Pt. 11* the column veered right towards, it was hoped, *Ref. Pt. 27*. The night was as black as the bottom of a well, and the moon was not due to rise until early morning. Dark heavy rain clouds hung low and the numerous fires which herald the arrival of war blazed about the horizon. All was silent save the clank of steel tracks against the driving sprocket and the hum of motors which the drivers were making a determined effort to keep as low as humanly possible. To the men walking single-file on either side these noises were like the roar of breakers crashing on the beach.

Bolts click. Suddenly the column stopped and motors were automatically switched off. The turrets traversed left as if pulled by a single string. Infantrymen lay down quietly on the turf and there was a click of bolts up and down the line. From the left there could be heard the sounds of moving men. There were a few muffled shouts in an unfamiliar tongue. Some of the men whispered that they thought they could see something out there. But that was doubtful as in such a state of excitement one easily sees what is preying on the mind. Minutes passed and the distant sounds receded into the darkness. Not a single man succumbed to trigger-happiness, and that was well, considering the nature of the mission.

Recon. by Fire. At the head of the column Major Bradley and several of the junior officers were alternately staring

off into the darkness and consulting their pocket compasses. There was quite a difference of opinion as to the location of *Ref. Pt. 27*, as compasses are notoriously untrustworthy in the vicinity of tanks and the accuracy of our maps often left much to be desired.

"I'd like to know exactly where 27 is," spoke Major Bradley, "as I don't want to drift too close to *Hoboken*."

"I think I can show you exactly where it is, sir." Speaking was 2nd Lt. James Nichols, highly-regarded observer of the 83d Field Artillery Battalion and recently the recipient of a battlefield commission. "Let me throw a few rounds of white phosphorous out there on 27."

"OK, Nick, let's see what you can do," the Major replied.

Lt. Nichols hopped back into his tank and within a matter of moments had contacted his FDC. The message was sent . . . "Fire Mission, Fire Mission. Request several rounds of William-Peter on *Ref. Pt. 27*. Over."

In about a minute FDC replied . . . "On the way." A 105 howitzer grunted in the rear. Heads followed the path made by the whine of the shell in the sky. About 1,000 yards ahead there appeared a flash, followed by a large plume of luminous smoke, which rose slowly and spread out at the base. Two more rounds fell in about the same place and Lt. Nichols gave the cease fire order.

"That's where we're going," ordered Major Bradley.

The tank motors hummed once again and the unit proceeded directly towards the billowing smoke. Soon they reached the railroad line at about the point where it converged with highway 1 and everyone realized that artillery had proved an effective and practical substitute for the compass. Reconnaissance by artillery fire became the motif for the rest of the night.

Major Bradley's small task force turned northward while Lt. Nichols repeated his performance. The flash of the first round outlined the farmhouse at *Ref. Pt. 59*; and like beagle hounds after picking up the scent, the tanks moved perceptibly faster. Baker Co. passed through Able Co. at 59 and turned north

from highway 2. Major Bradley knew exactly what he wanted for this leg of the trip, and he ordered his observer to throw some smoke and HE on *Ref. Pt. 47* as the unit moved. The first round of smoke revealed the small estate of Mutzerath the observer then made small shifts to keep the fire in that general area while Baker Co. made for its objective. Upon approaching within several hundred yards of Mutzerath the fire was lifted and the outfit moved in, taking several prisoners out of the basement.

The successful formula was then repeated. This time Lt. Wesley McDonald, of the 83d FA Bn., adjusted fire on *Ref. Pt. 63*, which was the Hasselrath estate, and the recon troops drove in quickly behind the artillery to seize several more of the enemy without a struggle. From here Baker Co. again went to the front and the fires of the 83d FA Bn. pointed the way to *Ref. Pt. 75* like a beacon to a lost ship. Light concentrations of artillery were kept continually falling into the edge of woods to the north, to screen the movement towards *Ref. Pt. 75*.

Pounding Pittsburgh. Pletsch creek was crossed at approximately *Ref. Pt. 89* and it did not prove to be the obstacle that it was feared it might be. A few rounds were pooped into the Kurth estate, *Ref. Pt. 33*, and the outfit moved in. Intelligence from the prisoners taken revealed that there was a large garrison in *Pittsburgh*, and Major Bradley requested that that town be hit heavily. Lt. Nichols established an OP on the top floor of the Kurth place and obliged by raining artillery on *Pittsburgh* for about a full hour. Then, after a particularly heavy barrage, the tanks and men moved straight up highway 3 into the town.

On the Rhine. At about 0400 Lt. James Gasvotta, of the 83d Armd. Rcn. Bn., was given the mission of taking a small patrol to the Rhine. Covered by artillery fire to the north, he reached that historic waterway and reported that none of the enemy were encountered. The men either went to sleep or made coffee.

Colonel Yeomans sent his historic message, "We are on the Rhine . . . Rodger, Over, and Out."

Report On The United Nations

By Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Republished by courtesy of THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

American soldiers are becoming increasingly aware of the vital importance of their keeping abreast of the rapid surge of events in the field of international relations.

THE faith placed in the United Nations by the people of the 51 countries whose representatives signed the Charter at San Francisco has been more than justified in London by the accomplishments of the first meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

This first gathering was primarily conceived as an organizational meeting at which the principles of the Charter would be translated into the actualities of a functioning international organization.

Actually we found ourselves confronted with a two-fold problem: the actual establishment of the organization with the vast mass of procedures involved; and the discussion of substantive problems which cut across the regular agenda to provide the first tests as to whether or not the United Nations was a workable mechanism.

The United Nations has met its responsibilities in both respects. An organization has been created, and constructive consideration given to the urgent political and economic problems brought before its first meetings. Discussion was vigorous and open. This was true not only of the General Assembly but equally so of the Security Council. There was much plain speaking, and each nation expressed forcefully its point of view. The large measure of agreement that was reached can be judged by the many constructive results achieved.

A great achievement, beyond mere terms of organization, was the establishment by unanimous agreement of the Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy. The Secretary of State, with the collaboration of the statesmen of the other members of the Big Five and Canada, achieved this objective

when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted without change the draft resolution on the control of atomic energy.

At the Assembly plenary session which considered the resolution, Secretary Byrnes urged the nations to "see that the world ceases to be an armed camp." He warned that "the problems presented by the discovery of atomic energy and of other forces capable of mass destruction cannot be solved by any one nation. They are the common responsibility of all nations and each of us must do our part in meeting them."

The commission, composed of representatives of the 11 members of the Security Council and Canada, must set to work on this problem "with the utmost dispatch" and make recommendations to the Security Council. Specific proposals they will make concern: (A) Extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; (B) Control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes; (C) Elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and (D) Effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

It was natural that after the passage of the atomic energy resolutions the center of public interest turned to the dramatic problems which were placed on the agenda of the Security Council almost from the first day that Council was established. In consequence, less spectacular but nevertheless basic work of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council has often been overlooked; to say nothing of the important election jointly conducted by the Security Council and Assembly of

the fifteen judges of the International Court of Justice, one of whom is Mr. Green Hackworth, the distinguished Legal Adviser of the Department of State for so many years.

I should like to sketch briefly the accomplishments of the General Assembly. Here, working in six main committees with several ad hoc committees for specific problems, the Assembly, by the democratic process of ballot and debate, and functioning much as does our own Congress by preparatory work in committees, disposed of a large amount of important business.

A major problem was the question of securing more effective support from governments for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association. On this issue the Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by the distinguished Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Representative Sol Bloom. This resolution set up a subcommittee which would seek to ensure that members of UNRRA which, unlike the United States, have not already taken action to do so, will meet promptly the obligations they have assumed toward UNRRA. It would also encourage the admission to UNRRA of those members of the United Nations who have not already joined UNRRA.

A resolution jointly sponsored by the five great powers and unanimously adopted by the Assembly of the United Nations recognized the threat of famine in the world resulting from the failure of rice crops in the extreme East and wheat crops elsewhere and called upon the governments concerned to take

Messrs. Bevin and Stettinius at the Security Council Table.





The American Delegation at the opening session of the General Assembly. (Photos "Daily Sketch.")



The American Delegation to the United Nations Conference at London, left to right: Mr. John Foster Dulles, Representative Sol Bloom, Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Stettinius, Secretary of State Byrnes, Senator Conally, Mrs. Roosevelt, Mr. Frank Walker, ex-Senator Townsend.



Mr. Stettinius confers with the Russian Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs Andrei Vyshinsky while Foreign Minister Bevin ponders his notes.

drastic action to meet the crisis. In support of this resolution on the floor of the Assembly I said: "The United States supports the pending resolution wholeheartedly."

"It welcomes and supports the proposal of the Food and Agriculture Organization to call a conference on the food crisis at the earliest possible moment."

"The United States believes the adoption of these measures will demonstrate to the world the intention of the members of the United Nations to act together vigorously and promptly for the survival and welfare of men and women and children—of individual human beings."

"That is the underlying purpose that has brought us together in the United Nations."

"That is the overriding factor that cut across every conflict of national interest and every political question which has been brought before this Assembly or the Security Council."

I believe that the fact that the Security Council dealt with the four intricate international problems which were given it to consider even before it had completed its own organization, including its rules of procedure, gave the Council more strength in its infancy than any of us had dared to hope it would acquire so soon. The discussions were conducted with the utmost frankness and in the presence of the press and public. They were a severe test for a newly-born organization. Some of you may have been disturbed by reports of conflicts from London. There were sharp conflicts. This was to be expected. Members pressed their own views strongly and frankly. Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Bevin, for example, spoke on opposite sides of some of these issues in the same terms as two representatives of opposing parties would expect to speak on the issues that come up daily in Congress or a state legislature.

I do not believe that open discussion of differences of international interest and viewpoint, always provided that they are carried on in good faith, makes for division and disunity. On the contrary, to deal with disputes and controversial situations is and will be the principal business of the Council.

The presentation of the different

views regarding Iran, Greece, Indonesia and the Levant demonstrated, I believe, that these cases did not involve immediate threats to peace and security.

The "situation in northern Iran," as it was termed, received a full hearing by the Council from both parties to the dispute, the Soviet Union and Iran. The Council decided to leave the matter to direct negotiations between these two governments, following an indication of the desire of both Iran and the Soviet Union to undertake them. At the same time they were requested to apprise the Council of the results achieved and the Council expressed its right "at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations."

In the case of Greece, the Soviet delegate, in expressing his Government's belief that the presence of British troops in that peninsula was a threat to international peace and security, called upon the Council to require the immediate withdrawal of those forces from Greece. In rejecting this demand the British Foreign Secretary called for "a clean bill of health." For our part, early in the discussion I took the stand that in this case the Council could do more to maintain international peace by refraining from direct intervention under the circumstances as explained by the British and Greek governments and by not taking any formal action. This approach was eventually accepted in the form of a statement by the President of the Council, noting the declarations made by its members, a majority of whom had said that they did not believe the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a threat to international peace. The British Foreign Minister, for his part, as also in the similar case of the Indonesian episode, consistently stressed his Government's desire to withdraw its troops.

Nevertheless, the delegate of the Ukraine called the attention of the Security Council to the situation in Indonesia and asked that a commission of investigation be sent to the Netherlands East Indies to determine whether or not the presence of British troops there also was a threat to international peace and security.

I stated that in this Government's opinion the Security Council's power of investigation was not only a useful

instrument but a matter of extreme importance. Although the United States would not wish to limit the use of the right of investigation, it should not be lightly undertaken. Before an investigation was started the Security Council should have reason to believe that continuance of the situation was likely to endanger international peace; an investigation should have a constructive purpose, it should seek to promote a just settlement and to avoid the introduction of new complications.

I went on to add that in neither of the two aspects of the question before the Council, namely the presence and activities of British troops in Indonesia or the relationship between the Netherlands Government and the Indonesians, did an investigation seem justified.

I concluded by saying that the Council should note with satisfaction the statements made by the Netherlands representative as to the policy of his Government with respect to its relations with the Indonesian people, and expressed the hope that the negotiations now in progress would be successful, that the results would be in harmony with the principles of the Charter, and that the legitimate aspirations of the Indonesians to self-government would be realized.

After full discussion the Security Council decided not to take any action in the matter at the present time.

In the case of Syria and Lebanon, after the Levantine delegates had stated their case and asked that the Security Council take steps to bring about the immediate withdrawal of British and French troops, a solution was reached by a method which may afford an important precedent for the future. The American Delegation's position was that we desired to see the withdrawal of the forces of one United Nation from the territory of another United Nation as speedily as circumstances would permit. Accordingly, I presented a resolution to the Security Council expressing its confidence that foreign troops would be withdrawn from Syria and Lebanon as soon as practicable and that without delay negotiations to this end would be undertaken by all the parties concerned. The British and French delegates abstained from voting

on this motion, which received seven votes in favor. It was not adopted, however, because the Soviet Union, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, voted against it. Nevertheless, the two great powers party to the dispute, France and the United Kingdom, indicated that they would act in accordance with the resolution, despite the fact that technically it had failed of adoption. It can be expected, accordingly, that negotiations will be undertaken without delay having as their objective the prompt withdrawal of Anglo-French forces from Syria and Lebanon.

The Economic and Social Council was elected by the General Assembly and established eight principal commissions to carry out its manifold functions. The Economic and Social Council will convoke a preparatory conference next June to pave the way for a world conference on trade and employment and is also convening a United Nations conference to establish an International Health Organization.

Whenever matters relating to non-self-governing territories were under discussion in the General Assembly, our delegation took an active part. The Preparatory Commission had proposed, with our support, that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution calling on the mandatory powers to take practicable steps, in concert with the other States directly concerned, toward the conclusion of trusteeship agreements for the mandated territories. Each of the mandatory powers subsequently made a formal statement of policy before the General Assembly. Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom announced that they were prepared to have the mandated territories under their administration placed under the trusteeship system. The United Kingdom, moreover, declared its intention to take steps in the near future for establishing Trans-Jordan as an independent state. The Union of South Africa reserved its position concerning Southwest Africa until the inhabitants of the territory could be consulted.

In view of these new circumstances, Mr. John Foster Dulles on behalf of our delegation, in the first paper submitted to Committee 4, proposed that

the draft resolution on establishment of the trusteeship system should be expanded to welcome these declarations of intention and to include reference to Chapter XI of the Charter, relating to all non-self-governing territories. In the resolution ultimately adopted by the General Assembly, largely as a result of our leadership, the United Nations not only dealt with trusteeship matters but also expressed its keen awareness of the problems and political aspirations of the non-self-governing peoples not directly represented in the General Assembly,

reminded the Members of their obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter, requested the Secretary-General to include in his annual report a summary of the information transmitted by members administering dependent territories, and expressed the expectation that the realization of the objectives of Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter will make possible the attainment of the aspirations of non-self-governing peoples.

On the much discussed question of the site of the United Nations headquarters, an *ad hoc* committee of the General Assembly approved the recommendation of the interim sub-committee which had visited the eastern United States at the turn of the year and decided that the home of the organization should be in the Westchester-Fairfield area of New York and Connecticut with the interim headquarters in or near New York City. It is my hope and belief that the United Nations will find in the free atmosphere of our country that same amplitude of spirit and scope for growth which gave the United States so rich a spiritual endowment.

Central Hall, London. These are the same United Nations flags that were used at San Francisco.

Below: Left to right around the Council table: Foreign Minister Bevin, Mr. Stettinius, Executive Secretary Jobb, and the President of the Council, Mr. Makin, Minister for War of Australia.



I should not wish to close this account of our stewardship in London without paying tribute to the splendid cooperation, inspired with energy and intelligence, which was given the Secretary of State and me by our fellow delegates: Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Senators Connally and Vandenberg, Representative Sol Bloom, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Mr. Frank Walker and Mr. John G. Townsend, Jr. I should like also to add that the work of the Delegation in London was greatly aided through the tact, experience and wide contacts of a hard-working group of Foreign Service officers who acted as political advisers to the Delegation.* I am also indebted to the expert and indefatigable team of State Department officers who served as technical advisers to the Delegates and, frequently working around the clock, did yeoman service.

Such, in brief, is the story of the United Nations' meeting in London. If in certain cases absolute and sweeping solutions were not found, it is because in most cases and at most times absolute and sweeping solutions are neither possible nor desirable. The relations of states, like the relations of human beings, are a continuing process. They cannot be crystallized or held up in test tubes like scientific exhibits. If I have any conclusion to draw for the Foreign Service, whose aims are identical with those of the United Nations and whose work lies so intimately in the field of international organization, it is to restate a truth I am sure is evident to Foreign Service officers. It was natural and right that in London there was a vigorous interplay of national interest. Nevertheless, I sensed in London, and I was not alone in this feeling, an attitude of responsibility and loyalty not only to the national interest but also to the international interest as expressed in the purposes and activities of the United Nations.

*Editor's note: The following Foreign Service officers were assigned to the Delegation:

Mr. Theodore C. Achilles
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. Cabot Coville
Mr. Gerald Drew
Mr. Dorsey Fisher
Mr. William Fowlet
Mr. Raymond Hare
Mr. Rudolph E. Schoenfeld
Mr. Eric Wendelin
Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson
Mr. George Wadsworth

More on the Massacre at Malmedy

By Kenneth C. Parker

LT. LARY'S article about the massacre at Malmedy (page 80, THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, February, 1946) really started a string of nostalgic memories, despite the horrible experiences there.

On the map the scene of the massacre is designated *Baugnez*. I studied the map of this area many times while writing up the exploits of several officers and men of Company B, 120th Infantry, whose 60-man raiding party discovered the bodies on New Year's Eve.

Incidentally, this road junction was known by everyone in the 1st Battalion as *Five Points*, the same name Lt. Lary gave to the area. In fact, our battalion executive officer described this spot as Five Points to Major General Leland S. Hobbs, 30th Infantry Division Commander, when he dropped in at our CP at Airimont, one of the "small settlements" indicated on your map.

The situation at the time of the General's visit (either 14 or 15 January) was far from social, for our regiment was experiencing extreme difficulties in seizing Thirimont. General Hobbs rebuked the Major immediately by saying: "Five Points? I don't know what you're talking about. Be more explicit."

The first I heard of the massacre was from a Belgian, an old man who had stayed behind to take care of the stone and brick house in snow-covered Airimont, where we lived during the defense phase of the Battle of the Bulge. He spoke French and German, had served in the German army on the Russian Front in the first war, but was a great tooter for the Americans this time, and during our stay never failed to study apprehensively the maps in our copies of the Stars and Stripes.

He told of the massacre by pantomiming "les Americains" with their hands in the air, imitating the sound of a machine gun, clutching his middle and pretending to fall forward. We got the idea all right. It cost us five good men (killed, wounded and missing) on 1 January 1945 to go "down in the valley" and see for ourselves and seize an enemy

In mid-July, 1944, Private Kenneth Parker joined the 30th Infantry Division as a replacement in Company B of the 120th Infantry just in time to participate in the heavy action of the St. Lo breakthrough and at Mortain which followed closely thereafter. Parker remained with the 120th Infantry and was a T/4 in the Headquarters Company of the 1st Battalion when victory came. He adds some interesting sidelights in this short article (extracted from a letter to the Editor) to the story of the horrible massacre at Malmedy, which was told by Lt. Virgil P. Lary, Jr., in the February issue of *The Field Artillery Journal*. Readers will recall (see "Artillery in the Ardennes" in our March issue) that the 30th Infantry Division was playing a most vital role in the decisive Battle of the Bulge at the time of the events described here by Kenneth Parker.—Editor

infantryman near one of the three machine gun nests in the woods about 200 yards south of Five Points.

Sgt. Herman Fisher, an assistant squad leader with one of the raiding platoons on New Year's Eve, later received the DSC for his heroism in remaining behind, while the others withdrew, to guard a wounded buddy. At daybreak he treated the man's wounds and began the laborious task of evacuating him by dragging his body through the snow. He was spotted by enemy snipers as he neared some of the buildings in Baugnez. For a time he sheltered himself and the wounded man behind one of the vehicles that Lt. Lary's unit was forced to abandon. He was unable to get assistance from any of the local inhabitants, since they feared German reprisals. After all, they were living in a kind of No Man's Land more accessible to the enemy than to us and certainly under German observation. He managed to borrow a wheelbarrow, put his charge in it, and wheeled him downhill along the route

marked "not a through road." He came to a marshy area in the valley, which made further progress in this manner impossible. He made the wounded man as comfortable as he could and went on alone for about 800 yards north up the side of the mountainous slope to our nearest outpost. Willing hands got the wounded man out of the wheelbarrow and to an aid station. Unfortunately, this heroic effort came to naught, for the wounded soldier suffered frozen arms and legs as well as a chest wound, and died a few days later in a hospital in Spa.

Five Points was heavily shelled by the Germans during our offensive from 13 through 15 January, but despite the dangerous situation there a Negro quartermaster group removed the bodies of the massacred men during this period.*

On 17 January I said "goodbye" to the old Belgian, promised him that I'd be back some day and that I would look him up. Then I rode in an open jeep down the winding mountain road with its vistas of snow-covered hills and pine trees, which were at once beautiful and deadly, and passed through Five Points on my way south to Thirimont.

I gave the spot a good look, but as is usually the case it failed to match up with my preconceived "map" picture. It belongs with many other previously little-known dots on the map which wars have spotlighted.

*The negro group referred to was a platoon of a First Army graves registration unit, which was itself part of a small task force consisting of Inspectors General personnel, 8 medical officers, the graves registration platoon, and a company of engineers, which was organized and directed personally by Colonel Rosser L. Hunter, the First Army Inspector General. The recovery of the bodies was one part of a thorough investigation of this atrocity which was completed by Colonel Hunter and his assistants. Some 200 individuals—both friendly and enemy—were interviewed; these included many prisoners of war from the 1st SS Panzer Division who were apprehended by placing "stop orders" on their names at all PW cages, both within and without the First Army area. Upon completion and approval, the report of the First Army Inspector General was forwarded to the War Crimes Commission and it is gratifying to be able to report that the offending individuals will soon face trial for this horrible crime.—Editor.



SELDOM WILL THE EDITORIAL PAGE OF this JOURNAL devote itself to a book, best seller or otherwise. An exceptional book, *Top Secret*,* is the exceptional case. To give it less prominence would be unfair to our readers.

Author. Released from active duty last August as a lieutenant colonel, Ralph Ingersoll, the editor of Manhattan's explosive *PM*, promptly sat himself down and wrote an explosive book. Written in an exhilarating and inimitable style, *Top Secret* is superb in those sections where Ingersoll is content to remain the reporter; it founders miserably when Ingersoll attempts the role of military historian and judge of the great events and the great people he tosses about so blithely. Be it emphasized at the outset, however, that *Top Secret* pays high tribute generally to American arms, and particularly to the ground combat soldiers. Created by no individual "great genius," Ingersoll finds that "the invincibility of American arms grew out of the whole American people—our of their brawn, their brain and, for better or worse, their soul."

Unmatched Reporting. Ingersoll's "feel" of the collective state of mind of the American forces in the European theater at various stages of the operations is unmatched elsewhere in print. Outstanding are his interpretations of: the maddening frustration experienced by "high level" American staff officers and commanders when they ran up against a unified British determination *not* to go along with an American idea; the exciting and dreadful inexorableness of the plan OVERLORD (cross-channel assault) in the spring of 1944 in England—too great a thing, as he so rightly observes, either for full comprehension of, or command by, any individual; the assault itself and the "cozy" character of the Normandy lodgement area before Saint Lo; the bitterness of the Falaise gap days and the mad scramble thereafter on to the Siegfried Line; the trying weeks of short supply and the much more trying weeks as our advance slowed, winter approached, and the fighting degenerated into a disheartening slugging match, with casualties mounting. Ralph Ingersoll is at his very best in these sections; more important, they can be read with every confidence that they give an unbiased picture.

**Top Secret*, by Ralph Ingersoll. 373 pp., index Harcourt Brace and Co. \$3.00

Knowledge Can Be Dangerous. Although *Top Secret* betrays certain conspicuous blind spots in his broad World War II experience, Ralph Ingersoll knows a lot about the great people and issues he discusses. These blind spots in his experience bother him not a whit, however, as he rushes sensationally to certain more-than-doubtful conclusion thereby proving again that even considerable knowledge can be a dangerous thing. He went to England with General Devers in the spring of 1943, served as an American observer in Field Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group Headquarters prior to and immediately after the Normand assault, whereupon he joined and remained with the G-3 (Plans) Section of General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group Headquarters. It may be observed in passing that if Ingersoll were as objective in his thinking as such critical staff assignments demand of their incumbents, *Top Secret* would be a great, and not merely an *explosive*, book.

Doubtful Assumption and Pitfall. *Top Secret* has two inherent weaknesses—a doubtful initial assumption and self-made pitfall, into which Ingersoll plummets with arms flailing. Albeit his covering remark on page 56 that he does not seek to debate the relative merits of the American and British approaches to the overall strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe, *Top Secret* screams, from cover to cover, Ingersoll's inflexible bias that what is good *politically* for the British Empire is *axiomatically bad* for the United States, both politically and militarily. True in certain instances—and disregarding here the significant factors that contributed at the time to major strategic decision taken (of which, incidentally, Ingersoll shows no evidence of being aware) the trend of events over the past year since VE-Day gives added emphasis to the doubtful soundness of this assumption. From this questionable starting point Ingersoll leads the unwary reader straight through a fast-moving case to the *dangerously explosive* conclusion that throughout World War II a duped America was led by the British to a head-on collision with the Russians, certain to result in World War III.

Non-explosive in itself, but certainly unfortunate for the reputations of the individuals concerned and confusing to the searcher for the truth, Ingersoll's self-created pitfall is not uncommon; he permits his great loyalty and respect for his boss, General Bradley, to warp his objectivity to the point of minimizing the capabilities of subordinate commanders

and damning wholesale all higher headquarters and commanders. Thus, Ralph Ingersoll finds: (a) General Eisenhower a genial and incompetent "front" man and stooge for General Marshall, himself merely "mildly confused and irritated" during the critical years of 1942 and 1943; (b) Marshal Montgomery a complete villain (among many British villains) as well as being very bad mannered and a very bad general, and (c) General Bradley utterly beyond reproach, as individual or commander. The truth isn't quite that simple.

Incompetents, Villain, and Hero. Ingersoll's brief but shabby treatment of General Marshall is more than unjust. It may be, as *Top Secret* charges, that General Marshall failed to slug hard enough for the power and prestige of the Army Ground Forces during the free-swinging days of the "battle of Washington" in 1942 and 1943. In fact, not a few ground soldiers feel that, to a degree, our leadership sold us "down the river." Be that as it may, objective history will find (and so will Ralph Ingersoll if he ever reads the minutes of the vital meetings of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff) that, far from being "merely confused and irritated," General George Marshall stood out head and shoulders above the other U. S. Chiefs of Staff as an objective minded citizen-soldier and statesman.

Top Secret builds a strong case against General Eisenhower, particularly for his alleged failure to divert at least all the then available American means to Bradley's "winning team" in the early fall of 1944. Not competent objectively to judge Ingersoll's heavy charges against General Eisenhower, this writer tends to discount them sharply, primarily because of his fantastic twisting of the relatively simple facts in the case of the Battle of the Bulge. Possibly his most vindictive attack on General Eisenhower, Ingersoll rests his case on the following: (1) that it was militarily unsound to place the American First and Ninth Armies temporarily under Montgomery's command; (2) that, unsoundly, Montgomery reversed Bradley's plan for the conduct of the battle; (3) that Montgomery hampered the conduct of the fight on the north flank; and (4) that, in any event, the north flank soon "ceased to be a factor in the battle

*** which had been decided, as all the world now knew, at Bastogne." Unworthy of detailed analysis and rebuttal, it is sufficient to state that: first, *the overwhelming weight of qualified and informed military opinion disagrees with Ingersoll on point (1)*; and second, *points (2), (3), and (4) are factually incorrect.* Ingersoll is at his very worst in this section. Apparently utterly ignorant of the facts bearing on the north flank (the main German effort) of the battle, he does an inexcusable injustice not only to Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery but also to many thousands of American soldiers who died fighting the most brutal battle of the war in Europe in one of the *twenty* divisions (Ingersoll refers lightly in passing to "half a dozen") that fought in the First U. S. Army at one time or another during this battle. Less important but nonetheless regrettable is the fact that his garbled treatment of this battle will serve to confuse countless uninformed readers who will gobble up this explosive book. Fortunately for its readers, the March issue of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL carried a splendidly objective article, "Artillery in the Ardennes," which surveyed the Battle of the Bulge from the north (First Army) flank.

The hero of the book, General Omar Bradley, was probably the greatest American field commander in World War II. Further, his military stature will grow with the passing years. For what it may be worth, however, this writer ventures to suggest that a close study of all the facts by military scholars of the future may find that, relatively speaking, General Bradley was at his greatest as a corps or army commander and not as an army group commander. Great though he was, certainly only the naive will credit either him or his headquarters with the unreachable perfection portrayed in *Top Secret*.

Tongue-in-Cheek. Many artillerymen will, and should, read *Top Secret*. Explosive, rather than great, there's still much to be learned from it. The motivating thought here is to caution the reader to keep a level head and tongue-in-cheek, lest he be led far astray by *Top Secret's* unsound and unjustifiable conclusions. D. A.



THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1910 WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTS — AS WORTHY NOW AS THEN

The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

The Field Artillery Journal is not a medium for the dissemination of War Department doctrine or administrative directives. Contributors alone are responsible for opinions expressed and conclusions reached in published articles. Consistent with the objects of our Association, however, the Field Artillery Journal seeks to provide a meeting ground for the free expression of artillery ideas in the changing present.

The



UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

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Panama's Watermelon War

By Ralph Z. Kirkpatrick

FOR OVER three centuries (1523-1855) the infamous transisthmian Cruces Trail saw much tragedy and hardship. This, the oldest of American roads, went back to jungle when the Panama Railroad began operations. In sentiment, at least, it is now back in service, for in April 1943 the Public Roads Administration opened a modern interocean highway in the Canal Zone.

Old vs. New. But how the old and new differ! The 55 miles of Chagres River-Cruces Trail was a grueling 5-day endurance test. One traveled in open river boats, and over a rough cobblestone (and usually very muddy) Spanish road, alternately under a blazing sun and torrential rains. The wayside inns were terrible. On the Trail one walked or bestrode a scrawny mule or pony. There was no other way, be the traveler bishop or goldseeker, soldier or gentle lady, adventurer or business man.

By contrast, the new route is a scenic, all-land, two and one-half hour ride over a deluxe four lane concrete highway of minimum grades and compensated curves, eventually to be a spur of the 3,300 miles of PanAmerican Highway connecting Texas and Panama City. Although later retarded to the original construction pace, work on this road was being rushed, early in World War II, and it then appeared that military traffic would soon be running between the United States and the Canal Zone. With this in mind, radical overhaul of road rules was made in the Zone and Republic of Panama. They dropped their long-used left hand turn and otherwise modernized things. Once so-somnolent Panama is now very internationally cooperative.

Lost in History. Not always was this true. When Panama Railroad traffic superseded the Cruces Trail, the change begot local resentments that developed into an international incident. Historically, the gathering clouds of Civil War in the United States had so

overshadowed the details of the "Watermelon War" that one must search diplomatic documents to find it. But it was front page news at the time! The American and New Granadan (Panama was then a province of New Granada, later called Colombia) ministers withdrew from Bogota and Washington, a real war nearly ensued, and eventually New Granada paid a property damage settlement of \$400,000 to the United States. This was a large sum in those days.

In the afternoon of April 15, 1856, 970 passengers from the SS *Illinois* arrived at the new Panama City Station. They were en route to San Francisco from New York, and had expected to embark directly on the SS *John H. Stephens*. However, the tide was out and although their ship was in plain sight of the depot the ship could not dock for a few hours. So the passengers, with usual tourist curiosity, idled about the station, nearby market, cantinas, and the cheap hotels that had sprung up in that area.

Melon and Knife. A colored fruit vendor and a drunken American quarreled over a ten-cent slice of watermelon. A knife was drawn and a wild pistol shot killed an innocent bystander. In the ensuing excitement the intoxicated American disappeared, but the affair seemed to have touched off what almost appeared to be an organized mobilization. A church bell sounded a general alarm and shortly a mob was attacking every American in sight with machetes, knives, guns, clubs or anything handy. The railroad company, with some difficulty, managed to get a messenger through the rioters, asking help from the Chief of Police and Governor. Soon those officials arrived, together with many police armed with rifles; by this time most of the passengers were in the depot, and two armed men were firing at the mob from an upstairs window; with no more investigation than what their eyes took in as they hurried to the scene of battle, the police joined the rioters. Governor Fabrega looked on passively.

There followed a veritable "night of horror," as it is called in Panama's histories. The unarmed passengers were kicked, hacked and plundered. Baggage, express and mailsacks were broken open and looted. Some mobsters, too well known to risk identification, wore black masks while tearing loose rails, sacking cars, and looting both railroad

Californians! read this through
ATLANTIC & PACIFIC STEAMSHIP CO.
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FORMERLY THE VANDERBILT LINE.



2,500 tons burthen, Capt JONES, will leave from the old established Wharf, Foot of Warren St., North River, 8⁰⁰ FRIDAY, January 20th, 1860, At 2 o'clock, P. M., previously, connecting via Panama Railroad with the new and magnificent Steamship

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Caution to the Public.

Beware of false Ticket Swindlers, bogus Passage Offices, and concerns falsely styling themselves "Mail" Companies. Unless you be on your guard, you will be deceived and defrauded.

8⁰⁰ This is the only line carrying the United States Mails on this route, under contract with the Government.

The NORTHERN LIGHT will succeed the NORTH STAR, leaving New-York 5th February, to connect with the steamship UNCLE SAM.

Before buying your Ticket apply, only, at the OLD ESTABLISHED OFFICE,

No. 177 West Street.

Cor. Warren Street.

Atlantic and Pacific Steamship Company's
handbill of the 1850's.

and private property. Letters, bills and documents were strewn about but the company's safe withstood attack.

Nearby, the railroad's tender *Taboga* was looted of arms and its supplies. The depot, though fired, mercifully failed to burn — therein many women and children were crouching among the seats. In their defenselessness and terror many Americans ran out of town and into the jungle where they spent the night. Others leaped into the bay and swam either to the *Taboga* or to the *Stephens*. At dawn, when the mob's fury had abated somewhat, more responsible citizens slowly took control of affairs. It was several days, however, before the hawking, without molestation from the police, of looted articles ceased on the streets. Complete peace and quiet followed the arrival of American naval vessels. About 20 Americans had been killed and perhaps 100 wounded. An official investigation followed.

Cause and Effect. Perhaps the explanations made by Foreign Secretary Lino de Pombo to Secretary of State Wm. L. Marcy about the affair accurately state the basic resentments and jealousies that had been mounting and came to a focus on the innocent railroad passengers:

"... travelers thronged our territory . . . California made flattering appeals to emigration . . . multitudes of adventurers . . . called for employment and remuneration of our native sons.

"... to get the railroad we gave lands and help with waning success and advantages . . . smoke from locomotives . . . noises of trains . . . yells of passengers . . . exhibitions of wealth . . . immoral, ignorant, quarrelsome, intemperate men, without God other than gold, nor law other than force . . . filibusters . . . disgraces to civilization . . . look with contempt upon Spanish people especially if they have African blood. . . only thoughts are of annexation. . . ."

Certainly the presence of aggressive and overdirect American goldseeker and filibuster transients had given cause for resentment and distrust to the natives. Again slavery was then at high tide in the United States. Colored men in the Caribbean and Central American areas had been freedmen for over a generation.

Yet many of the Americans treated them as slaves.

The new railroad's operation had caused a definite depression among Panama's laboring class. Hundreds of porters, muleteers and boatmen had lost employments they and their forefathers had had for centuries. In other words economic, racial and nationalistic hurts had been accumulating and the explosive hatreds of the ignorant peons and officials were ignited by an insignificant quarrel. The attack on the innocent passengers of the SS *Illinois* was the result.

Eye to Future. Must we anticipate such untoward incidents later when through traffic is an every day matter across America's 3,300-mile Pan-American Highway from Texas to Panama City? Will not the traditions, economics and nationalisms of those seven Latin-American republics be similarly upset by the presence of all types of foreign travelers?

The sure answer is likely the Spanish goodhumored, *quien sabe* (Who can say?). Undeniably the American tourist, albeit unintentionally, says and does wrong things too often when he is away from home. But he is rather well known now in Latin America; mostly he amuses more than he offends. The native usually shrugs it off with a tolerant thought "another crazy Amercano" but he doesn't say it aloud. This is true mostly because now the expression the *El Coloso del Norte* is more often translated "Our Big Northern Colleague" rather than "The Big Northern Bully"; that latter meaning was the current one in the pre-Civil War days of filibustering.

From the standpoint of the economics and nationalism of the seven Latin American countries involved there is no conflict. Each of them have been enthusiastic participants in the construction that is now so nearly finished. It has been a matter of intercountry cooperation and they are using the completed portions now, with satisfaction. Of course they anticipate better markets for their products and rich harvests in sales to the passing parade when through traffic starts.

What a sensible and satisfactory contrast to the interconflicting conditions that caused Panama City's *Watermelon War* of 1856.

POOL OFFICER'S LAMENT

With a mind full of symbols I arrived
at the pool
'Cause I was a "grad" of the
Leavenworth school!
With nary a plan as to what I would
do,
I thought I was set for what might
ensue.

The pool was well filled, to my honest
surprise.
I gaped at its set-up its smoothness, its
size.
There were eagles and oak-leaves—so
polished and grand—
Their owners all ready to meet each
demand.

With a circumspect glance at the other
men near,
My heart flip-flopped in a frenzy of
fear.
It's as plain as the nose on your face to
see
There won't be assignments for new
guys like me.

The management here at the center is
fine.
Everything hews to that straight,
narrow line.
Our quarters are snappy,—there's
even a bar
These "comforts from home" are 'way
above par.

But for almost a month I've been one
of the "sitters"
(I'm getting that ailment the vets call
"the jitters")
I'm tired of seeing the doctors each
day,
Which I've been a-doin' to speed time
away.

My 66-1 says a whole lot of things,
But what is it worth if the praise never
brings
An assignment of value to keep me
alert?
(How long can I pose as both brilliant
and pert?)

If I am not needed to finish this war,
Please make me a "cit" and I'll ask for
no more.
The fact that I've set this lament into
rhyme
Ought to prove beyond doubt I've had
too much of T-I-M-E

Colonel John Lemp, F.A.



For Heroism and Service



BATTLE HONORS'

The 42d FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action during the German counteroffensive 16 to 25 December 1944. The 42d Field Artillery Battalion, functioning in its normal role of direct support of the 12th Infantry Regiment, was responsible for furnishing fire support in its zone of action across a 10-mile front. When, on 16 December, the Germans in overwhelming strength launched their fanatical attack aimed at the city of Luxembourg, thereby threatening Radio Luxembourg, Headquarters Twelfth United States Army Group, and tremendous supply establishments, the 42d Field Artillery Battalion was faced with demands which, except for superior technical ability and undaunted courage, could never have been met. The full strength, highly trained, and completely equipped 212 Volk Grenadier Division attacking in the Combat Team 12 area threatened momentarily to engulf the isolated towns which the understrength, battle-weary infantry manned as strong points. Penetration up to 4 kilometers in depth was made by infiltration groups as large as a battalion in strength and threatened to overrun the command posts and battery positions of the 42d Field Artillery Battalion. Accurate artillery fire in great volume and of all calibers up to 210-mm fell ceaselessly on the battalion command post and howitzer positions and swept all roads in the sector over which reconnaissance parties, wire crews, and supply vehicles were forced to operate. Despite these apparently insurmountable obstacles, the 42d Field Artillery Battalion accomplished its mission in an outstanding manner. Fighting without rest 24 hours a day, the battalion delivered fire in support of the hard-pressed infantry, and, on occasion, its own defense. Observed fire wrought havoc on the attacking Germans. Ceaseless, unobserved fire interdicted their supply routes, river crossings, and approaches to our lines. From skillfully chosen positions, fire from the battalion's howitzers and those of reinforcing and attached units were massed with highly successful effect everywhere on the wide front. The heroic defense of Combat Team 12 was completely successful in protecting vital installations and terrain against a fanatical attack in overwhelming strength. The superb fire support furnished by the 42d Field Artillery Battalion was a decisive factor in determining the results of the action. The superior technical ability and

high courage in the face of tremendous odds demonstrated by the personnel of the battalion, as well as the outstanding success achieved, reflect the highest credit on the armed forces of the United States.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

1st Lt. ALBERT L. KESSLER, FA, 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 2d Armored Division, U. S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations. On 23 November 1944, Lt. Kessler demonstrated extraordinary courage as a forward observer for an 8" howitzer battalion. Throughout the night, in order to destroy enemy positions, Lt. Kessler called for and adjusted fire which landed near his position which was well within the known safety limits from the center of impact. Although his observation post was within one hundred yards of the enemy lines, his persistent devotion to duty and total disregard for personal safety was largely responsible for the destruction of the heavily defended town. The extraordinary heroism and courageous actions of Lt. Kessler reflect great credit upon himself and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service. Entered military service from New Jersey.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

Maj. Gen. ARCHIBALD V. ARNOLD, for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service in the performance of duties of great responsibility during the period October 1944 to July 1945.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM A. CAMPBELL, for exceptionally meritorious service as Acting Assistant Commandant, Command and General Staff School, from August 1944 to September 1945. Under his far-sighted and inspiring leadership, accurate instruction was given to more than 6,000 potential general staff officers by the augmented faculty he organized and trained, imparting up-to-date information essential for the efficient performance of combat, operational and administrative staffs. His supervision of the training given numerous officers of our Latin American allies at the School helped in important measure to further hemispheric solidarity. In addition, he planned and supervised the courses presented to Army-Navy Staff College classes and Philippine Army classes. Responsible for the effectiveness of all instruction given at the School, he performed his duties with outstanding devotion and with the aim of improving educational techniques and standards.

Brig. Gen. JOHN MAGRUDER, for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished

service while serving as Deputy Director, Office of Strategic Services, from January 1943 to September 1945, he was responsible for the supervision and coordination of the Secret Intelligence, Counterespionage Intelligence, Research and Analysis, Foreign Nationalities, and Censorship and Documentation Branches. Through exceptional foresight, initiative, and perseverance, he welded the functions of these units into a single effective, coordinated intelligence service capable of meeting the needs of the armed services and other government agencies which required intelligence as a basis for policy-making decisions. He developed innumerable and varied intelligence activities and carried out their fulfillment to the lasting benefit of the Allied forces.

OAK LEAF CLUSTER TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

Maj. Gen. JOHN P. LUCAS
Maj. Gen. STANLEY E. REINHART
Brig. Gen. JOHN M. LENTZ

SILVER STAR


Maj. Gen. JOHN MILLIKIN

LEGION OF MERIT

Maj. Gen. RALPH McT. PENNELL
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM A. BARRON, Jr.
Brig. Gen. JOHN M. EAGER
Brig. Gen. JOHN T. KENNEDY
Brig. Gen. KENNETH P. LORD
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM SPENCE
Col. JOHN W. ANSLOW
Col. HERMAN J. CRIGGER
Col. IVAN J. DYCKMAN
Col. LEWIS S. GRIFFING
Col. FALKNER HEARD
Col. DONALD C. McDONALD
Col. HENSON L. ROBINSON
Col. JOHN A. SITZ
Col. GEORGE STALLWITZ
Col. JOHN E. THEIMER
Lt. Col. RALPH R. BUSH
Lt. Col. LEO B. CRABBS
Lt. Col. OTTO H. HEGEMANN
Lt. Col. JOHN T. HONEYCUTT
Lt. Col. ALAN F. S. MACKENZIE
Lt. Col. ARNOLD W. SIGLER
Major GERALD L. BENSON
Major DOUGLAS GORMAN, Jr.
Capt. ANTHONY E. BALLOCH, RA
Capt. DAVID R. HAGEN
Capt. LEE P. McCARTER
Capt. JOHN H. NANCE

OAK LEAF CLUSTER TO LEGION OF MERIT

Col. DEVERE ARMSTRONG
Col. JAMES K. WILSON



THE STORY OF THE GUN

By Lt. A. W. Wilson, RA

Part VI: Conclusion

Reprinted by Courtesy of THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY


MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY

For some reason the re-equipping of this branch of the artillery gave some difficulty. At the end of the Boer war the mountain batteries were still armed with the 2.5 R.M.L. screw gun. It was unthinkable that such obsolete equipment should still be in use in the 20th century, and as the guns in any case were fast wearing out, a 10-pr. was rather hastily approved in 1901. Due mainly to the fact that the carriage of this gun was of the old rigid type, it failed to give satisfaction. A new carriage was designed on the lines of the 13 and 18-prs., and a 12½-lb. shell substituted for a 10-lb. shell. The whole equipment was then given the title of "2.75" B.L." and was approved in 1911.

For many years India had been demanding a mountain howitzer as well as a mountain gun, and because of this fresh experiments were made. New conditions were formulated in 1912 and the resulting design later to be known as the 3.7 Q.F. how, was under trial at the outbreak of war in 1914.

SIGHTING ARRANGEMENTS

Following the realization that guns would henceforward be required to fire from behind cover, there was much speculation as to the form the new sights would take. It will be remembered that the "gunners' are" of the Boer War had given place to the "goniometric sight" or "lining plane" but this had fallen far short of requirements. A telescopic sight was demanded and finally the Goerz pattern of panoramic sight was approved after trials lasting through 1907-8-9. They were ready for issue in 1913 under the title of "dial sight No. 7."




sight No. 7."

DIRECTORS

As the layer could no longer see his target, it was necessary that some means should be devised in order to get all guns in a battery pointing in the same direction. This, together with the introduction of indirect sights on guns, had been one of the first results of the South African war, and in those days the

methods of "laying out the line" was to plant the aiming posts of the directing gun in the line indicated by the post or posts planted by the battery commander. Gunners from the other guns would then go forward carrying lengths of cord, which corresponded to the distances from the aiming posts on their flank, plant their own front aiming posts, then their second posts in rear. The guns were then brought



into action in the line of their own aiming posts and under cover; thus they were parallel. In order to engage targets, an observation post officer would observe the fall of shot from a crest and order right and left movements of the guns as required.

In 1902 various appliances were tried. Finally a director on the lines of the lining plane and a field plotter (an instrument for solving triangles) were made into a workable system, and the "fishing tackle" of the early days disappeared. Nearly eight years passed before the first director to be fitted with a compass had been approved. This was the director No. I; old gunners will remember its unwieldiness.

AMMUNITION

The equipment committee had insisted upon "fixed" ammunition for the new field guns because it afforded the greatest rapidity of loading and firing, while at the same time minimizing the number of men in the detachment. The combination of the charge and shell in one piece also obviated all chance of the omission of either part in supply. Fixed ammunition was impossible for howitzers, however, owing to the variable charges used. There were good reasons for retaining "bare" charges for mountain and heavy

guns: the saving of weight was of great importance in both types, while the loss of rapidity of fire was not of great consequence for heavy artillery and in the case of mountain was discounted by the chance of a dented case's causing difficulty in loading.

An important lesson from the Boer war had been the great superiority of shrapnel, as a man-killing projectile, over common shell which, already given up for field guns with the introduction of the 15-pr. B.L., was out of date and disappeared from the service shortly after. Not only did shrapnel replace common shell in this sphere but it also sounded the death knell of case shot, which had been in the service since the birth of the gun. Shrapnel with the fuze set at zero did all that case shot could do, which by 1919 was used only for the lighter equipments on fixed mountings. With the disappearance of common shell, case shot, and grape (which went out with the smooth bores), and a disinclination to consider H.E. for field guns, the ambition of "one shell and one fuze" was well on the way to being achieved.

With shrapnel the only projectile for field guns, the principal projectile for mountain and heavy guns, and coming into use with howitzers (these three latter types also firing H.E.), the provision of the best possible time fuze was a matter of utmost importance. Conditions had for some time been growing increasingly difficult, but the introduction of the No. 80 series of fuze appeared to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem. During the next few years all kinds of modifications were carried out and in 1912 a Mk. IV of the time and percussion fuze was adopted.

Ranges had increased considerably and progressed from year to year. Field guns accomplished 2,000 yards in 1899, 2,300 in 1900, 2,600 in 1901, 3,200 in 1902, 3,600 in 1903, and (on Salisbury Plain) 4,000 in 1904. Pointing out the target became an art in itself and the clock-code was introduced as the best means of effecting this hitherto difficult procedure.

In 1903 Trawsfynydd was established as a practice camp and together with Salisbury Plain, Okehampton, and Shoeburyness gave the gunner every opportunity of practicing his new-found science.

OTHER CHANGES

To make full use of the up-to-date guns and knowledge we



Harness breast, pole draught, R.A., 13 & 18-prs. Team of 6 horses.

now possessed, some minor changes were brought about in standard equipment. Five foot wheels had been a standard that had not been departed from for many years and we had scoffed at the continental practice of reducing wheels to a minimum diameter. The Ehrhardt guns with their 4-ft. 6-inch wheels had, however, proved both mobile and stable, but the

conservative authorities were not thus to be lightly swayed. They compromised with 4-ft. 8-inch wheels and retained the 5-ft. wheels for heavy guns only.

Axletree seats on the field guns were abolished during this period because it was found that there was too large proportion of weight on the gun wheels. The gun layer now had seats on the limber, and a wagon containing the remainder of the detachment now always accompanied the gun.

Following the introduction of pole draught in 1895, but with the retention of the horse collar, experience with difficulties in collar fitting, and the superiority of mule harness in India, was showing that a new harness was required to replace the collar.

In 1904 harness breast, pole draught R.A., was adopted.

ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS


One of the features of the South African war had been the use of balloons for observation, and in the following years there were spasmodic trials at practice camps to ascertain their real value in this respect and, in particular, how they might be attacked. But when in 1908 the "dirigible" made its

appearance, and in 1909 M. Blériot had flown the channel in a heavier-than-air machine, it was plain that the aeroplane could not be neglected. With its speed of 70 to 80 miles an hour, its attack would be a very different proposition from that of a captive balloon or kite.

Trials with various experimental antiaircraft equipment were made in 1911, but these failed to produce anything suitable. The few aeroplanes which had been used in the maneuvers of 1910 had been regarded by the troops and spectators as interesting curiosities, but by 1912 the cooperation between the new Royal Flying Corps and artillery made it quite clear that the development of the new arm must be of vital interest to the artillery. The possibility of observation from the air must affect both gunnery and tactics, while the designing of a weapon capable of engaging an aeroplane presented problems in gun design of great complexity.

In 1909 at the Frankfort Exhibition, Krupp and Ehrhardt had exhibited a large selection of guns designed for use against dirigibles and expected to be effective against aeroplanes also. The heavier sort were mounted on platforms drawn by trucks, and the lighter on swift motor cars on which the guns might chase and shoot down their quarry. There were tracer shell and sensitive fuzes, but the method of hitting such elusive objects had not yet been investigated, although the provision of an aerial target was being discussed by the Aeronautical Society.

Perhaps the provision of a suitable target for practice was



13 pr. One of the first A.A. guns

the chief cause of the slow progress being made, for up to 1914 there had been no practice against targets approximating in the remotest degree to the height and speed of the aeroplane; the tendency was to regard the difficulty of hitting such a target as insuperable, and to make no attempt to tackle



it. It is significant that before the Great War of 1914-18 no nation had equipped a field army with A.A. artillery, although much work had been done. One of our first A.A. guns was a converted 13-pr. R.H.A. gun mounted on a truck; this together with an adapted "pom pom" (a relic of the Boer war) represented our A.A. artillery until 1914, then a special 3" A.A. gun was introduced. By the use of improved sights, rangefinders, and a sensitive fuze to act on fabric, it did splendid work for the remainder of the war.

Although the field artillery was fully prepared for a mobile campaign "with a clearly defined role of supporting infantry action by fire when and where required," its mobility became unnecessary when opposing forces settled down to stabilized trench warfare. Counterbattery work and the destruction of enemy strong points demanded long range guns and heavy howitzers, and as already mentioned these weapons were added in due course to the army artillery. A feature of the artillery support of an infantry attack was the barrage (first used, it will be remembered, in 1813), originally lifted from trench to trench as our infantry arrived but now in the form of a creeping barrage on a timed program. Fire power alone was given primary consideration, and perhaps explains why the 18-pr. gun was in greater demand than the 13-pr.

The introduction of chemical warfare set the artillery yet another problem and enemy batteries were soon being neutralized by the use of gas and smoke shells fired from field pieces. The old belief that "the use of smoke for blinding the enemy is a cuttlefish policy, too fanciful for our consideration" had suffered the fate it deserved. Tanks in the attack had to be protected by covering fire; close support was still required for the infantry; and the rapid progress made in aircraft design made necessary an entirely new technique for engaging them, thereby creating a new branch of the artillery, a branch which has lived up to all the old traditions of the gunners.


The 18-pr., 4.5 how., 60-pr. and 6-inch how., served us well throughout the war; and very heavy artillery (notably the 14-inch gun, 12-inch gun, 12-inch how., 9.2-inch how., and 15-inch how.) performed invaluable service in harassing enemy concentrations well in the rear. These heavy guns and the 60-pr. and 6-inch how., were manned by the Royal Garrison Artillery, while the adapted 13-pr. and 3-inch guns were manned by Anti-Aircraft batteries.

THE YEARS OF DISARMAMENT


It was to be expected that the disarmament following the end of the Great War would be on a very large scale, and in

the years of comparative peace little was done to improve the armament of artillery. The methods of construction of pieces had, however, undergone a complete change; the old "wire-wound" system was replaced by a method known as "auto-frettage," where the strength in the piece was provided by internal and external stresses applied to a single piece of forged steel. As there could be no question of re-armament most effort was spent in reorganization; thus in 1924 the distinction between R.H.A. and R.F.A. on the one hand and R.G.A. on the other was abolished, and the Royal Artillery became one Regiment which included artillery of the territorial army. In 1938 the existing two branches came into being, field artillery forming one and antiaircraft, antitank and coast defense artillery the other. The term "brigade" in the field artillery was replaced by "regiment," each regiment consisting of two twelve-gun batteries, three troops in each battery, in place of the old four batteries of six guns each. Today the field regiment consists of three batteries, two troops in each, with four guns to each troop.

Meanwhile the draught horse was giving place to the



gasoline-driven engine and year by year batteries were mechanized. At first battery staffs were mounted and the guns towed by "dragons" (tracked vehicles) which also carried the gun detachment. Later the "dragons" (the term is a contraction of "drag-gun") were replaced by six-wheel vehicles, and trucks replaced the horses of the staff.



Loading a 5.5" gun-how.

The trunnions are set far back thus making the piece muzzle heavy. The 'horns' are stabilizers and correct the balance



Rubber tires were introduced and the old 4-ft. 8-inch wooden wheels were seen no more.

By 1939 the transformation was complete and the only links with a horse-drawn past were a ceremonial R.H.A. battery in London and a few units on foreign service. There is no doubt that many gunners, while appreciating the advantages of the new mode of transport, looked with regret on the passing of the draught horse, "that faithful friend and servant of the Royal Artillery since its formation."

The experiences of the war had shown that still greater firepower would be necessary in field equipments, but without robbing it of its mobility. By 1934 a 25-pr. gun-howitzer had been designed to replace the 18-pr. and 4.5 howitzer. It was intended that this equipment should fire H.E. shells by means of variable charges and at last the sublime faith in shrapnel as the best man-killing projectile was changed to an almost equal faith in high-explosives.

The 25-pr. was shelved for a number of years, due no doubt to our policy of disarmament, but a compromise was effected by adapting the 18-pr. Mk. IV to an 18-25-pr. That is, the

piece of the 18-pr. was re-bored to take a 25-pr. shell. Other new designs (unfortunately mainly in blueprint form until the war) were the 5.5-inch gun-how, and the 4.5-inch gun-how, for medium regiments, and the 7.2-inch gun-how, for heavy regiments to replace the 9.2 how.

With the coming of the tank yet another problem for artillery had been set, and a gun with a high velocity armor piercing shot and large traverse was demanded. The 2-pr. Q.F. antitank gun issued to newly-formed antitank units appeared to fulfill all requirements, but with tanks becoming more and more heavily armed the 2-pr. was handed over to the infantry and replaced in the artillery by a 6-pr. antitank gun and, later, by a 17-pr. A.T. gun.

The great progress made in aircraft design had outmoded the old 3-inch and converted 13-pr. A.A. guns which while proving good enough against the slow, low-flying "crates" of the last war, could not be expected to provide the answer to modern, high-flying, fast machines. New designs and improved appliances resulted in A.A. guns with tremendous muzzle velocity which could engage aircraft at any height, and the increasing danger of night-bombing met by the introduction of radio-location and more powerful searchlights. The "arte of shooting in greate peeces of ordinance" had indeed become the "science of artillery."

THE LAST WAR

When once again the country was in danger, the work on the new equipment, so long delayed, began in earnest—but few batteries had been re-armed when the war started. In ever increasing numbers the new equipment was issued to the swelling ranks of the artillery until finally the change-over was complete. Our first successes in this war were heralded by the crash of hundreds of new guns of all calibers and by the fine work of the A.A. and coast defense gunners in the Battle of Britain. In such actions the quality of material, however important as a factor in victory, transcended by the devotion to duty and self-sacrifice of men—as it will be, always.

What of the future? The inventive genius of a modern world may devise means whereby artillery becomes outmoded. But even if that is realized, nothing can ever diminish the glorious history belonging to the gunner and to the weapon which bears the proud title of "Ultima ratio regum"—the last argument of Kings.



1914
The Last War
An 18 pr. in action
Typical of the last
epoch of the 19th

VII Corps Artillery Battle Experiences

GROUND OBSERVERS CONFERENCE

The following VII Corps Artillery units, including a total of 56 ground observers, were represented:

Hq Btry, VII Corps Arty
18th FA Bn (105 H)
802d FA Bn (105H)
951st FA Bn (155 H)
87th FA Bn (105 H SP)
183d FA Bn (155 H)
188th FA Bn (155 H)
195th FA Bn (8" H)
660th FA Bn (8" H)
957th FA Bn (155 H)
980th FA Bn (155 G)
981st FA Bn (155 G)
991st FA Bn (155 G SP)

TARGETS AND TYPE AMMUNITION

Tanks and SP Guns. High explosive shell, fuze quick, was favored by 155-mm units as being more likely to knock out the tank without a direct hit. A near miss with delay fuze will not harm a tank. For direct fire, use T-105 fuze or delay fuze.

No observer present had seen HEAT ammunition fired.

White phosphorus is very effective in frightening tank crews, but it does very little actual damage and forms a screen under cover of which the tank can withdraw.

If hostile tanks are well out and friendly fighter bombers are in the vicinity, fire red smoke to draw the aircraft to that area.

Infantry. *a.* In the open: Observers favored adjustment with fuze quick, and fire for effect with time or V-T fuze. Time fire frequently was not used because of the additional time required to adjust. The impression was that neither time fire nor the V-T fuze had been used to full advantage.

b. In woods: In general, fuze quick gives tree bursts with excellent effect. When the enemy is dug in, fuze delay in woods is more effective because of its deeper penetration.

Pill Boxes and Strong Emplacements. 105-mm howitzer ammunition was ineffective. 155-mm

Brig. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, the VII Corps Artillery Commander throughout the entire campaign on the Continent, conducted a series of seven conferences, between 23 May and 6 June 1945, to discuss battle experiences and to record — while still fresh in mind—the outstanding lessons learned. In general, the conferees were the captains and lieutenants who had done the actual fighting. The seven conferences were as follows: Ground Observers; Air Observers; Group and Battalion S-3s; Group and Battalion S-2s; Battalion and Battery Motor Officers; and Battalion and Group Communication Officers. Unfortunately, redeployment orders for the VII Corps prevented the holding of a culminating conference of battalion commanders, as had been intended.

Included in this issue are the reports on the first two conferences: Ground Observers and Air Observers. The reports of the remaining conferences will be published in later issues.—Editor.

and heavier calibers were used with success. Delay fuze was used in adjustment, to get incidental effective hits. For direct fire, T-105 fuze with supercharge was used. One observer reported having used base ejection smoke to mask a pillbox while the infantry, receiving no injuries from the smoke shells, moved in on the pillbox.

Machine Guns, Mortars, etc. High explosive with air bursts was used generally. In one case, delay fuze was used with intent to shake the mortars off of their base plates.

Vehicles. Use fuze quick for adjustment and for effect against tires and personnel. When the vehicles have stopped, they can be destroyed by precision methods or additional fire for effect.

Observation Posts. Fuze depends on the type of shelter. Often enemy OPs are well dug in, indicating delay fuze. Air bursts are sometimes required.

Towns. TOT's on towns should include all types of fuze (air, quick, and delay) to catch the enemy on the streets

and inside the buildings. White phosphorus was included frequently, both because the Germans hated it and also to start fires.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Good ricochet conditions were very seldom found.

2. Most observers felt that time fire is generally too difficult to adjust; consequently, they consider it of little value. (Being from corps artillery units, these observers were mostly dependent on mechanical fuze M67. However, even the 105-mm observers seemed leery of time fire.)

3. Time fuze M67 is too erratic to be of much value.

4. The V-T fuze is very good and entails no difficulties of adjustment. The observers generally felt that it could have been used more. Experienced observers agreed that, when fired above a woods, the V-T fuze bursts too high to be effective on the ground beneath the trees. When used in conjunction with massed fires of several battalions, it appears to give too many early bursts by sympathetic detonation.

5. M51A3 fuze fired with delay action from 155-mm howitzer was found to give a high percentage of duds.

6. The French and British projectiles which were issued to 155-mm and 8" howitzer units were not satisfactory because of excessive dispersion.

7. From a forward observer's standpoint, the highest charge possible should be used because it gives least dispersion.

INITIAL DATA

Initial data were usually from the map. Coordinates were estimated to the nearest 100 yards, and tied in if possible by announcing a terrain feature appearing on the map. When small shifts were made, initial data were usually given from the last concentration fired.

When no map was available, an estimated compass and range were used. If the battery location was not known, a town shown on a road map could be

used as a reference point for the initial data. (Even in Europe, observers once in a while had no map, usually because they had advanced beyond the limits of the sheets available.)

BATTERY SHEAF

For light artillery, a sheaf of 100 yards was believed ideal and was found in nearly all cases to be well aligned.

For medium artillery, a sheaf of 200 yards was believed too wide for the average target. A width of 150 yards was suggested by most observers.

Additional exactness is needed in sensing the sheaf. A suggested standard message from observer to FDC is (for example): *Converge on # 3 to 50 yards.*

ADJUSTMENT OF TIME FIRE

Most forward observers used the standard sensings: graze, mixed, air and high air. They recommend a change of *Up 10* to follow at FDC from an initial graze sensing. They think that positive height sensings should be given by the observer (for example, *Air 50 yards*).

METHOD OF FIRE

Adjustment. Most observers favored adjustment by one gun. A minority favored one platoon. In special cases, such as a counterattack, the battery should be used.

Fire for effect. The most important consideration is the proximity of the target to our own troops. If the target is within 150 yards, only the adjusting battery should be fired for effect. For targets between 150 and 300 yards, the rest of the battalion may be brought in. For targets beyond 300 yards, other battalions may be used for effect. Observers generally agreed that the spread of battalion and large concentrations made these restrictions necessary to avoid likelihood of hitting our own troops.

CONDUCT OF FIRE

All missions were processed through the battalion fire direction center, except when a battery was separated from battalion control.

Forward observer sensings were invariably used by all observers. They feel that a sound understanding of the principles of lateral observation increases the efficiency of an observer.

High angle fire has been used very little by these particular observers and

results were not conclusive. Excessive dispersion of high angle fire was reported by several.

The chart, below, is a compilation of written *estimates* prepared by observers during the conference; figures are not reliable statistics.

PREARRANGED FIRES

These observers recommend clean breaks of several minutes in long preparations, to entice the enemy out of their holes expecting the attack. Then start preparation again and catch them exposed.

These observers do not favor rolling barrages. Used at request of infantry in one case to protect open flanks of advancing unit, the observer considered this firing wasted. Observers consider a plan of successive concentrations to protect attacking troops much better than a rolling barrage.

Training in the planning of defensive fires after the day's fighting, with the FO planning with an infantry company

commander and the liaison office planning with an infantry battalion commander, was insufficient at all stage prior to reaching the battlefield. FO must work with the infantry company commander in planning defensive fire. Planning of defensive fires must start at all levels simultaneously; there is no time to develop them successively from company up to division.

Whenever possible, data for defensive fires should be verified by actual adjustment on several of them, especially those which are close to our own troops.

FORWARD OBSERVER EQUIPMENT

It was agreed that the following equipment should be taken by the forward observer:

Offensive mission

- 1—1/4-Ton truck
- 1—610 Radio (with Armor, 510)
- 1—609 Radio (with Armor, 509)
- 2—536 Radios

Distance of Target from Observer:

Weapon	Maximum	Minimum	Average	Based on estimated No. of missions
105 H	6,000	25	500-800	380
105 H (SP)	7,000	50	700-800	1870
155 H	14,000	50	1000-2000	2680
155 G (SP)	12,000	400	4000	190
155 G	14,000	300	3000-7000	400
8" H	15,000	1000	2500-5000	60

Distance of Guns from Observer:

Weapon	Maximum	Minimum	Average	Based on estimated No. of missions
105 H	8,000	1500	4000-5000	380
105 H (SP)	6,000	100	3000-4000	1870
155 H	14,000	4000	8000	2680
155 G (SP)	10,000	0 (direct fire)	7000-8000	190
155 G	12,000	0 (direct fire)	8000-12000	400
8" H	10,000		5000	60

Relative locations of Observer—Gun—Target

Weapon	Extreme	Average
105 H	Lateral on Flank	Axial and Small T
105 H (SP)	Target between O and G	Small T and Large T
155 H	Lateral	Small T
155 G (SP)		Axial and Small T
155 G	Lateral	Axial and Small T
8" H		Axial and Small T

(Remark: Conclusion is that fire is usually requested by an observer near the target, in an "axial" position, who—50% of the time, at least—is not a member of the battalion which fires.)

- 1—Remote control set
- 1—Set extra radio batteries
- 1—Power telephone
- 1—Mile W-130 wire
- 1—Pr field glasses
- 1—Coordinate square
- 1—M2 compass
- 1—Flashlight
- 1—Watch with sweep second hand

Defensive mission

- Same as offensive, adding:
- 1—BC Scope
 - 1—Small plotting board and plotting equipment

OBSERVER'S "HEARTFELT GRIEVANCES"

When a Corps Artillery observer picked up an important target, such as a tank holding up our infantry, it was often almost impossible to obtain a clearance to fire on it (Observer to Bn to Gp to Div Arty to 105 Bn and return).

S-3's lacked confidence in their observers. Examples: not firing requested amounts of ammunition for effect; not clearing fires in doubtful areas.

All captains and lieutenants in the battalion should take their turn as forward observers, and the FDC staff should come up and see the battle the way the observers see it, so they can visualize it at the FDC.

In hard continuous fighting, 72 hours is the maximum time an experienced forward observer can be expected to operate effectively, and 48 hours is the maximum for a green observer.

PILOTS AND AIR OBSERVERS CONFERENCE

The following VII Corps Artillery units, including a total of 44 pilots and air observers, were included:

- Hq Btry, VII Corps Arty
- Hq Btry, 142d FA Gp
- Hq Btry, 188th FA Gp
- Hq Btry, 224th FA Gp
- 18th FA Bn (105 H)
- 87th FA Bn (105 H SP)
- 183d FA Bn (155 H)
- 188th FA Bn (155 H)
- 195th FA Bn (8" H)
- 660th FA Bn (8" H)
- 802d FA Bn (105 H)
- 951st FA Bn (155 H)
- 957th FA Bn (155 H)
- 980th FA Bn (155 G)
- 981st FA Bn (155 G)
- 991st FA Bn (155 G SP)

PLANE AND EQUIPMENT

Plexiglass or a better grade of pyrolin should be installed to improve all-around visibility. One piece should be used in the left side rather than the present three sections.

Every officer used field glasses on many of his air observation missions. A special field glass, light and compact, with 8-power lens and a wider field of vision, is needed for air observers.

The observer very seldom faced to the rear. The general opinion was that observers should face to the rear only where enemy aircraft are particularly active. All observers want an adjustable seat.

All observers wanted an intercommunication system between pilot and observer. Many had improvised their own in the L-4 airplane.

The most serious defect in the air sections was lack of messing arrangements. The section is rarely convenient to a unit kitchen. T/O & E should furnish a cook, a cooking unit, and mess equipment for 10 men.

The general opinion was that, while transportation currently available gets the air section around, the habitual serious overloading would be avoided by substituting a 1½-ton personnel carrier for the ¾-ton weapons carrier.

Spare parts supply was usually satisfactory. A suggested list of additional spare parts to be carried by the air section follows:

- | | |
|--------------|--------------|
| Carburetor | Shock struts |
| Piston rings | Spark plugs |
| Propeller | Tail wheel |

HAZARDS OF FLYING

Forty of the 99 major accidents in the VII Corps during combat occurred either in takeoffs or in landings. The first consideration in selecting a field should be suitability for takeoffs and landings. The second consideration should be exposure of the field to enemy artillery fire. In a stable situation, the base field should be 10,000 yards from our front lines, with a strip farther forward.

Safeguarding Planes. Pilots and observers commented on the difficulty of safeguarding planes on landing strips when operating with armored combat commands in a rapidly moving action. No general agreement was reached on a

solution but some remedial suggestions were:

1. Keep all planes working with a particular combat command on one strip.

2. Keep the strip close to combat command headquarters.

3. When the combat command pulls out during the night, arrange for a platoon of light tanks to remain behind and protect the landing strip until the planes and ground crews can move up in the morning.

Aircraft Warning. The enemy aircraft warning system often did not work satisfactorily for separate battalions. Suggested remedies:

1. The mobile AAA battery accompanying each corps artillery battalion receives all aircraft warnings. The AAA battery should notify its FA battalion FDC immediately, and the FDC immediately relay the warning to the air observers over SCR-608 net.

2. Any corps, division, group or battalion FDC which receives an air warning message should immediately broadcast the warning over the SCR-193 net to all FDC's for further relay as in 1, above.

It was learned the hard way that German flak fired at Air OP's. The best counter-flak measures were to avoid known flak areas, and to use varied evasive patterns when attacked.

COMMUNICATION

Radio. The SCR-619 had not been available to any unit present at the conference.

Observers agreed that the SCR-610 has been satisfactory. An important advantage is its interchangeability with any other 610 set. The best place for the SCR-610 is on the shelf in rear of the observer. The trailing antenna should not be used with the SCR-610 as it has definite directional characteristics. The recommended settings on the SCR-610 set for each battalion Air OP are battalion "common channel" and air channel of next higher headquarters. Observers also recommended that the FA group combine its air and command channels, as observers get much useful information by listening in on the normal command traffic.

T17 Microphones and P23 earphones are preferred to the present ear plugs

and throat microphone; the latter in fact were never used.

Present radio procedure is satisfactory, but proper priority in many cases was not given to fire missions.

Wire. Wire should always be maintained between the (group or separate battalion) FDC and airstrip. In a fast moving situation, a field should be selected where good communication can be maintained with the battalion.

MAPS AND PHOTOS

The best all-around map is the scale 1/50,000. It is the best compromise between amount of area covered and detail shown, and also gives a very good duplication of the view from the plane.

The 1/25,000 map was used frequently in a stable, limited area.

No type of photograph was considered really necessary. Gridded obliques were rarely used. Ungridded obliques were preferred for briefing. Some observers thought that a 1/25,000 gridded, colored photo map would be very helpful in all except fast-moving situations.

TARGETS

Most targets were picked up by seeing a flash or movement. German camouflage and camouflage discipline were both excellent, and targets were difficult to find except by prolonged study of suspected areas. Many targets were picked up by observing the reactions of friendly troops. In some cases communication with friendly forward observers was helpful. German dummy gun positions were not seen at all, except when flash pots were used in conjunction with them. Enemy flak installations were often spotted when they fired at our fighter bombers. Targets were taken under fire in the following order of frequency:

- Artillery in position
- Registrations
- Tanks and vehicles
- Moving foot troops

GUNNERY

Registration. For a registration, give the observer an area in which to select a registration point rather than designate a specific point from the ground which may be unsuitable from the air.

Center-of-impact was obtained by firing 2 groups of 3 rounds, after splitting a 100-yard range bracket.

Adjustment. All observers agree that:

The gun-target line must be known. If not determined otherwise, it must be shot in.

The target must be bracketed when adjusting. A yardstick on the ground, such as two crossroads a known distance apart, is very helpful and was usually easy to find in the European Theater.

The use of an auxiliary target to get surprise was not successful because the shift could not be fixed accurately enough.

In snow, delay fuze is helpful in spotting bursts.

Fire for Effect. Average area covered by one battalion was 300 yards by 300 yards.

Amount of fire for effect given by S-3 was felt generally to be sufficient.

Observers noted that a smoke screen with 155-mm howitzer was difficult to maintain due to the larger number of duds from the M67 fuze.

Time Fire. Air observers rarely used time fire except for time registrations. Accurate sensings on height of burst are impossible; air or graze are the only possible sensings. All grazes with M67 fuzes are *lost*.

GENERAL

Situation Map. Each division and group air officer should keep an accurate up-to-date situation map at the air strip with the following information:

- Front lines.
- Plan of operation of supported troops.
- All FA battalion position areas.
- Known enemy installations.
- Areas in which flak has been received.
- In the best combat divisions, this was done; in green divisions, it was not done.

Hazard—V-T Fuze. The present VII Corps method for warning Air OP's of V-T fire (V-T, LEFT ZONE, UNTIL 1305) is satisfactory except that warnings were rarely given in time. Observers recommend:

Broadcast the warning *at least* 10 minutes prior to the firing, and include *both* starting and ending time for the fire. (Example: V-T, LEFT ZONE, 1235 UNTIL 1305.)

Broadcast the warning over the SCR-193 (Corps Artillery Officer's net) so

that all FDC's in the corps can notify their planes.

Zone of Operation. No agreement was reached on the best zone or area in which to operate an Air OP. It was generally agreed that in a stable situation with good visibility the plane should stay 2000 to 3000 yards behind the front line. When enemy resistance seemed disorganized or feeble, many observers frequently went well into enemy territory for reconnaissance or for a detailed search of a specific area. The average patrolling altitude is 1500 feet, but altitudes up to 4500 feet are favored by some observers if visibility is good. Some feel that there is more danger from flak and enemy aircraft at such higher altitudes; others disagree. In support of a tank breakthrough, altitudes as low as 300 feet must sometimes be flown.

Depending on visibility, which was extremely variable, the distance from plane to target on the majority of missions was between 3500 and 5000 yard. The maximum distance was 15,000 yards on a day of exceptional visibility.

Daily Missions. On their primary mission of flying for the artillery, the present Air OP section (2 aircraft) can handle 4 two-hour missions per day. Reconnaissance flights, flying for infantry commanders, messenger service etc., simply reduce the flying time for field artillery. The maximum flying time of a pilot and observer should not exceed 5 hours in the air per day and this rate cannot be continued for more than 5 or 6 days. Observers feel that 2 two-hour patrols per day are much better than 4 one-hour patrols because the former permit more detailed study of the terrain and more continuous attention.

Regularly Assigned Observer. All pilots and observers felt strongly that two trained air observers should be regularly assigned to each air section. Some units had detailed many officers haphazardly as air observers; these observers saw nothing. No observer had received reasonably adequate training before working as an observer in combat. Training should include intensive work on map reading and aerial orientation; also Air OP firing.



PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS



By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, FA, Ret.

EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST (19 Feb to 18 Mar 46)

SPAIN

Deep-seated Trouble. Spain is a new danger spot, and a possible future theater of operations.

The cause of disturbance dates back many years, but did not become acute until 1936. Without going deeply into the historical background, the present problem stems from the elections held in Spain on 16 February 1936. It is alleged that these were the last free elections in Spain, and that consequently the individuals then elected should be recognized to this day.

Left In. In those elections, some 9,408,550 ballots were cast. The Left parties (consisting of communists, anarchists, and several "kinds" of republicans) polled 4,356,599 votes, or slightly under 50% of the total. The left had united on a common ticket. Thus in Catalonia, all Left parties voted for an anarchist ticket; in communist territory, all united for the communist candidate, etc. The Right parties (which included certain republicans, anarchists, agrarians and others) failed to unite. Each component put up a separate ticket, and they lost the election. Under the Spanish electoral law the Left gained 278 votes of Parliament, against 205 for the Right.

Right Out. The Left then proceeded to oust the President of the Republic, which the Parliament had a right to do. This was accomplished on 6 April 1936, and a few weeks later a new president was installed. The entire government was now legally in the hands of the Left.

The objective of the Left was to divide up the great landed estates among the peasants, to revise taxation, to raise the educational standards, and to bring about other social reforms. Necessarily, it took time to draw up the laws, discuss them and then pass them. Only a beginning had been made by summer time.

Trouble Brews. Some of the followers of the Left, particularly the Communists, believed that the legal ways of establishing the new regime were much too slow. As early as the date of the elections, they undertook the use of force, and seized certain estates and parceled them out, without waiting for the expected law. For the most part the landlords fled, but a few were murdered. The lands of certain Catholic orders were seized and the orders driven out, with considerable bloodshed.

Officially deploring such haste and violence, the Left Government took no effective measures against them. Finding that immunity might be expected, the disorders grew; it appeared that if they wanted land, they had better take it before someone else did. Still holding a considerable number of places in the Parliament, the Right raised numerous objections to the course of events. Left adherents then began to kill off the more pronounced Right opponents, on the ground that they were obstructing national improvements. Beginning in June, some Right members of Parliament were killed by the state police, which was of course controlled by a Left minister. This led to the revolution, which broke in mid-July, 1936.

Army Right In. The Spanish Army had long been active politically. Like most military men, the Spanish military leadership was essentially conservative, and the majority (but by no means all) belonged to one of the Right parties. Well aware of this, and remembering that in the past the Army had been instrumental in previous overthrows of the Government, the Left Government feared that this might happen again, and were looking for a revolution headed by the Army. They were unable to discover anything, but as a precaution ordered the

retirement of leading generals, who they believed might become sympathetic to a revolution. The generals took alarm and got into communication with the civilian leaders of the Right. It was decided that if they hesitated, they were doomed anyway, and that they might as well take a chance and fight it out. The generals agreed to direct the revolution.

At that time General Francisco Franco was the second senior general and was in command of the Canary Islands. His single superior was killed in an air accident a few days after hostilities commenced. Thereupon Franco assumed command, and has held it ever since. A very bloody war resulted. It came close to ruining Spain, and caused an immense amount of destruction. It ended in January, 1939, with the complete victory of the Right.

All-for-All. The last campaign was against the Anarchists, who held Catalonia. Spain is the only country in the world which has a real Anarchist Party. The members are opposed to all government, and consider a communist type of government worse than any other. They carried their ideas to absurd conclusions. For example, in 1936 the original anarchist troops were organized into companies. Each company had a captain and a lieutenant, detailed by roster for a 24-hour tour of duty. Except for routine matters, the captain could issue no orders. He could propose an attack, or other military maneuver, but had to submit his plan to the entire company for debate and decision. Nobody was bound by the decision. Everyone was free to join an attack or stay out. As might have been expected, this unusual system of military command led to disaster, and it

was later somewhat modified. However, the Anarchists, although bitter fighters, never were efficient as an organization. They were completely defeated when Franco finally got around to them.

Axis Testing Ground. In the 2½ years of civil war, certain foreign nations intervened. The United States did not; it abstained from aiding either side. Italy and Germany aided Franco, while France and Russia helped the Spanish Left. Italian participation equalled about two divisions, plus technical troops and services. The members were volunteers, but the Italian government was in strong sympathy with Franco's cause, and helped him as much as it could. This writer was a witness to the fraternization of Spanish and Italian troops during the civil war.

The German participation amounted perhaps to some 6,000 men, organized into a Legion. Germany was also in sympathy with Franco, but the main idea of their military support was to test weapons and tactics. Thus the air force developed the support of the infantry assault, and tank maneuver on the battlefield was perfected. Important lessons were learned, some of which were discussed in THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL in 1939.

French participation was allegedly unofficial. However, the French government made artillery, planes and other military supplies available to individuals who saw to it that they got to Spain, for use by the Left.

Russian participation was partly by the supply of munitions, and partly by a few combat units not belonging to the Russian Army. The most important Russian contribution was a headquarters unit, which had much to do with supervising the Left's fighting forces. To prevent Russian officers and men from becoming contaminated by contact with the western nations, their contingents were detailed by roster, with tours usually limited to not exceeding six months. There are no reports as to the efficiency of this system of command. It lost, although not necessarily for that reason.

Bad Feeling Persists. The Spanish war resulted in continuous bad feeling of a most intense nature. Many members of the Left escaped to France. These included Republicans, Communists and

Anarchists. They went to France as that was the only place they could reach. When World War II broke, hundreds of thousands of them were destitute in the concentration camps in southern France. Many of these volunteered for service in the French Army, and others took an active part later in the French Underground, during the German occupation.

At the end of World War II the French Underground had a preponderant influence in the new French Government, which has been very sympathetic to the old Spanish Lefts. Thus the execution of some former Lefts by the present Spanish Government in February, 1946, for alleged crimes, raised much animosity in France where the same men were heroes of the Underground.

Spain and the Victors. According to our State Department releases, Franco discussed an alliance with Germany during World War II. Nothing came of this, but it resulted in Franco's government incurring the displeasure of the United Nations. In February, the United States and Great Britain joined with France in discussions. It was decided to issue a joint declaration inviting the Spanish people to end the regime of General Franco peacefully and thereby place Spain in a position of respect with the United Nations. This declaration was issued on 4 March. In the meantime, France closed its Spanish frontier. Spain thereupon increased its border guard by Moorish troops transferred from Morocco. The situation thus brought about may, or may not, lead to a new violence. The border situation, itself, is conducive to "incidents" which can be dangerous, regardless of whether they be intentional, unintentional, provoked by government order, or induced by unauthorized acts of individuals.

According to British intelligence reports, the Russian Army whose CP is at Vienna has opened a new additional CP close by, whose mission it is to prepare plans for possible Russian intervention in Spain. Assuming that there will be incidents and that the French Government may find itself at war with Spain, perhaps Russia anticipates being invited to associate herself with France in an invasion

intended to overthrow Franco. All this of course is tentative and contingent upon future events which may or may not occur. The mere fact that it is being planned for, however, is an indication of the seriousness of the situation.

The past history of Spain indicates that the country will unite against a foreign invader, no matter what the cause Don Juan, the head of the Spanish Monarchical Party, made a strong protest against the Allies on 8 March for attempting to interfere in Spanish internal affairs. Don Juan has been strongly anti-Franco, has refused to work with him, and is an exile from his own country. As a rule, Spaniards have preferred to fight out their own quarrels.

There is a want of reliable information as to whether the people of Spain prefer the present government of Franco or would rather have some other. No serious opposition to Franco has appeared for a considerable time. Whether this is due to fear, as alleged by some or to desire as claimed by others, remains to be determined.

IRAN

Russian and British troops occupied Iran during the summer of 1941, presumably to prevent a German invasion. A new government was established, with which a treaty was signed in January 1942, in which the Russians and British undertook to occupy only so much of Iran as was necessary for the war against Germany, at the conclusion of which they agreed to withdraw after six months. That date arrived on March 1946.

Useful Revolt. In November, 1945 a "revolt" broke out in the Iran province of Azerbaijan, occupied by Russian troops. The latter prevented the suppression of the "revolt" and as a consequence an Azerbaijan government which demanded autonomy but not severance from Iran, was organized and established. (The inhabitants of Azerbaijan speak a Turkish language, incidentally, and differ also in customs and religion from the remainder of Iran which is Persian. A large part of Azerbaijan had been conquered by Russia prior to the commencement of the present century, and is now one of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union

and adjoins Iran Azerbaijan.) The available evidence indicates that the "revolt" in Azerbaijan was due to Russian influence. Reason—a desire for oil concessions, which Iran had refused and which the autonomous state is willing to grant. It would not be unnatural to unite Russian and Iranian Azerbaijan into a single state, as it used to be. Whether the people desire this or not is unknown. Russian occupation of Azerbaijan would be advantageous in case of war with Turkey.

The new Azerbaijan Government has raised some troops. During February they cleared the Caspian coast, after minor fighting, from the Russian boundary southwards to include Karganrud. A demonstration was then made against Pahlevi and Resht, important Caspian Sea towns, which are essentially Persian. This movement was not pushed.

In the latter part of February, Iranian forces based on Hamadan advanced towards Takistan. The local Iranian governor reported having armed 60,000 tribesmen to aid in this operation, which accomplished nothing. It is doubtful that the governor had 60,000 sets of arms to issue, or anything remotely resembling this. There may have been 60,000 tribesmen in the area, who already had some assortment of arms.

Deadline Delayed. As 2 March approached, the British complied with their treaty provisions and withdrew their troops, who marched across the boundary into Iraq. Russia did not withdraw. Instead, she regrouped her forces. Since that date there have been many reports as to Russian troop movements, of which the majority cannot be verified.

New Russian troops have arrived in Azerbaijan. These came from the railhead at Astara. Astara is just north of the boundary on the Caspian Sea in Russian Azerbaijan. On 7 March the new troops moved thence by road to Tabriz, about 200 miles away, which was reached on 10 March. The Russian movements were reported by Iran as made by night, and therefore difficult to observe. From Tabriz there has been a deployment.

Russian Dispositions. As of 18 March, when this account closes, best information concerning this Russian force is as follows.

Iran reports the total Russian strength in Iran as being approximately 60,000; this includes the troops recently arrived. This corresponds to a corps of 3 divisions. The headquarters is at Tabriz, which has rail connections with the Armenian Soviet Republic. The three divisions have occupied a triangular formation: one division in the Khoi sector, covering the high road to Erzurum, which goes around the north side of Lake Urmia in Turkey; a second division is in the Miyandua sector at the south end of Lake Urmia with outposts along the line Mehabad to Saqqiz; the third division went to the Mianeh sector covering the main road from Tabriz to Tehran. A line of small posts has been established across country between Miyandua and Mianeh.

An advance Russian force (observed by air by Americans) is at Kazvin, with outpost at Karaj. Air observation revealed about a dozen tanks and armored cars, and 6 planes. Iran reports about 3,000 troops present.

A separate Russian force was holding Shahrud and Samnan in northeast Iran. The force at Samnan has been at least partly dispersed, since trucks at that place were seen some time ago by an American who noted their numbers. Those same trucks, identified by their numbers, were last reported at Karaj.

The Russian disposition indicates a defensive line through Miyandua-Mianeh-Karganrud. In front of this is a screen through Kazvin. The purpose of a screen is to cover troop movements, and this screen seems to have accomplished its mission, as there are no reliable reports as to what is happening behind it. Of course nothing may have happened, and there may be no Russian troops other than those mentioned above.

Reactions. The entire Turkish border from the Black Sea to Iraq (approximately 400 miles) is now covered by Russian troops. This has caused unrest in Turkey.

Iran reports its own army as concentrated near Tehran. This consists of 2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, plus some corps troops, and services. Their efficiency is unknown.

The Russian division at Miyandua is in contact with Kurdistan tribes. According reports from Iraq, which is watching closely, no movement has been noted among the Kurds. Iraq has

announced that its forces will cooperate with the British.

As this account closes, Iran has filed an official complaint with the UNO regarding Russian troops remaining within Iran territory contrary to the provisions of the treaty of January, 1942.

RUSSIA

General Situation. There has been no major change during the past month. Russia's political activity continues to be aggressive in all directions—through Manchuria and Iran to western Europe. It is so directed that if checked in some places advances are made in others.

Russia's great advantage is that she sponsors communism, whose adherents exist everywhere. Often a small minority, they are well organized and directed and aid Russia materially. Experience indicates that communists usually favor Russia's cause, rather than that of their own country, apparently under the mistaken belief that living conditions are materially better in Russia than elsewhere. In general, the reverse is the case. The fact that the Russian people, brought by the war into contact with western civilization, have found out for themselves that their standard of life is inferior to that of other countries is a Russian weakness. Russians have lost some confidence in their own government.

Even under the doubtful assumption that the people would stand for it, the economic conditions in Russia are such that a major war could be continued only for a short time after existing stocks of war supplies are exhausted. Large but undetermined quantities of supplies were captured from Germany; certainly there is ample for a minor campaign.

A regrouping of Russian forces in Europe has been announced. The bulk of the forces is reported as on the Danube or south thereof. This was discussed in this column a month ago. As was pointed out, this movement may be influenced by a desire to quarter troops in countries having relatively large food supplies. However, they are there.

On 11 March, Russia offered to supply 500,000 tons of wheat and barley to France, provided that nation furnished

necessary transportation from Black Sea ports. Russians have been on short rations, and just how Russia saved this amount of grain is unknown.

Russia has had perhaps four million troops subsisted in the Balkans, and has thereby saved feeding those. Through the UNRRA she has received substantial quantities of food from the United States. According to UNRRA reports for February, 36,200 tons of food were shipped that month to the Ukraine and White Russia; and 104,600 more tons to Poland. Some 78,700 tons were shipped to Czecho-Slovakia, who thereupon furnished Russia an unstated quantity of its own food products. With this help and strict rationing, Russian may have saved grain for France. Why it was offered to France, rather than placed in the UNRRA pool for general distribution to starved areas, hasn't been explained.

The Baltic States. New coast fortifications are reported by Swedish sources at Paldiski (in Estonia) and on Dagoe and Osel Islands at the entrance of the Gulf of Riga. Work is being done by Estonian labor battalions composed of men believed to be anti-Russian.

Finnish reports are that the Underground is active throughout the Baltic states, and is concentrating on assassinating Russian officers. Intercourse between the Baltic states and Sweden and Finland is prohibited.

Poland. The Underground movement is increasing. According to reports of American correspondents, the 18th Polish Division, operating in the Bialystok sector, has been reinforced by an additional Polish division and one Russian division. Two Polish divisions, rated as 2nd class, are operating south of the Pinsk marshes. There is no reliable information as to the strength of the Underground—estimates vary from

50,000 upwards. Underground units attack critical points, such as RR junctions, post officers, banks, etc. In the resultant fighting an unspecified number of villages are reported to have been burned down.

Austria and Hungary. At the end of February, Russia demanded cession of a large number of farms, complete with tools, animals, etc. As the Austrian and Hungarian governments demurred, the Russians took the farms they wanted during the ensuing two weeks. In Austria, the total acreage amounted to over 104,000 acres — a large amount for a small state. The acreage taken in Hungary has not been ascertained.

The Russian explanation is that the land was wanted to raise food for Russian soldiers. Russian farmers are occupying the farms. Local labor has been retained, and at an increased wage. It is noted that the distribution of farms forms a belt, suitable for strong points and OPs, all the way from the boundary of Czechoslovakia to Yugoslavia. They include some rocky hills and forest land.

The owners of the seized farms were instructed to reimburse themselves by seizing farms owned by Germans who are to be expelled. The Germans had been expecting that fate. They disposed in advance of all movable property, and sowed nothing. Consequently these farms are not in a position to produce this year.

Allied Polish Troops. Those in British service are to be demobilized. They include the II Polish Corps in Italy of over 100,000 men, and a force in Great Britain about half that size. Russia had asked that this be done, charging that these Poles were responsible for the operations of the Polish Underground. The demobilized men will be returned to Poland if they so desire. Otherwise they

may remain within British territory, and employment for them will be found as discharged veterans.

Political Squeeze-Out. Russia steadily increasing her hold on occupied states. The aim is to have but a single political party which must be communist. Any other political party is charged with being "undemocratic and dangerous to the state — consequently due for elimination. The idea is to have an "election" for but a single ticket.

In Russian Germany, a union of the communist and socialist parties is reported. If true, this will be the largest political party in Germany. A similar union is under way in Poland, where "elections" are due. The government desires to have but one ticket in the field, but has not yet quite succeeded suppressing the Labor and Peasant Parties.

Similar steps are under way in Bulgaria. An official American note demanding recognition of other than the Communist Party has been rejected by Russia in a sharp note.

In Yugoslavia, the pro-Tito propaganda is very active and Russian directed. Opposition is openly suppressed where recognized. There is a strong anti-Tito movement but it is not able to operate openly.

Little progress has been made in drafting peace treaties with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria. American correspondents agree that the delay is due to Russian non-cooperation, apparently because Russia prefers to maintain the present status of occupied states rather than to recognize their independence and the ensuing obligation of foreign troops to withdraw. As occupied states, the small countries are at the disposition of the occupying Power whose will is law.

THE FAR EAST (19 Feb to 18 Mar 46)

SITUATION QUIETS IN S.E.A.

There has been a notable decrease in military operations. None have been reported from Burma and Malaya.

Operations in the Netherlands Indies have been limited to minor warfare. In Java the occupying British forces have restricted themselves to maintaining the

existing situation pending negotiations between the Dutch and Javanese authorities for a permanent peace.

Operations in Sumatra are equally at a standstill. It is understood that the outcome of the negotiations in Java will set the pattern for other form. Netherlands territory. Increased

military activity is reported from Celebes but as yet this is unimportant. New centers of hostilities have developed in Bali and Timor, which have not yet reached the stage of active campaigns.

In Indo-China France has announced completion of peace agreements both with China, which has been occupying that area north from Latitude 16°, and with the native Viet Nam Party. The latter agreement has not been released for publication and its terms are partly known. Some fighting continues in this area.

The Southeast Asia Command, with LP at Singapore, is arranging to reduce the activities solely to British territory. On 1 March, Indo-China was detached from control by the SEA, and turned over to France as an independent command, less matters relating to removal of Japanese troops, about which SEA retains control.

It has been officially announced that British troops from India are all to be relieved from duty in the Netherlands Indies as soon as practicable, and in any case by not later than July. The British divisions in that area are mostly India troops, and largely Moslem. Java is practically wholly Moslem, and there has been some fraternization and sympathy between the India and Javanese troops. Some desertions to the Javanese have occurred. High ranking Moslems in India have publicly protested against the employment of Moslem troops against their co-religionists. Troops thus relieved are being replaced by Dutch troops, who have heretofore been held near Singapore, or were training in Holland.

NETHERLANDS INDIES

Java. At the beginning of the period, two Swiss Red Cross officials completed an inspection tour of concentration camps held by the Javanese. They reported that they had visited camps at 50 places, had been given free access to wherever they wished to go, and opportunities to talk with the prisoners of war. They rated the conditions of the camps as being good, with satisfactory subsistence standards. They found a marked defect in medical supplies, and recommended the Allies furnish this by dropping medical stores. Total number of POWs inspected (either white or partly white) was 35,000, which includes women and children.

The Japanese 16th Army in Java is reported as having 70,000 troops. The British occupying forces are under Lieut. General Sir Montague G. N. Stopford. British troops are encircled and hemmed

in. Buitenzorg and Bandoeng are supplied by armed convoys with air cover at required intervals. The other stations are on the sea, and supply presents no problem.

At the beginning of the period, the Javanese had captured the water supply plant for Bandoeng. The British thereupon started an operation to recover it. After reporting 5 days of fighting, against enemy road blocks, the British appear to have accomplished their mission. On 22 February, the Javanese resumed the offensive. The British commander now decided that the Japanese were surreptitiously aiding the Javanese, and relieved them from further duty, reporting to Batavia that they were awaiting transportation back to Japan. The Javanese attacks were by night and showed good leadership.

The Netherlands representatives renewed their efforts to come to an agreement with the Javanese on 26 February. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador, acted as mediator. He appears to have endeavored to induce the Javanese to accept the offer of local self government but under the Dutch crown.

According to British intelligence reports, based on POW statements, the Japanese at and near Bandoeng, in part now went over to the Javanese with arms and motor transportation.

On 28 February, the British announced that they intended to withdraw their India troops. At the same time Dutch troops commenced to land in Batavia to relieve the British. The Javanese were naturally pleased with the British withdrawal, but displeased with the arrival of the Dutch. The Javanese charged that the British had remained in Java for no other purpose than to secure and hold beachheads until the Dutch could organize and complete mobilization. The Dutch arrived in British ships.

In view of a crisis, the Javanese Government resigned and a new government was formed. There were changes in the cabinet, but Dr. Sutan Sjahrir retained the position of Premier, and assumed that of Minister of Foreign Affairs as additional duty. Dr. Soekarno remains President.

On 4 March, minor fighting was reported at Buitenzorg, Bandoeng and Semarang. This soon spread to Batavia

and Soerabaja. More desertions of Japanese to Javanese were reported, and explained on the ground that the Japanese were restive in view of the nonarrival of Allied troops to accept their surrender and to return them to their own country.

The arrival of Dutch troops caused a new complication. The Dutch issued their own money, to replace Japanese currency still in circulation. There was general objection to this change and a refusal to accept the new money. This unforeseen complication intensified the bad feeling between the Dutch and Javanese. However, Sir Archibald Kerr continued his mediation efforts and his conferences.

Sumatra. The British 26th India Division holds Medan, Padang and Palembang against minor opposition from irregular Sumatra forces. About 10,000 Japanese have surrendered and are awaiting transportation to Japan. About 60,000 Japanese are under arms, operating under orders of the British SEA Command. They are not engaged in active operations against the Sumatrans.

The natives have an administration service which functions. A definite government is in process of organization. The east side Sultans who previously governed extensive areas have been induced to resign, except for the Sultan of Dili who appears to have taken refuge within British lines at Medan. This is in line with precedence of events in Java, where the Sultans (only two in Java) joined the anti-Dutch forces.

Sumatra is in liaison with Java, and will probably be guided by events there. The population density of Sumatra is materially less than in Java. In area it is 3½ times larger, and its population is now estimated as about 9,000,000 as against 45,000,000 in Java. As a result the military situation in Sumatra is different. It has large uninhabited areas, without established means of communication, which afford hiding places for guerrillas. The conquest of this great island was only completed by the Dutch shortly before World War I and large native elements never have willingly accepted Dutch authority. It would

seem quite possible for the Sumatrans to maintain a long guerrilla warfare should peace efforts fail.

Celebes. Uprisings by natives, first reported as not serious during February, now appear to be increasing. A British liaison detachment visited Manado on the north coast, and found the native troops in control. These had confined about 200 whites, but agreed to allow their evacuation, which the British arranged for. In addition to Manado, native troops hold Gorontalo, and in general are controlling the north peninsula.

A separate force of native troops, charged by the Dutch as organized and led by Japanese, is holding the area around the head of the Gulf of Bone on the south side of Celebes. Its advanced posts are about 75 miles north from Makassar, on the southwest coast. That town is held by British troops, with which are some Dutch troops. The latter have had contact with the natives, with indecisive results. Japanese troops are still on Celebes, and none have yet been reported as surrendered.

Halmahera. Dutch reports are that the Japanese garrison has joined the natives. A Dutch force which had relieved American troops at Morotai sent a detachment to Galela, Halmahera, which is just across the strait from Morotai, but results are unreported.

Bali. This island has had a Japanese garrison of about 3,700 men, who have retained their arms. On 2 March, a British Naval Force escorted 2,000 Dutch troops and landed them. The British had orders not to support the Dutch against the Balinese, but only against Japanese. Previously advised by radio, the Japanese offered no resistance. On the contrary, they had constructed a wharf to facilitate Allied landing. The Dutch commander established his CP at Denpasar on the south coast.

The Balinese have refused to deal with the Dutch. A boycott has started which extends to all dealings and social intercourse. However, no resistance has developed.

Timor. Dutch troops have landed on this island. No resistance was met, but unrest is reported as being shown by the natives.

New Guined. The United States base at Hollandia has been closed, and the property sold to the Dutch for about \$8,000,000. This includes the wharves and port base, the headquarters, various barracks and quarters, utility machinery, etc. The Dutch have announced that they do not intend to continue this base, but will remove its facilities to Batavia.

Morotai. This former U. S. base has been turned over to the Dutch.

CHINA

There have been no military operations of importance other than in Manchuria, which is the present center of activity.

The Russian Occupation. Except for Port Arthur and Dairen, the Russian occupation was to have ended by 2 February 1946. However, it hasn't ended. At least not for key points.

According to Chinese Communist reports, the Russians have evacuated the provinces roughly east of the South Manchuria RR from Port Arthur to Harbin. The 2nd Ukraine Army Group is holding the railroads and key points. This is the same Army Group which took part in the capture of Vienna, and it is a first class attack unit.

The Russian advance CP appears to be at Chanchun (formerly Hsinking, capital of Manchukuo). The services and supplies are being centered at Chita, where an extensive military base is under construction. From this base the Chinese Eastern RR extends to Harbin and on to Vladivostok. The old Trans-Siberian RR runs from Chita around the north boundary of Manchuria, affording an alternate line to Vladivostok. There is a connection to a parallel railroad (recently completed) further north which terminates at Sovetskaya Gavan on the Pacific opposite south Sakhalin. This newer railroad has cross connections with the Chinese Eastern RR. From Chita there is a double track railroad west to Moscow.

Road connections from Chita extend eastward into Manchuria, and southward into Russian controlled Mongolia.

Chita is about 900 air miles from Peiping, nearest point where foreign fields exist at present. It is about the same flying distance from Mukden; about 1,200 miles from American bases

in Korea, and 1,500 air miles from Japan.

POWs Work and Study. Large numbers of Japanese POWs are working on the Chita base. Unverified reports state that there are between 100,000 and 200,000 Japs so employed. Over 60,000 other Jap POWs are reported working on bases at Port Arthur and Dairen; 55,000 Japanese POWs are reported as in training near Harbin, taking courses in Communism. Jap POWs totaled over 500,000, so at least 200,000 are unaccounted for. None have been repatriated to Japan.

About a million civilian Japanese are in Manchuria. American suggestion for their repatriation to Japan, along with the POWs, have been ignored.

The Russians have removed all movable machinery and stores from Manchuria. Some has appeared at the Chita base. The Manchuria industries development comprised 90% of the Chinese heavy production, and the loss of this is bound to handicap China. Of nearly 1,000 industrial establishment in Mukden, which had 2,000,000 people, only 20 are now working, and these on unessential articles such as cigarettes and vodka.

The Russians are changing the gauge of Manchuria RRs, less the South Manchuria RR, to the Russian standard.

The Russian garrison at Port Arthur and Dairen, which they were authorities to retain, is reported by Chinese source as 1 corps of 2 divisions, with a total strength of some 40,000 men. Mukden had been nearly evacuated by 15 March but there have been no reports of evacuations north of that city.

On 11 March, an American consul was convoyed to Dairen under an escort of warships. The Russians made no opposition to his arrival, and have recognized him as Consul. The Chinese Russian Treaty specified that Dairen was to be an open commercial port. To date no other foreigners, nor even Chinese officials, have been admitted.

According to Russian reports banditry has appeared throughout Manchuria. This used to be normal price to Japanese occupation, but the Japanese came near to wiping it out. It is also reported that small numbers of Japanese troops who failed to surrender are holding out in the hills and mountains of east Manchuria. Largest body

is estimated as 7,000 men and is located southeast of Mukden.

The Communist Position. Headquarters continue to be in Yen-an, but may move elsewhere. A liaison detachment and secondary CP is maintained at Chungking. Officially, peace exists with the ancient enemy—the Kuomintang.

A considerable number of Communist troops are in Manchuria, who claim to hold all areas (outside of Russia) less Mukden and the corridor from there to Tientsin. Their total strength as reported by themselves is 300,000 men, divided between their 4th and 8th armies. This number admittedly invades irregular levies; the combat value is much below what the strength returns might indicate. These troops appear to have gotten along well with the Russians, who they claim reequipped them with Japanese captured arms. This too needs confirmation.

The Communist general commanding their 4th Army has been a POW of the Kuomintang since last year. He was released on 4 March and returned to duty, in exchange for the Kuomintang General previously in command at Peiping, who had been captured by the communists and also now released.

Minor fighting between Communists and Kuomintang forces has occurred around the Mukden area, and in Mukden itself following the Russian withdrawal. It does not appear to have been serious, and no change in lines has been reported.

The Communist C-in-C for Manchuria is General Chu Teh, whose CP was at Fushun, close to Mukden. His troops kept the coal mines there open, and furnished coal for operating the SM RR under Russian control.

The Kuomintang Position. The headquarters are in Chungking, now far distant from main theaters of operation. Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek remains in command. Theoretically and according to a signed pact of 10 January 1946, the Kuomintang is to unite with the Communists, and any other recognized political party, to establish a unified China. The Kuomintang and Communist armies are to be consolidated, and reduced from three millions on paper to about a fifth of that strength.

The American Government is actively aiding the Kuomintang. Large quantities

of supplies are being furnished; transportation is being placed at the disposal of the Chinese; and the Chinese Theater Command, under Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, is directing Chinese operations.

The present main mission is to occupy Manchuria. Since mid-January, large Chinese forces (Kuomintang) have been southwest of Mukden waiting for the Russians to get out. Since 15 March, when the Russians withdrew, Mukden has been occupied.

The Chinese base is at Hulutao where Americans are aiding in maintaining efficiency. Incoming troops, replacements and supplies arrive by sea.

<i>Kuomintang Armies</i>	<i>Divisions</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1st		Commenced to debark at Chinwangtao on 11 March
5th		Near Mukden
6th	22nd, 207th and 1 other	At Mukden
13th (armored)		Near Mukden
52nd	2nd and 25th	At Mukden. 1 more division en route to join.
71st		Sailed from Shanghai on 12 March for Chinwangtao.
92nd (airborne)	2 divs only	Vicinity Peiping. These two armies constitute

The railroad to Tientsin is operating and partly under protection of the 1st Marine Division as far as Peiping.

The problem is to take over the remainder of Manchuria, as and if the Russians withdraw. It is also desired to arrange this without having hostilities with the Communist forces, known to be considerable throughout Manchuria.

The Communists hold the port of Yingkow; the Russians Dairen. Neither will permit the Kuomintang to use either place. Hulutao is inferior to either Yingkow or Dairen for base purposes, and is used only because nothing better is available. The initiation of a campaign to secure a more desirable base is being avoided, with a view to arriving at a peaceful settlement.

This plan is being carried out under American supervision. A special Headquarters Command has been set up at Peiping under an American officer. He has two chief assistants—one Kuomintang and one Communist. The chief of staff is also American and so is the operating staff for the most part.

This special command details boards of one American, one Kuomintang and one Communist officer. Such a board, with interpreters and clerical assistants, is sent to points of contact, and

endeavors by argument to induce Chinese commands (either Kuomintang or Communist) in the field to cease hostilities with each other and agree to unite. The boards supervise and if necessary aid in the issuance of necessary orders.

These boards have had some success, but not yet at critical points. Up to the close of this account, they had not succeeded in arranging for the amalgamation of Kuomintang and Communist troops at Mukden. Mukden is closely bordered on the east side by Communist forces. Minor fighting has occurred.

The Kuomintang is assembling large

American equipped and trained forces in the Mukden area, presumably in preparation for future operations. This force includes the following, in which Chinese "armies" should be rated as corps, as they rarely have over three divisions. The TO strength of divisions is about 14,000 and the combat strength 11,000.

When all the above troops have arrived, there will be 18 divisions about Mukden, and four more in Army Reserve in Peiping. Including service and supply troops, the entire force will number some 400,000 men. If the Communists will join the Kuomintang, there will be at least 500,000 Chinese troops in Manchuria. It is announced that Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer will visit this force during the last half of March.

The Realities. Russia considered Manchukuo under Japanese control as a threat. The Japanese strength varied between 250,000 and 500,000 men at various times. Russia felt it necessary to keep about the same number of troops in east Siberia. The Japanese were formidable not only from their numbers and position, but because they had made Manchukuo nearly self-supporting for military supplies.

As the result of forty years of experience, Russia has desired to remove the former menace to eastern Siberia, and have a weak Manchuria, which would not require large Russian forces constantly on the watch. Her aim was to establish bases at Port Arthur, which has been granted, and lines of communication thereto. It is evident that if Manchuria (which has replaced Manchukuo) is now to be garrisoned by a large and efficient Chinese army, using American equipment and control, Russian access to Port Arthur could be cut at any time, and the general situation as to east Siberia would not have changed.

In view of this situation Russia is showing reluctance to abandoning Manchuria. She has admittedly destroyed, or transported to east Siberia, the vast industries which the Japanese had established throughout their Manchukuo. This action will greatly aid the Russian armies in east Siberia, and correspondingly handicap the Chinese in Manchuria. According to Chinese reports it is estimated that it will take five years to rebuild the demolished plants, assuming, of course, that the United States undertakes that mission. In the meantime, China has no heavy industries.

In case of war within five years the Chinese armies would have to be supplied by the United States from American depots.

For the present the Russian Army Group in the Far East is undergoing regrouping according to some plan issued during the last half of January. Nothing is known of the plan except as it has developed. From this it appears that a garrison has been established at Port Arthur and Dairen, estimated by the Chinese as exceeding a corps. This would indicate preparation for a possible siege. Before evacuating Mukden large quantities of stores were shipped to Port Arthur, which action corresponds with making Port Arthur self dependent. Temporarily Port Arthur is being supplied by sea from Vladivostok.

Main Russian forces have withdrawn to Changchun or beyond, but their actual deployment is unknown. As previously noted, the depots and centers of supply have gone across the border into Siberia.

JAPAN

The occupation of Japan and the reorganization of its government and economic conditions are proceeding in a remarkably smooth manner. There has been no opposition from the Japanese and little protest. Outward appearances indicate complete acknowledgment and acquiescence in the wishes of the conquerors.

British forces are now occupying south Honshu. They number about a corps of 2 divisions. With service and supply contingents, total strength is around 45,000 men. They are of course a part of the command of General MacArthur. The British commander is Lieut. General John Northcutt, Australian Army. His CP is at Kure.

The new Far Eastern Commission was organized at Washington on 26 February. This commission was envisaged in the Moscow Conference which ended on 26 December last, and was apparently set up on Russian demand. On it are the representatives of eleven nations. The Commission has authority to investigate whatever it pleases regarding the Far East, and to make appropriate recommendations. The major Powers, as usual, retain an individual veto right. Consequently the Commission's recommendations can have no executive effect, unless all major Powers are in agreement. This prevents the Commission from reversing any action which General MacArthur may have taken.

On 1 March, the Supreme Command undertook to control imports and exports of Japan. No outside private traders are authorized for the present. The RFC has set up a United States Commercial Company which will handle the exports, which will be mostly silk at first and for which there is a considerable demand. The funds accruing to Japan from such sales will be used to purchase such articles as may from time to time be authorized. Most of these purchases are expected to be in the United States; the War Department will procure what is required.

The Supreme Command published a proposed new Constitution for Japan on 6 March. This is to be voted on at a future date. It somewhat resembles the


American check-and-balance system of executive, legislative and judicial systems, each independent but checking on each of the others. The throne is retained, but is reduced to a ceremonial position with no independent authority. War is abolished, and Japan is forbidden to have military forces of any nature, because war is futile, and should be replaced by justice, tolerance and understanding of mankind.

It seems probable that the new Constitution will be accepted. Whether the Japanese will really believe in it, especially as to its statements on war, is another question. Being disarmed, there is nothing they can do about it.

On 14 March, the Supreme Command turned over to the Japanese Government 3,500 tons of flour belonging to the Commissary. This flour was surplus, due to reduction of American forces over the number originally contemplated. Bread from this flour is to be sold at an official price, which was markedly below the black market price currently in use.

The action of the military authorities is due to the worsening of the food situation in Japan. Large numbers of Japanese are being repatriated to their home country, which was already overpopulated and unable to subsist its own people. The repatriation includes civilian Japanese as well as military personnel throughout the Far East. The repatriated people are brought back in an indigent condition, since they have not been allowed to bring property other than personal hand baggage. The movement is a reversal of the usual trend of migrations of people from dense to less densely peopled areas. It establishes at once a problem of how to feed these people (estimated as about six millions) and how to find living space and work for them.

The food situation is further influenced by a prohibition against Japanese fishing boats operating in other than home waters. This prevents fish products previously obtained in large quantities from waters now assigned to Russia, from waters adjacent to Alaska, and from the high seas, from supplying the Japanese market as had been customary in pre-war days.



Inadvertent Insinuation

Dear Editor:

There seems to be more than considerable doubt as to the justification of the complaint contained in the article "Forgotten Men" in the March issue of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL. It is, in effect, a reflection on many senior artillery commanders for not looking after their officers and men.

While at Fort Sill attending the recent Artillery Conference, I received a message from Brig. Gen. W. B. Palmer, who commanded the VII Corps Artillery in Europe, who expressed himself quite strongly on the subject. General Palmer stated that twelve colonels and lieutenant colonels of VII Corps Artillery and the AAA Group Commander have been awarded the Legion of Merit on his recommendation.

Colonel James R. Winn, who is now with my Section and who served in Hq. XIX Corps Artillery in the ETO, informs me that three group commanders with XIX Corps Artillery were awarded the Legion of Merit in addition to several other awards. Also nine battalion commanders were recommended near the end of the war, but the number actually awarded is not known.

I am confident that the other corps commanders who served in the First U. S. Army in Europe did not neglect this important duty.

If the complaint is not justifiable from the point of view of the entire Army, it might be well to point out that all commanders were not guilty of neglecting to recognize the merit of their group commanders. Many senior artillery officers spent considerable time and energy in obtaining awards for deserving officers and men. These commanders are fully justified, in my opinion, in taking offense at the article.

BRIG. GEN CHAS. E. HART, U.S.A.,

First Army Artillery Officer
Fort Bragg, N. C.

—Proud and militant mouthpiece for the Field Artillery and Field Artillerymen and their magnificent combat record in World War II, THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL would be the last agency on earth to infer that senior artillery commanders, in general, shirked their sobering duties and responsibilities to subordinates in the matter of awards.

Ill-advised or otherwise, the letter was published in forthright openmindedness with an accompanying remark which read in part: "* * * Data are not available to the Editor either to substantiate or to disprove the allegations made in this letter. It is considered a specific case in point, however, of the need both in and out of combat for the 'suitably integrated artillery guidance'" which—again in honest conviction—is deemed essential. Expressing the motivating thought in reverse language, the artillery *might have done an even better job* in World War II.—ED.

Broad Men of Character?

Dear Editor:

It is with some hesitation that I approach this subject for obvious reasons. However, although only a junior officer in the recent war, I feel that remarks and constructive criticism from all levels are needed to obtain a clear overall picture of the problems now facing West Point and the Army as a whole. Also, as a reserve officer, I have a vital interest in the Army and the Field Artillery in particular.

General Taylor's article "West Point Looks Ahead" in the March issue was a fine article expressing, in the limited space provided, the fundamental aims of a West Point education. If the outlined program is carried out, there can be no doubt but that the USMA will provide many capable officers to help fulfill the very great task now ahead of the Army.

However, West Point, despite its virtues, and they are many, has in my opinion one great over-riding fault. It manages to impart to all its graduates a greatly distorted sense of values. It graduates a majority of men who firmly believe that advancement in rank and numerous decorations are the ultimate in success. It engenders the thinking that a product of the USMA is automatically and unquestionably a superior officer and gentleman to any other officer who does not share his background. One of the several results of this creed is the condonation of the military and social sins of its graduates and the ruthless punishment of others for sins of the same or lesser gravity.

This arrogance and intolerance, which unfortunately pervades so many West Pointers, is the main reason why the average man who served in the Army refused to consider embracing the profession of the soldier. (Italics by the Editor.)

This current political uproar about democratizing the services is mainly nonsense. The system, as set up, is basically sound. It is the abuse of privileges granted an officer that brought this widespread condemnation of the whole, so-called "caste." No one, least of all the enlisted man, wants common recreational facilities, messing or living quarters for men and officers alike. What the average thinking enlisted man and junior officer does want is to be treated as a man, and not as some fundamentally inferior being. They want equality in the basic necessities of life, such as food, shelter, heat and plumbing facilities. They do not want to see admirals' lawns being sprinkled when their own washing water is rationed. They do not want generals' planes bringing in private loads of liquor when they have been told that airmail is slow because of the lack of air transport. Such abuses are the real reasons for poor morale, soldier demonstrations and the present wave of bitter criticism.

No one can dispute the Regular Army officer's technical efficiency in his profession. He is, for the most part, capable, courageous and conscientious. But it seems that all too many overstress the unimportant, the minor things; as is evidenced by the colonel in

the March JOURNAL deploring the fact that group commanders had not received as many Legions of Merit as had AGF officers. (See "Inadvertent Insinuation," above.—Ed.)

Thus, I feel most strongly that the USMA should teach tolerance along with pride; breadth of understanding as well as of knowledge; realization of their grave responsibility to their men in addition to the worship of duty, honor and country. Then West Point cannot fail but "to produce broad men of character, capable of leading other men to victory in battle."

LAWRENCE JOHNSON, JR.,
Philadelphia, Pa. *1st Lt., F. A., Res.*

—Searing hot is the charge that as a group West Pointers are arrogant and intolerant. These things are not taught at West Point. Graduates that manifest these traits—and, in honesty, I cannot deny that we have them in our midst—are a disgrace to the uniform they wear and a dishonor to the high ideals of selfless leadership connoted by the very term, *officer and gentleman*.—ED.

Applies Correction

Dear Editor:

Have just learned that my renewal check has bounced. Enclosed a money order for \$3.00.

Honest WILLIAM ———
New Philadelphia, Ohio

Reader Response

Dear Editor:

As an officer who served forty-three months overseas with the 37th Infantry Division and who spent almost a year as Division Artillery I & E officer, I am unable to refrain from taking issue with the comments of Marshall Andrews as reprinted in the February JOURNAL.

With unsurpassed disregard for truth or logic, Mr. Andrews levels a most unjust criticism against the War Department and the officers of our Army. His underlying fallacy should be apparent to anyone who has read or heard one of the earliest orientation lectures presented to our World War II soldiers. I refer to Orientation Course Lecture No. 13, presented to all units in

early 1942, and from which the following is quoted:

"When war comes to the United States, the men in uniform . . . go off to fight that war. The military strategy . . . is determined, and should be determined, by the generals and admirals. But . . . the military policy . . . is determined by the members of Congress and by the President of the United States, who in a democracy are responsive to the will of the people . . . These two allies — military strategy and military policy — are united but unique. They are independent but inter-related. In some instances, the military policy is influenced by the experience and advice of the generals and admirals. In many instances, the military strategy is dependent on the military policy which, in turn, is dependent on public opinion."

In the light of the above, let us examine some of the facts which Mr. Andrews has so blithely ignored.

Under the pressure of public opinion the War Department was forced to announce a rotation policy. My unit was in the Pacific. When, after VE-Day, the War Department was forced by public opinion to announce a demobilization program, the subsequent publicity accorded demobilization plans by agencies outside the Army only resulted in a serious blow to the morale of troops required by military necessity to remain overseas, even though many of them had more than enough points for discharge. It was impossible to take a man off the firing line when no trained replacement was available simply because that man had a certain number of points.

With VJ-Day the clamor of public opinion became so insistent that military policy lost all sight of the requirements of military strategy. In formulating its demobilization policy the War Department considered the requirements of military strategy; to have done less would have been gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. But public opinion made no such concession to rational processes of thought or consideration of all the factors involved. And this public opinion was most loudly expostulated by civilian organizations and individuals like Mr. Andrews rather than by the soldiers with the longest service or most combat

experience. The soldiers had sufficient experience and knowledge of the facts to realize the requirements of military necessity. Many of them had seen only too close at hand the high price that must be paid when public opinion dictates military policy devoid of realistic consideration of the requirements of sound military strategy.

Despite the fact that no unit serve longer or more arduously than the one to which it was my privilege to belong there was never anything but good healthy griping among the men of that command. And probably as much of that griping was directed against the apparent situation back home as against the Army — a public opinion which countenanced mass violence, labor strife, and the clamoring of special interest groups for special privilege. Moreover, the majority of soldiers participating in overseas demonstration were comparatively recent arrivals who had more opportunity to be so indoctrinated than the veterans with long combat records.

The demonstrations of soldiers against the demobilization slowdown have their roots in the practices and preachings which have prevailed outside the Army. The idea that one can get anything if one howls long and loud enough rather than working for it is foreign to the Armed Forces. The attempt to cast the blame for demobilization demonstrations on the War Department or the officers of the Army reflects such ignorance of fact or careless thinking that I can only justify its publication in THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL on the grounds that the Editor desired a reader response.

MAJOR ARCHIBALD M. RODGERS, FA
Ada, Ohio

Never Missed

Dear Editor:

Just a note to report a change in my address. Incidentally, I never missed an issue of the JOURNAL while I was overseas. Many thanks for the fine service and for a magazine no Field Artilleryman can afford to do without.

THOMAS H. KINGSLEY, JR.
Kansas City, Mo.

MANY ARTILLERYMEN WORK IN WASHINGTON

Roster of Field Artillery officers on duty in Washington, as of 20 March 1946

COLONELS

Albert, Russell F.
WD Manpower Bd
 Alexander, William
HQ AGF
 Allen, William H., Jr.
O AC Staff OPD
 Anding, James G.
HQ AGF
 Armstrong, Devere P.
HQ AGF
 Barnes, Verdi B.
HQ AGF
 Barth, George B.
9901 TU Pat Det
 Bassich, Cyril
9901 TU Pat Det
 Berry, John A., Jr.
HQ AGF
 Beynon, James L.
HQ AGF
 Black, Frederick H.
HQ AGF
 Blair, William P.
HQ AGF
 Chamberlain, John L.
Bur of Pub Rel
 Connor, Voirs B.
US Rep MSTC UNO
 Cooper, Ralph C.
HQ AGF
 Cox, Macolm R.
HQ AGF
 Coyne, Christopher C.
O AC Staff OPD
 Crosby, Robert H.
Fld Agency WDMB
 Cureton, William H.
AGO
 Danforth, George L.
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Contemporary Foreign Governments

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HERMAN BEUKEMA

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Major, United States Army

and ASSOCIATES

Department of Economics, Government and
History, United States Military Academy

This important, timely study is a prerequisite to the full understanding of today's confused international scene. Only four years ago seven foreign nations could boast the classification of "great power." Today only the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth retain this status. Here is unfolded the pattern of development which has brought these seven countries to their present political positions—as well as their historical origins, philosophical bases and constitutional structures. World stability efforts of recent years are particularly emphasized, from the Atlantic Charter to the United Nations Organization. *With maps and illustrations.* \$3.50

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THEY WORK FOR YOU

Major Robert F. Cocklin joined the staff of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL as Associate Editor early in March.



Recently returned from the Pacific Theater, Major Cocklin served with the 93rd Infantry Division from January, 1944, until his return to the United States late in December, 1945. He

participated in the Bougainville, Bismark Archipelago, New Guinea and Philippine Islands campaigns, and served for a time as the Acting G-4 of the 93d Infantry Division. A graduate of the OCS at Fort Sill in June of 1942, Major Cocklin has been on active duty since March, 1941.

Prior to entering the Service, Major Cocklin attended the University of Nebraska where, among numerous other activities, he engaged in journalistic work. Although both call San Francisco home, Major and Mrs. Cocklin are now residing in Washington.

Master Sergeant Vito Tassono has completed over thirty-two years of consecutive service in and for the Field Artillery. When he retires—which will be soon—he may do so with the warm satisfaction of having well achieved the high ideals of the United States Army. And certainly, the



Army has every reason to be most proud of Sgt. Tassono—fine American soldier that he is.

Born in Italy in 1892, Sgt. Tassono came to the United States when he was 16 years old, and enlisted in Battery E of the 6th Field Artillery (then at Fort Riley) in 1913. He served continuously with the 6th Field Artillery (including its distinguished combat service in Europe in World War I) until 1923, when he was transferred for duty in the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery. He remained in that Office until it was inactivated in 1942, when he joined the staff of THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL. Here at the JOURNAL Sgt. Tassono is in charge of the circulation department.

ONE WORLD

"Since Whittlesey House was first established by McGraw-Hill in 1930, we have not published any book devoted to a subject of greater importance to the survival of mankind than **ONE WORLD OR NONE.**"

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PREPARED BY 17 OF THE FOREMOST AUTHORITIES ON THE SUBJECT

Edited by **DEXTER MASTERS**, Editor of Science Illustrated and **KATHARINE WAY**, Nuclear Physicist, of the University of Chicago

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To give the American public an authoritative, over-all analysis of the immediate and long-range problems created by the atomic bomb, we have persuaded some of the outstanding scientists associated with the project, as well as top authorities from the political and military fields, to collaborate on this book. This remarkable document presents a rounded discussion of the full meaning and dimensions of the bomb's threat to world survival, bringing together in one book, *for the first time*, an informed discussion of all the ramifications of the subject.

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ALBERT EINSTEIN,

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
The bulk of the proceeds from this book will go to the Federation of American (Atomic) Scientists for use in furthering public understanding of the facts of atomic energy and their implications for society.

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Useful Round-up

ONE WORLD OR NONE—A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb. Edited by Dexter Masters and Katharine Way. By 17 individual authors and the Federation of American (Atomic) Scientists. Whittlesey House, New York, 1946. 75 pages. \$1.00.

By Richard Cordon McCloskey

Of the 17 contributors to this book, five are Nobel Prize winners, and all are leaders in nuclear physics. They deal in a masterful way with the physical aspects of the bomb.

The first eleven chapters discuss specific aspects of the atomic bomb problem. Ten of the chapters are written by scientists who worked on the bomb. All of them agree that the inconceivable destructiveness of the bomb makes it the greatest weapon for peace that the world has ever known on the ground that it is too terrible to use. The one military contributor to the book agrees with the scientists but from the opposite viewpoint. He hails it as the savior of the world because the nation which uses it will win any war, hands down.

The second part of the book contains three chapters. One proposes international inspections to prevent the manufacture of the bomb; one discusses present and past international organizations that might control the bomb. The last suggests rather inconclusively that internationalization of atomic information and military forces might solve the problem.

Shining through the whole book is the unquestioned sincerity of the authors. Shining with equal force is the fact that none of the authors have any workable suggestions for solving the atomic bomb problem. They pose all the questions, but give no answers. They discuss at length the horror of the bomb—few of us have to read the book to appreciate that—but do nothing to ameliorate the tension under which we are living.

If you want to know what the bomb can do and—approximately—how it does it, this is a very useful round-up of expert opinion. If you want to know what we should do with the bomb and how we should do it, you will have to seek elsewhere for the answer.

CURRENT and CHOICE

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THE CASE AGAINST THE ADMIRALS

*Why we must
have a unified
command*

by
**WILLIAM BRADFORD
HUIE**

Written from the Army Air Force "side of the arena," this book sets up the following devastating charges against the Navy high command.

- ✓ Failed to act on the Martin-Bellinger report of August 20, 1941, which described in detail the planned Jap attack on Pearl Harbor.
- ✓ Engaged in fratricidal struggle to prevent General MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander in the Pacific.
- ✓ Hailed as great naval encounters the magnificent air victories at Midway and Coral Sea—when the big naval guns fired not a single shot at an enemy vessel.
- ✓ Hid the results of the test bombing in 1937 of the battleship Utah in an attempt to block the development of heavy bombardment aviation.
- ✓ Maintains an un-American caste system that rates "normal and customary procedures" above intelligence.
- ✓ Opposed and opposes consolidation of our armed forces out of a desire to maintain its own prestige and command position.

"The book's attack on the Navy higher-ups is deadly and devastating. It will be surprising indeed if it doesn't have repercussions on Capitol Hill, where so far the Navy brass has been able to prevent legislation uniting all forces under one command."

—Chicago Sun

**U. S. Field Artillery Assn.
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"Angry" Book

THE CASE AGAINST THE ADMIRALS.
Edited by William Bradford Huie. 216
pages; index. E. P. Dutton &
Company, Inc. \$2.50.

By John R. Cuneo

At the moment of writing there is a temporary lull in the vocal and ink warfare being publically waged by the armed services over the question of unification. Here is an angry attempt to destroy the truce, to arouse the public against the naval objections to unification and to win the battle for a united armed service.

Mr. Huie's qualifications for writing this book are based principally on the knowledge he acquired through an association with General Hugh Knerr of the AAF during which he was the general's literary ghost and finally his collaborator in writing the book *The Fight for Air Power* (1942). To a lesser extent his knowledge come from his experiences as a historian of the Seabees concerning whom he wrote two well-received books.

The "admirals" accused by Mr. Huie are those in charge of the Navy Department—usually anonymous "Old School Ties" although at times Admirals Leahy and King come in for personal attacks. This reactionary clique of admirals is charged with obstructing the development of long-range bombardment aviation prior to and during the war, with being partially responsible for the dual organization which at times during the war resulted in a fratricidal struggle for power and a wasteful duplication of means, with having a caste system which engendered bitterness among the civilians inducted into the Navy and with refusing to recognize the implications of air power in the atomic age. As each of these subjects could fill a separate volume, the discussion is necessarily brief. However, this sketchiness cannot help but make some of the claims of the author unconvincing.

It is, I have stated, an "angry" book. This arises from the fact that its most original and interesting sections deal with Mr. Huie's hero, General Knerr. The author's wrath is engendered by the failure of the armed services to recognize this man's value. Mr. Huie claims that General Knerr foretold the

air-naval battles of World War II but was unheeded; that he was "fired out of the service"; that he was eventually taken back during the war not for his ability but as a means to stifle his and Mr. Huie's) writings on air power after other underhanded attempts by the Navy to silence him—such as getting him fired from the Sperry Company and threatening his publisher—failed. There seems to be reason for Mr. Huie's wrath and his chapters on the subject are the best in the book.

For the most part the book is primarily part of the attack by army airmen on the navy and is more of an argument for an independent air force than for a unified command. It repeats a great deal of the earlier *The Fight for Air Power* and in common with most air-power literature its style is high-pitched. Readers who know that the fight on air power has not always been a conflict between angels (the airmen) and devils (the ground commands) may find it hard to stay with the book to the end.

The book does not pretend to be a balanced estimate of the situation and hence its one-sided claims cannot be criticized on that account. It is frankly the excited, rhetorical charge of a prosecutor to a lay jury.

Modern Boswell

*MY THREE YEARS WITH
EISENHOWER.* By Captain Harry C.
Butcher, USNR. 912 pp.; illustrated.
Simon and Schuster. \$5.00.

To one unfamiliar with the European theater of operations, this personal diary of Captain Butcher makes delightful reading. Tracing the day by day events, both social and military, of the Supreme Commander in Europe, he unfolds the story of the days when General Eisenhower was actually carving himself a sizable niche in history.

Starting on July 8, 1942, this book faithfully records the actions, impressions and beliefs of a man who was destined to handle the largest military organization ever to be assembled on the face of this earth. From the first toddling steps of the American forces in Europe, through the molding of the mighty allied SHEAF, to the ultimate

victory of the allies, this diary gives the reader an insight into many of the hitherto "TOP SECRET" phases that set our course in the European war. The very subject matter of the book makes it one that will be read by anyone who has the slightest interest in the military. More than that, however, it will appeal to the many of us poor humans who love to peek into the so-called private lives of the famous.

Since this reviewer was busily engaged in another part of the world during the period covered by the book, he is not prepared to vouch for the authenticity of the statements contained therein. Being recorded day by day, it cannot help but be an accurate record of the course of the world-shaking events in that theater together with the "bossman's" approach to the problems he faced. As such, even the most authoritative critic will find scant room for criticism of the chronicle which Captain Butcher has prepared.

Far from being the dry, staid, official type of document, this book is written in a very personable style with sufficient "human" angles interspersed with the historical data to make an easily digestible seven-course biographical repast.

The reader is held in positive awe of the casualness with which the great men of our time parade before him. We breakfast with Marshall, lunch with the King and sup with the Prime Minister. Sandwiched in our day are constant meetings with the world leaders of our time. We are carried from London to Gibraltar, thence to Africa, to Sicily, Italy and then back to London to start the great invasion of the Continent. Each new scheme and each new operation brings to light the innumerable problems to be solved, questions to be answered and ruffled personalities to be smoothed over.

Butcher wrote it, Eisenhower lived it; this interesting book is truly "a backstage account of the movements of the most important actors in the greatest drama ever played." R. F. C.

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(If not listed, unsigned illustrations are from authors, by the Journal staff, or from special sources. References are to pages.)

Signal Corps: 258, 264, 265, 266, 267, 271

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NY Herald Tribune and Irena Lorentowicz: 319

Nice Cup of Tea

THE KING'S GENERAL. By Daphne du Maurier. 371 pp. Doubleday Co. \$2.75.

By Susie-Lane Armstrong

George M. Cohan once observed about a play in which he starred on Broadway, "Well — it's a nice cup of tea." Much the same can be said of this novel, for it lacks the full-bodied flavor of the author's *Rebecca* and the stimulating tang of her *Jamaica Inn*. Nevertheless, it's a satisfying brew for several evenings' entertainment. Honor Harris gives us the story—an unusual

heroine in that she is a cripple unable to walk. Her handsome "King's General" — proud, embittered, cruel and domineering, finds his only peace when with her in the bleak Cornish-coast castle which hid its grisly secret so long and so well.

Ably bridged is the 300 years' gap since the clash between His Majesty and Parliament; hence the reader is scarcely aware of moving in another era of secret passages, night-riding couriers and ships in full sail. This vivid background of action, however, tends to submerge the personalities themselves until so late in the book that we take their leave wishing we had grown to know them better in the beginning.



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
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Rational Thinking

THE ANATOMY OF PEACE. By Emery Reves. 293 pp. Harpers. \$2.00.

Mr. Reves has written a book that gives us a basically sound argument on the fundamentals of what it takes to make peace a reality. He has dealt with the subject matter in a straightforward, clear manner that stimulates thinking on the problems with which we are faced today.

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Anatomy of Peace will be hailed a service by the thousands of puzzled men and women today who are haunted by the question of "Where do we go from here." It should be read by every thinking person throughout the world.

R. E. C.

Model Book

BASTOGNE: The Story of the First Eight Days in Which the 101st Airborne Division Was Closed Within the Ring of German Forces. By Col. S. L. A. Marshall, assisted by Capt. John G. Westover and Lt. A. Joseph Webber. 216 pp.; illustrated; maps. Infantry Journal Press. \$3.00.

By Maj Gen. H. W. Blakeley, USA


This book is recommended without reservation to everyone who participated in the historic eight days referred to in the title, to army officers who are writing unit histories, and to anyone who likes a straightforward story of a military action. It is in many respects a model book. Its background is remarkable. Colonel Marshall, official historian of the European Theater of Operations, was on the ground at Bastogne with trained assistants while the battle was still in progress. Between December 31, 1944, and January 25, 1945, interviews were conducted with individual American officers and with whole groups of

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officers and enlisted men. Official records were available to an unusual degree. Nearly a year later, in November and December, 1945, the author conducted a series of conferences with the three senior German generals most directly concerned in the Bastogne opinion. Rarely has such a combination of military and historical ability and of first hand knowledge of both sides of the operation gone into a book.

There are many sketches showing in considerable detail all of the main actions in the vicinity of Bastogne during the period covered. Some twenty reproductions of photographs, and several drawings made by Tech. Sgt. Olin Dows during the siege will bring back memories to anyone who fought in the ETO in the winter of 1944-45.

One section is devoted to notes on the text. One of the few unfavorable comments possible on this book is to say that this is an unfortunate arrangement, in that notes of interest to most readers and notes which are merely references to authority for statements in the text are not separated.

Antitank Warfare

HARD POUNDING by Lt. Col. G. D. W. Court, MC, RA. 137 pp; index; photographs; U.S. Field Artillery Association \$2.50

By Col. Peter C. Hains, III, Cav

Although Colonel Court and I served in the Tunisian Theater together, the privilege of making his acquaintance was deferred until the fall of 1943 when we served together at the Tank Destroyer Center, Camp Hood, Texas. From the very beginning we found our sympathies and experiences in combat with respect to anti-tank warfare were closely allied. Colonel Court furnished valuable assistance to the Tank Destroyer Center in analyzing and criticizing our methods, doctrine, and procedure from a constructive standpoint.

As the author points out in his preface, "there exists definite gaps in the written material already produced, in various forms, covering the employment of anti-tank guns of all calibers. My aim, then, was to make some attempt to fill those gaps in a constructive manner, not solely for the anti-tanker, but for all members

of the armed forces." *Hard Pounding* is a big step toward accomplishing the author's aim. It is unfortunate that this handbook was not produced at an earlier date in the war, in order that it might have been available for study by those elements of our combat forces who were engaged in anti-tank warfare. The book, as a whole, is in the nature of a notebook reflecting the experiences of the author and of his research into the matter discussed.

In his initial chapters Colonel Court traces the development of the philosophy of tank and anti-tank warfare in a unique and interesting way. Many questions are raised and answers are offered with the obvious intent of stimulating thought and discussion on the matter. This part of the book is well worth the attention of all armored and artillery personnel.

Unfortunately the latter part of the book, which is devoted to organization, is not strictly applicable in view of recent trend in the doctrine of our armored forces toward the development of a fighter tank for tank destroyer purposes. However, the principles involved are still applicable.

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Military men will do well to read and consider *Hard Pounding*, as it is a clear, simple, exposition of the problems of destroying mechanized combat machines by anti-tank warfare.

Between Great and Good

RED CANVAS. By Marcel Wallenstein.
304 pp. Creative Age Press. \$2.75.

By Major James V. Shea, AC

Tod is an American pin-up artist; Desna his titian-haired wife; and Paula is an English government girl. The setting is war-torn London in the preinvasion days, moving for its finale into liberated Paris. The plot reverberates through bombings, boudoirs, battles and black markets.


It would seem that with all these ingredients, *Red Canvas* couldn't escape being a great novel. However, something is missing—that special touch that spells the difference between great and just good. It is good reading.

Tod, separated from his lovely wife just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, receives an urgent message from her requesting his return. He is unable to get back to her until he receives a job with OWI as an illustrator.

While waiting for an opportunity to get into Paris, he meets Paula in London. Her characteristically British calm soothes his troubled heart and he finds solace in her arms until, torn between two loves, he accepts an invitation to accompany the invasion of the continent. In his rush to get to Desna in occupied Paris, Tod leaves the Army to join forces with the FFI. After several hair-raising episodes in which he sees several of his friends killed and kills his first Boche, he reaches his wife.

Their hectic stay together entangles them in black market investigations and ends in an abrupt and final parting.

Mr. Wallenstein concludes his yarn in a very satisfactory manner, with all concerned getting their just deserts.



"The love story of little Anya and her huge captain is told with such delicacy and grace that one easily understands why the whole battalion fell in love with Anya. No one can read *Days and Nights* without a lift of the spirit and some little accretion of pride in being a man."

—*New York Times Book Review*

This is one of a spate of superb reviews (there have been no adverse ones) which have greeted the publication of this major novel from the Soviet Union. *Days and Nights* is the epic story of the Battle of Stalingrad, told by Russia's hero-reporter-poet, Konstantine Simonov. (A Book-of-the-Month Club selection.)

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Repeated here is your Association's earnest request for copies of unit histories of divisional and non-divisional artillery units in World War II.

Stalingrad Saga

DAYS AND NIGHTS. By Konstatine Siminov; translated by Joseph Barnes, 421 pp. Simon and Schuster. \$2.75.

Most of us book readers have been a little dubious about the books written by Russians that have come out of Russia in the past few decades. Most of them could not avoid weaving their political thread throughout the pattern of their history. Konstatine Siminov, in this new novel, has successfully evaded that pitfall.

He brings us the simple story of a young Red Army officer and the Russian nurse with whom he falls in love. The siege of Stalingrad would scarcely be selected by most of us for the setting of a beautiful romance. However, in *Days and Nights*, the author has skillfully brought into play all the emotional nuisance that any reader could ask by combining the grisly tale of the Russian defense of that city with the heart-warming tale of the romance of this officer and his nurse.

We go with Capt. Saburov and his battalion to take up the defense of Stalingrad, and, in the course of the seventy days and nights that follow, we seize and hold three apartment houses, do away with a traitor in our midst and despite the horrible casualties inflicted on us, successfully repel the German attempts to wrest our position from us. The captain, when wounded, is cared for in the home of his nurse and the resulting account of their romance beautifully unfolds as the tide of battle swings into our favor.

The author, Konstatine Siminov, is one of Russia's outstanding war correspondents and has written many

short stories, novels and plays. With this book, he has established himself as one of Russia's foremost non-political writers.

R. F. C.

Completely Unique

LANDING OPERATIONS. Strategy, Psychology, Tactics, Politics, from Antiquity to 1945. By Dr. Alfred Vagts. 831 pp.; index; illustrated. Military Service Publishing Company. \$5.00.

In a sense, this book exceeds even its sweeping title and sub-title. It includes not only landings from the sea, but also landings from the air, and in addition goes into the question of command. It is divided into four parts: The Overall Picture, Ancient and Medieval Operations, 17th and 18th Centuries, and The Age of Steam.

The author was German born, and served in the German Infantry from 1914 to 1918. He is now an American citizen and a prolific writer on military subjects.

Of continuing interest to some military scholars and certainly a contribution to the history of warfare, the average soldier with an interest or experience in landing operations may be somewhat

overwhelmed by the first 502 pages, which are devoted to pre-World War I days. Regrettably, incidentally, are certain factual as well as obviously typographical errors that crept into the chapter on the Normandy landings, the greatest in world history.

But this monumental work — and such it is—cannot be judged as a mere detailed history of specific landing operations. Transcending these details is Dr. Vagts' scholarly analysis of the psycho-political and other related factors, viewed objectively in their ever-changing time setting, that combined in World War II to achieve a "new synthesis" among the sea, air and ground forces. Unlike World War I (a "war of missed opportunities"), Dr. Vagts concludes that World War II experience, including the advent and use of the atom bomb, "in combined and landing operations has provided the incitement for officers and civilians to consider, if not to demand, the unification of services in the United States."

Completely unique, *Landing Operations* constitutes a major contribution to the world's library of military art.

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Doctor VAGTS covers the entire history of landing operations in this monumental work, from the earliest recorded ventures of the Greeks to 1945. He analyzes all phases of the tremendous problem, and correlates the lessons provided by remote records with the history-making operations of the war waged by the Allies and the Axis.

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GENERAL WAINWRIGHT'S STORY. By General Jonathan M. Wainwright. Edited by Robert Considine. Doubleday and Co. \$3.00.

"Bataan" and "Corregidor" were the greatest defeat for American arms in history. Accompanying the tale of this defeat is a grim and pitiless story of gallantry and heroism by our vastly outnumbered defenders.

As the commanding general of the U. S. forces in this engagement, General Wainwright unfolds a heart-breaking reminder of our complete unpreparedness for war in those years, and the price that he and his men had to pay for it.

The heroism of the American and Filipino soldiers who fought in this campaign overshadows that in other phases of the war because every one of them knew that they were without hope of reinforcement or supply. For five months these men laid down their lives, inching back grudgingly, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy before additional resistance became hopeless.

Starting at the very beginning of the war in the Philippines, General Wainwright leads us through the many heart-breaking events that heralded the ultimate defeat. He takes the reader through his months of confinement and in true fiction manner brings the reader out of his imprisonment to witness the unconditional surrender of the Japanese commander who defeated him, back home to the Congressional Medal of

Honor and the just acquittal of one of America's most gallant soldiers.

No tale of Japanese mistreatment of American prisoners of war has been more forcefully told. The American commanding general tended goats, sharpened razor blades and was struck by Japanese enlisted personnel for not bowing with proper respect. The starvation, privation and utter humiliation that was forced upon this group should arouse readers whose memories have been dulled by the complete about-face the Japanese people have taken in defeat.

In the final chapters of the book General Wainwright, witnessing the surrender of Yamashita, tells the American general in charge that he hopes that Yamashita will receive the courtesy due his rank in the matter of personal accommodations, housing and food. Wainwright is thus revealed as a good soldier, a good loser and, in the end a great winner—an outstanding individual tribute to the way of life for which we fought.

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