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The United States Army Field Artillery Branch's Newsletter

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Purpose: Founded in 2011, the Redleg Update provides past and present Field Artillery leaders with a monthly update of informational highlights to assist in their individual, collective and professional training efforts, as well as report on activities occurring throughout the Field Artillery community.

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Stephen J. Maranian Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commandant,

United States Army Field Artillery School

Stephen J. Maranian


RFIs, Notes, and Notices: To submit a Request for Information (RFI), please email the POC listed below.

Points of Contact:

We appreciate those who have provided announcements, notices, articles and lessons learned.

Additionally, if you have a story of interest or wish to initiate a discussion on any topic or issue facing the Field Artillery community, contact Ms. Sharon McBride, Field Artillery Public Affairs Officer, at (580) 558-0836 or sharon.g.mcbride4.civ@mail.mil

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From the Commandant's desk

Readiness:

We Must Be "Ready Now"

The FORSCOM CG, GEN Robert B. Abrams, echoes the CSA's imperative – the number one priority for the Army is "Readiness." It is no longer good enough to focus solely on a unit's next assigned mission. As an operational force we must be "Ready Now" across a growing complex global environment, and we must be prepared to fight and win large scale ground combat operations against peer or near-pear adversaries. It is for this reason that "Enabling Readiness in the Operational Force" remains our Line of Effort #1 and our top priority.

Over the years, many have assumed that readiness relates primarily – or even solely to training. There are actually four measured areas of readiness which form the cornerstones of the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM): Personnel, Supply, Maintenance and Training. Building and sustaining readiness, whether at home station or deployed, must focus on all four pillars.

I would like to address aspects of two pillars that we as the Field Artillery branch proponent directly affect: Personnel and Training. From a FORSCOM perspective, we help the operational force by enabling ARNG Duty MOS Qualification (DMOS-Q) and facilitating Professional Military Education (PME) attendance.

Every Soldier – Active and ARNG, in every unit counts and they must be able to perform their mission at home or abroad, in peace and in war. Ultimately, the Field Artillery branch is about our people. No matter how technical our operations become, or how wide our global missions expand, our people will continue to be our most treasured resource and the bedrock of our ability to deliver accurate and lethal fires.

As leaders, we must take the time to invest in this resource. Commanders are responsible for scheduling Soldiers' PME attendance and ensuring they are DMOS-Q. HRC and State HQs facilitate PME attendance for your Soldiers, but commanders ensure

attendance and ensure attending Soldiers, regardless of rank, are physically and mentally prepared for the rigors of each course. At the United States Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), we are doing everything we can to bolster PME and other learning opportunities for enlisted Soldiers, officers and warrant officers. For example, we are rolling out a new performance-oriented program of instruction (POI) for all CMF-13 Advanced Leaders Courses (ALCs) and Senior Leaders Courses (SLCs).

In ALC, we will focus our efforts on developing muscle memory in those skills required of NCOs to be effective as Section Chiefs. Likewise, in SLC, we will work on the skills required for NCOs to be effective Platoon/Gunnery Sergeants, Task Force Fire Support NCOs, and Battalion Fire Direction NCOs. These reforms and our planned growth of the Master Gunner Course POI, will result in a much-needed recalibration of our NCO Professional Development System (NCOPDS).

Likewise, the FA Basic Officers Leaders Course (BOLC-B) received a significant upgrade to its POI. To facilitate the teaching of Joint Fires Observer (JFO) skills to our lieutenants, we developed and implemented JFO Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI). The JFO IMI is a software program students access on Blackboard providing students with virtual equipment 'hands on training.' Though it does not provide the form, fit, and function of field training, it does provide students the reps and sets on the technical aspects required in developing highly effective JFOs.

The program provides lieutenants the ability to gain familiarity with the equipment they will use in the operational force. The JFO IMI instructs these students on how to operate a Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR); it also incorporates the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR), the Advanced

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System Improvement Program (ASIP) radio, and the Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR). We are also working on adding the Joint Effective Targeting System (JETS) and the Harris 117G radio to the mix.

Additionally, the Fire Support Department increased the amount of digital training provided to our lieutenants. Students now receive hands-on training with the Pocket Forward Entry Device (PFED) and then have opportunities to incorporate the PFED into their live-fire training.

The Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) is also updating its POI, with increased rigor and instruction on Advanced Target Development and digital systems integration skills. This will provide students a better understanding of intelligence collection processes, the Joint Targeting Cycle and weaponeering. This past year, we gained approval to begin pilot courses for A+ Certification under the Army University Credentialing Program in an effort to align FA WOAC with other branch schools; the credentialing opportunity is something that our technicians have been asking for and we're glad to deliver recommendations made by the operational force.

We're also designing a Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Phase 3 course that will provide senior CW3 and junior CW4s with the additional technical depth they need to better operate at the division/JTF level and higher; we expect to begin instruction in FY21.

In conjunction to PME and professional development opportunities, it remains imperative for senior Field Artillery leaders to take on the role of mentoring subordinates in the art and science of the integration and synchronization of Fires and Maneuver for large scale ground combat operations – a lost art throughout sixteen years of COIN warfare.

Recent Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations have shown our BCTs are still struggling with delivering timely and accurate fires primarily due to challenges with mission command, planning, and clearance of fires. BCTs and FABs must return to the fundamentals of Field Artillery gunnery, clearance of fires procedures and rigorous fire support standards, which lay the foundation for renewed core competencies and, more importantly, confidence in our ability to meet our

tactical obligations. Commanders must place additional emphasis on digital fires from sensor to shooter in improving timely and accurate fires.

From our observations over the past year, I believe that we must continue to focus leader energy on aiding our Maneuver commanders to optimize planning and synchronization of warfighting functions to make fires more permissive. As I talk with Maneuver and Fires leaders, it is evident that we must get better at the early and iterative process of FSCOORDs and FSOs helping their Maneuver commanders and staffs create more permissive battlefield designs that enable timely Joint fires. This is imperative to effectively integrate and synchronize Fires and Maneuver.

We must be more sophisticated in our fire support approach. We must help design battlefield architectures that enable Maneuver commanders to bring all elements of combat power to bear simultaneously at the time and place of their choosing on the battlefield. Home station provides plenty of opportunity to plan, design, and rehearse these skills, without the time crucible imposed by a combat training center (CTC) environment. Table-top exercises, ROC drills, and Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT) are excellent venues for home station staff training, with multiple warfighting functions integrated. AFTADS version 6.8.1.1, and the future version 7.0, provide unparalleled clearance tools. The art of successfully designing permissive battlefields should resolve 90% of the conflicts we see across the CTCs.

The more rigorous training we conduct at home station, the greater we optimize our valuable time at our CTCs and ultimately the better prepared we are to fight and win large scale ground combat operations against peer or near-pear adversary's in a growing complex global environment. Fires commanders ensuring their Soldiers are DMOS-Q, PME-qualified, and rigorously trained is the sure-fire path to being "Ready Now."

BG Stephen J. Maranian



Long Range Precision Fires-Cross Functional Team (LRPF-CFT)

On 6 Oct 17, Army Directive 2017-24 established a future Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) Cross Functional Team (CFT) pilot. The CFT's purpose is to facilitate horizontal and vertical integration within the acquisition enterprise for long range surface to surface fires, improve the speed of materiel development activities, and inform the activation of the Army's future Modernization Command. LRPF is the Army's number one modernization priority and critical to winning in a fight against a peer or nearpeer adversary.

The Army must provide Commanders at echelon surface to surface fires that are precise, responsive, effective, and adaptable. Army long range precision fires must be able to penetrate through Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) operational environments by synchronizing effects across multiple domains.

What has the Army done?

- The LRPF CFT Pilot reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in November 2017 at Fort Sill, OK.
- The CFT is led by BG Stephen J. Maranian and comprises team members with the appropriate skills and experience who are linked to the Operational Force, Industry, and partners in Academia to bring forward the best solutions for our Soldiers.
- Following mission analysis, the CFT Director briefed the Under Secretary of the Army and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in December on the CFT's focus areas: Deep Fires, the Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) Missile, and Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA).

What continued efforts does the Army have planned for the future?

Deep Fires: Deep Fires will provide the Army and joint force commanders with a surface to surface capability that can penetrate peer adversary A2AD bubbles to engage key targets at strategic ranges.

Long Range Precision Fires Missile: The LRPF missile will replace the aging Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) for the Corps-level fight and above. The LRPF missile provides ten times the current capability through a combination of: increased range; improved logistics and lethality by including two missiles per pod; faster time of flight to target; increased rate of fire; jamming resistance and; lower cost per missile.

Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA): ERCA will be an improvement to the latest version of the Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzer that provides indirect-fires for the Division-level fight. Building on the mobility upgrades that the M109A7 provides to the fleet, this capability will increase the lethality of self-propelled howitzers to fill gaps in the fires portfolio. ERCA provides ten times the current capability through a combination of: increased range; increased rate of fire; increased lethality; increased reliability, greater survivability and; lower cost per kill.

The LRPF-CFT programs will accelerate surface to surface fires capability and capacity at all echelons to significantly increase the ranges and lethality of current and future fires systems. These efforts will provide additional strategic options to the Joint and Combatant Commanders and serious dilemmas for our adversaries through overmatch.

Resources:

http://sill-www.army.mil/usafas/;

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Hashtag: #ArtilleryRedLeg





Readiness Depends on Growing Future Leaders

Development of leaders is paramount to readiness. If we are to grow FA experts who are technically, tactically and morally prepared to lead Soldiers in large scale ground combat operations against a near peer threat, across multiple domains in the current operational environment through unified land operations, it must be done with a holistic approach encompassing the institutional, operational and self-development domains. The process requires investment, presence and commitment on the part of the institution, leaders and the individual Soldier – not a onetime investment, but a prolonged, continuous process which the dividends are reinvested over time perpetuating sustained development of effective future leaders.

We must first acknowledge that development will occur, even in the absence of presence but it may not be the development we are looking for. If a Soldier is not provided proper guidance, opportunity and supervision as required, they will revert to their personal values and experience to determine what they should and should not do. They will still develop in this environment, but it is not necessarily conducive to becoming a leader. What we truly desire is growth. Whether individual or organizational, growth does not occur without presence and involvement of leaders. In the contemporary environment, where there is a proliferation of technology, the challenge of presence becomes apparent. We have generations of folks in society, and in our Army who view technological connections as personal. There's a significant difference between physical presence and electronic connection when it comes to growth; the former will facilitate the growth we need with regard to future leaders while the latter may beneficial to reach and

influence the larger formation. This is not an indictment of the use of technology or society at large, but something that we must be cognizant of in the leader/led relationship. We must coach junior leaders when necessary that being where your Soldiers are/doing what your Soldiers do is irreplaceable in their own and their Soldiers' development.

Across the Army, we're at an all-time low in growing future noncommissioned officers; we just don't develop future leaders like we used to. Within our branch, our skill level one populations are near or over 100% across all MOSs. We've been showing some improvement in our skill level two populations, but not nearly what we need. 13J (130%) and 13R (109%) being the anomalies, the remaining MOSs range from 76% to 91%. Our skill level three populations are all below 84% with the exception of 13B (106%). It doesn't take a math professor to figure it out, we have the inventory to get the branch healthy... what are we doing with it?

There have been improvements within the institutional domain to invest in the development and growth of future enlisted leaders through a number of unprecedented changes; improved career guidance (revised DA PAM 600-25, Professional Development Models or 'career maps'), revolutionary changes to the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System (NCOPDS) from Basic Leader Course through the Nominative Leader Course, and increased opportunities and guidance for self-development ranging from suggested reading to accreditation to functional courses.

The changes implemented within the institu-

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tion are only part of the solution. We (leaders at all echelons, across all cohorts - enlisted, warrant and commissioned officers) need to coach, teach and mentor our Soldiers and leaders down to the squad/ section/platoon level in how to create, sustain and LEAD (presence) through proactive methods to build future leaders. As you all know, I have been adamant about improving our development of future leaders in order to increase the promotion opportunities for quality Soldiers, which ultimately increases our SGT and SSG populations to appropriate levels across the CMF, directly contributing to our readiness as a branch. As of 7 DEC 17, the SECARMY has issued a directive (Army Directive 2017-28 [Sergeant and Staff Sergeant Promotion Recommended List] that directs us to do what we should have been doing all along. If you understand the defined Leader Competency 'Develops' it's pretty clear what we should be doing to develop future noncommissioned officers -Organizational (SSG-1SG) "PROACTIVE in developing others through individual coach, teach and mentor subordinates; accurately and fairly ASSESS, IDENTIFIES future leaders" or Strategic (CSM) "Creates systems and adopts policies supporting professional and personal growth across the organization; stewards the Army's interest in caring for and managing people and other resources." However, the responsibility is not solely on the shoulders of our NCOs, it is an organizational responsibility.

The new policy outlines specific actions for commanders as the promotion authority, rescinds the Command List Integration (CLI) and outlines an "up-or-out" system. No longer can local commanders deny integration into the promotion recommended list as they could with CLI. Now, commanders must use the bar to continued service (with counseling) to identify those Soldiers who have no potential for continued service or leadership. Following the aforementioned Leader Competency responsibilities, we've got to put in the work - we can't simply fall back on 'they ain't ready'. Through a deliberate process, we must provide opportunities and supervision to allow Soldiers to demonstrate potential or lack of potential and assess that potential (through counseling) in order to adequately determine whether the Soldier should move 'up or out'.

Soldiers who do meet all eligibility criteria will be integrated into the promotion recommended list and compete for promotion with all earned promotion points; not unlike what we already do with Centralized Promotion Boards. If a staff sergeant is eligible for consideration to promotion to sergeant first class, no one gets to vote if they are "ready" for the sergeant first class promotion selection board. If they are not barred or flagged, their records go before the board and they are either selected or they are not. If they are not selected, the command must counsel them following the board results release as to what they must do to be more competitive. Under the new directive, a Specialist or Sergeant who is eligible for promotion, not flagged or barred (all else eligible), will go to the promotion board.

What must be absolutely clear to everyone is the new directive is NOT automatic promotion. It IS a Mandatory Board Appearance for eligible Soldiers. We need to ensure our Soldiers and Leaders understand this. It's not so much about promoting everyone as it is about improving how we develop Soldiers to become leaders. We have to invest ourselves in a deliberate process of growing junior noncommissioned officers in our organizations well ahead of when they are eligible, so that when they near eligibility we have properly assessed their potential, and either send them to the board or remove them from eligibility by taking the appropriate administrative action (bar to continued service ([with counseling]). Some will self-identify a lack of potential by failing Army standards; we must also ensure we are taking immediate administrative action when they do so (flag). As I have stated in previous articles and through engagement discussions, the same level of command focus and tracking of promotion eligibility and board appearance should be given as we do for reenlistment eligibility. Incorporated into Command and Staff, subordinate leaders brief by name, within their organizations, who is eligible and when they're going to the board as well as who is not and why and have the appropriate administrative actions be taken? This simple method will provide a sustained organizational focus and appropriate command at-

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tention at each level to be sure we are collectively invested in development of our future noncommissioned officers and we're in compliance with the Army Directive.

We all have a role to play in reversing the downward trend of developing our future noncommissioned officers, none of us can afford to be bystanders. The future of our branch depends on a continued holistic approach encompassing the institutional, operational and self-development domains; we've all got to do our part through increased investment, presence and commitment in developing and sustaining a continuous process maintaining constant development of effective future leaders. King of Battle!

Access https://actnow.army.mil/communities/community/enlisted-cmf13 and join/follow the CMF 13 community to get immediate updates to anything related to enlisted development and career progression.

CSM Berk Parsons





Second Security Force Assistance Brigade Stands Up

WASHINGTON, D.C. (Dec 8, 2017)- The Department of the Army announced today the activation of the second Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in Jan. 2018. SFABs are specialized units whose core mission is to conduct advise-and-assist operations with allied and partner nations.

This is the second of six planned units. SFAB Soldiers are highly trained and are among the top tactical leaders in the Army. Their work will strengthen our allies and partners while supporting this nation's security objectives and the combatant commanders' warfighting needs.

"It is my assessment, and the assessment of the secretary and the assessment of the Army staff, that we are likely to be involved in train, advise, and assist operations for many years to come," said Gen. Mark A. Milley, chief of staff of the Army.

The decision to station the second SFAB at Fort Bragg was based on strategic considerations including projected time to activate and train an SFAB, presence of senior grade personnel to man the unit, and required facility costs.

SFABs are designed on the brigade combat team

(BCT) model and consist of approximately 800 senior officers and noncommissioned officers who have proven expertise in training and advising foreign security forces.

Soldiers in the SFAB are screened based on qualifications and experience. The unit will receive the best, most advanced military equipment available. SFAB soldiers receive special training through the Military Advisor Training Academy to include language, foreign weapons and the Joint Fires Observer course.

Commanders and leaders in the SFAB will have previously commanded and led similar BCT units at the same echelon. Enlisted advisors will hold the rank of sergeant and above. The Army is starting to formalize policies and regulations that will help SFAB soldiers with promotion rates and boards, selection boards, and special pay.

Editor's Note: For more information, please contact MAJ Christopher Ophardt at: 703-693-6356 or christopher.d.ophardt.mil@mail.mil.



What skills can Field Artillerymen bring to the new SFAB?

Maneuver commanders have relied on and will continue to rely upon the presence and knowledge of the Field Artillery to provide "firepower insurance." However, the Field Artillery has proven over the years it can provide more than just "firepower." The Field Artillery can bring so much more to the SFAB. FA NCOs, warrant officers and commissioned officers are highly-trained and analytical-minded people who can think in the abstract, and are able to deliver concrete results. They are experts in coordination, synchronization and integration. They are imaginative, agile, and adaptive leaders and motivators who understand how to build teams and collaborate with others. They are —

multi-functional.

FA NCOs, warrant officers and commissioned officers can synchronize the Maneuver commander's objective and intent to achieve the end state. Through the careful integration of multiple stakeholders and team members, they are able to guide the employment of resources and assets in a way that delivers results at the right time and right place.

Editor's Note: To read more go to the Nov-Dec 2017 Redleg Update @ http://sill-www.army.mil/USAFAS/redleg/page.html The complete article starts on Page 8.



FISTers in Army's 1st SFAB encourage 13Fs to volunteer

By Staff Sgt. Sierra A. Melendez

FORT BENNING, Ga. -- Fire support specialists, also known as 13Fs, or FISTers as they often refer to themselves, provide a critical capability on the battlefield with their ability to synchronize and integrate fires. Whether fixed wing or surface-to-surface indirect weapon systems, they play an integral role in ensuring fires are on target and on time.

For 13Fs in the Army's 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, headquartered at Fort Benning, Georgia, their role as fires advisors for foreign partners is twofold - train them on fires standard operating procedures while simultaneously embedding with them in an austere combat environment.

"It [the training] leaves the classroom and heads straight to the battlefield," said Lt. Col. Melvin S. Jackson, the 1st SFAB's fire support officer. "That's a key piece that the SFAB employs that the conventional Army typically doesn't. This is an organization the Department of the Army has tapped to perform a difficult mission set."

Jackson explained the SFAB's particular mission set is to train, advise, assist, accompany and enable conventional foreign forces - not Special Forces - so that they have the ability to take ownership of their own security, establish stability and encourage autonomy.

The Department of the Army developed the SFAB to act in the capacity of combat advisors - not nation builders. While there is only one current SFAB, the planned activation of five additional SFABs shows that these units are permanent, additive force structure.

Although the SFAB remains similar in structure to conventional brigade combat teams, their elements are significantly smaller. For fire supporters, this will allow them to work alongside their infantry counterparts on a deeper level - reminiscent of the times before the division artillery units were reactivated.

"We're able to enable combat and battalion advisor teams with fire support to allow them to focus on their respective mission set," said Sgt. 1st Class Kyle B. Ihrke, 1st Battalion, 1st SFAB fire support noncommissioned officer. "We are able to communicate with close air support, attack aviation, artillery or mortars while simultaneously de-conflict situations if necessary to meet the commander's intent."

The utilization of FISTers as advisors for battalion level foreign forces enables them to use their indirect fire assets and become a force multiplier for ground forces. Combat Advisor Teams (CAT) work in small elements to create a more intimate training environment and cohesive bond. Once manning requirements are met, the intent is to have one fire support Soldier per CAT.

"We're still achieving the same goal as a 13F would in your BCTs," said Capt. William R. Edwards, 1st Battalion, 1st SFAB fire support officer and Madison, Alabama native. "We're just achieving it with fewer personnel."

Edwards said he is overwhelmed with the plethora of knowledge from fire support specialists in the SFAB's ranks. As part of selection for the SFAB, volunteers are chosen based on qualifications and experience. Many have served in the same position in their former BCTs on the same echelon.

"There's less learning your military occupational specialty (MOS) or going over redundant material and more performing your MOS," said Edwards. "The wealth of knowledge is unmatched and that creates just an overall more professional unit. I have really benefitted from the mentorship and the dedication of the SFAB's Soldiers and leaders." Ihrke echoed his sentiments.

"Everyone here believes in our mission at hand and wants to be successful at it," said Ihrke. "They volunteered to be here, so everyone genuinely wants to be here. It's a refreshing change."

Both Edwards and Ihrke encourage 13 series Soldiers interested in joining the SFAB to contact the field artillery branch manager for more information.

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From left to right: Sgt. 1st Class Kyle B. Ihrke, fire support noncommissioned officer for 1st Battalion, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade and Capt. William R. Edwards, fire support officer for 1st Battalion, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, study a map at Fort Benning, Georgia, Nov. 2, 2017. The SFAB is a specialized unit designed specifically to conduct security force assistance operations to train, advise, assist, accompany and enable partner nation security forces in support of combatant command requirements worldwide. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Sierra A. Melendez, 50th Public Affairs Detachment, 3rd Infantry Division public affairs)

"For the enlisted side of the house, it'll aid in the advancement of your career similar to other broadening assignments like being an observer controller at a training center or a drill sergeant," said Ihrke. "We get to solely focus on joint fire support versus being pulled away for something outside of your trade because of a tasking or as borrowed man power."

"It's a very fluid organization," said Edwards.

"It breeds the ability to adapt and therefore think outside the box and encourages innovation. A young 13F or a seasoned 13F can both benefit from that."



Book Review

The Killer Angel

The Killer Angels tells the story of the Battle of Gettysburg. On July 1, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia, or Confederate army, and the Army of the Potomac, or Union army, fought the largest battle of the American Civil War. When the battle ended, 51,000 men were dead, wounded, or missing. All the characters in the novel are based on real

historical figures. They include General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate army; General James Longstreet, Lee's second in command; and Union Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, who participated in one of the most famous segments of the Battle of Gettysburg, the fighting on Little Round Top.

The story begins on June 29, 1863. A spy comes to Longstreet and informs him that he has seen the Union army moving nearby. This information surprises Longstreet, because General J. E. B. Stuart is supposed to be tracking the Union army with his cavalry. Longstreet thinks the Confederate army must quickly move north to intercept the Union. The Confederates swing souththrough the mountains and toward a small town called Gettysburg.

Miles south of Gettysburg, Union Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain awakes to discover that his regiment, the Twentieth Maine, has a hundred new members mutineers from the Second Maine. Chamberlain gives them a brief speech, asking them to continue to fight, and all but six of the men join the Twentieth Maine freely.

In Gettysburg, General John Buford, leader of the Union cavalry, rides into the town and discovers Confederate troops nearby. He realizes that the two armies may end up fighting in the town, so he takes his

two brigades—approximately 2,000 men—and positions the soldiers along the hills in the area. He knows that having high ground is the key to winning the battle, since it is easier to fight from above than below. In the Confederate camp, Longstreet meets with

George Pickett and several other generals.

On the morning of July 1, Lee rises and curses Stuart's absence. He is blind without Stuart, because without him he has no idea where the Union army is.

He meets with Longstreet, who wants to swing southeast and come between the Union army and Washington,

D.C. Then, Longstreet says, the Confederates can use defensive tactics and have a much better chance of winning the battle. Lee refuses, because he wants to smash the Union army aggressively in one

decisive stroke.

Meanwhile, the battle begins at Gettysburg when the Confederates attack Buford's men. Buford holds the Confederates off until infantry

MICHAEL SHAARA General John Reynolds arrives. Reynolds positions his troops and fights the Confederates off, but he is soon killed. Lee arrives in Gettysburg and finds the battle in full fury. Two other Confederate generals arrive and send word to Lee that they have engaged the Union troops, who continue to pour in from the south. Lee orders his generals to attack. Meanwhile, Chamberlain's regiment begins to move northward toward Gettysburg.

> The first day's battle ends with the Union forces retreating into the hills surrounding Gettysburg. There they dig in, setting up cannons and defensive stone walls. Longstreet is nervous—he knows that the hills are good defensive positions, and he knows that Lee

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plans to attack them rather than swing the army southeast toward Washington, D.C. Lee meets with his generals and is angry with General Ewell for not following his orders and taking Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, thereby instead allowing the Union forces to retreat into them. Ewell is a cautious general, perhaps too cautious. Meanwhile, Buford returns to the Union camp to discover that he is being blamed for the day's loss.

On July 2, Chamberlain awakes and his regiment begins moving north again toward Gettysburg. On the way, his regiment discovers an escaped slave, and Chamberlain muses on the reasons behind the war and his thoughts on race. Back at Gettysburg, two of Lee's generals—Ewell and Early—suggest that the army strike the Union's two flanks in order to weaken it. Lee likes the plan, but Longstreet still wants to move southeast toward Washington, D.C. Lee refuses, and Longstreet reluctantly agrees to attack the Union's left flank. As he leads his troops toward the hills to the south of Gettysburg, Little Round Top and Big Round Top, he discovers that the army has come down off the hills and into the peach orchard at the bottom. He decides he has no choice but to attack anyway, and a bloodbath on both sides is the result.

Chamberlain's regiment finally reaches Gettysburg and is placed on Little Round Top. Chamberlain is told that he is the extreme left of the Union line, which means he can never retreat. Chamberlain and his men hold the hill against numerous Confederate attacks, but eventually they run out of bullets. Chamberlain orders a bayonet charge, and his screaming regiment, charging down the hill, frightens the Confederates into fleeing. The Union still controls Little Round Top at the end of the day, and Longstreet's men have suffered heavy losses in the peach orchard. That night, Stuart returns, and Lee scolds him for being absent. Lee then decides on a plan for the next day: now that he has battered the two flanks of the Union army, the middle must be weakened. He will charge through the middle of the Union line and split the army in two, then destroy each half individually.

The next morning, July 3, Chamberlain's men are moved to the center of the Union line, where it is supposed to be safe and quiet. At the Confederate camp,

Longstreet tries to convince Lee one last time to swing the army toward Washington, D.C., but Lee again refuses. He is intent on attacking his enemy. Longstreet tells Lee that he is certain Lee's plan is doomed to failure, but Lee obstinately refuses to budge. Longstreet reluctantly agrees to attack the center of the line and places Pickett in charge of the assault.

The Confederates begin with an artillery barrage in an attempt to weaken the Union artillery on the other side. Chamberlain finds himself and his regiment in the middle of this bombardment, much to his surprise, but he survives intact. Since the Confederate artillery shoots too high, not much damage is dealt to the Union batteries. The Confederate attack begins as the troops start marching across the open field toward the Union troops. The Union begins firing cannons, blowing huge holes in the Confederate line and killing hundreds of men. When the Confederates come within range, the Union soldiers open fire with their guns, killing hundreds more. Pickett loses sixty percent of his division. The Confederates soon retreat, and the Battle of Gettysburg comes to its bloody, spectacular end.

Book Review Courtesy of Spark notes @ http://www.sparknotes.com/lit/killerangels/summary.html

For the complete list of books on the Chief of the Field Artillery/ CSM of the Field Artillery Reading List go to

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/47930994

