

VOL 2

2021



St. Barbara Enlisted SITREP



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St. Barbara Enlisted SITREP



We appreciate those who have provided announcements, notices, articles and lessons learned.

Additionally, if you have a story of interest or wish to initiate a discussion on any topic or issue please contact:

SGM Reginald D. Atkinson
Chief Career Management NCO
Field Artillery Proponent Office
reginald.d.atkinson.mil@mail.mil
Office: (580) 442-4973

MSG Fernando L. Carrasquillo
13Z Career Management NCO
Field Artillery Proponent Office
Office: (580) 442-4972
fernando.l.carrasquillo.mil@mail.mil

MSG Roy Wilkowski
ARNG FA Proponent NCO
Field Artillery Proponent Office
Office: (580) 442-4970
roy.j.wilkowski.mil@mail.mil

!!KING OF BATTLE!!

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About the Cover:

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii – Soldiers from Charlie Battery “Copperhead”, 3-7 Field Artillery Battalion, 25th Infantry Division Artillery conduct a direct-fire M777 Howitzer qualification as part of their Artillery Table VI (AT VI) section vertical ion and qualification at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii on 27 November, 2020. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jessica Scott



REDLEG 7 SENDS

Redlegs,

Happy New Year! We cannot remember a more exciting time to serve in the Branch. Our entire community has maintained momentum across multiple lines of effort, and we are seeing ever increasing synchronization and communication. We have yet another informative edition of the Saint Barbara Enlisted SITREP for you this Quarter, thank you to all who submitted.

Approved changes/updates during 1st QTR FY21:

- Our Senior Leaders released the findings of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee. Several changes have been directed, and the full report can be read at the following hyper-link: [Fort Hood Report](#)

- CSM Select attendance at FA PCC. Beginning Feb21, 6C select CSMs are invited to attend FA PCC at Fort Sill. Course is one week, must be unit funded.

- Based on Critical Individual Task updates and feedback from the Operational Force, we submitted Course Growth requests for FA Master Gunner Course, 13J AIT, and 13J ALC.

- Branch Visits. Appreciate III and XVIII Corps hosting FAPO and I in October and November—we received invaluable feedback. We are looking to visit I Corps early in 2021.

- Enlisted Manning Cycle (EMC) 21-01. 80% of our NCOs eligible to move preferred assignments. Next EMC opens in Feb21. Do not miss your chance to vote on your next assignment!

Projects in 2nd QTR FY21:

- DA Pam 600-25 updates. We will work with EPMD of HRC to establish manning write ups for Strategic Fires Battalions, review Key Developmental Billets for our 13J40, and analyze the outcomes of EMC 21-01 for potential modifications to ensure we get the right Redleg in the right position at the right time.

- Self Development in Army Career Tracker

(ACT). We will update the Self Develop Model outlined in ACT to ensure our Soldiers are the best prepared for future changes in our branch and profession.

- Credentialing Opportunities. Partnering with The Army University, we will review all our career maps and provide additional credentialing and certifications based on Operational Assignments and Professional Military educational experiences.

- U6 First Responder. The FAMG Division will develop a pilot program designed to provide “over the shoulder” virtual expertise to the point of need in our Operational Forces that is designed to rapidly address emerging readiness concerns in our Towed Howitzer units, and provide critical gap coverage between Operator and Installation Maintenance. It will not affect current course schedules or MTT support.

Lastly, we conducted a Podcast with the Field Artillery Association recorded just before Thanksgiving, released mid-December click below to jump to the link on Spotify:

[RL7 PODCAST](#)

While this was great to discuss topics of their interest, we would greatly appreciate feedback on what our #Redlegs want to hear from us about. Send me the questions, we will schedule a second Podcast early next year to answer from the Branch as we continue to find ways to provide information and synchronize/create shared understanding.

Thanks for all you and your teams are doing across the branch. Continue to lead well and develop others, I am humbled to serve with you!

Redleg 7
CSM Michael J. McMurdy



FA PCC CSM ATTENDANCE



	Monday Week One	Tuesday Week One	Wednesday Week One	Thursday Week One	Friday Week One
0800					
0830	SH ROOM 112	SH ROOM 165	SH ROOM 112	SH ROOM 112	SH ROOM 112
0900	ADMIN 0900-0915	UTM COL CLARK 0900-1015	TARGETING AMTC 0900-1030	NCOA BRIEF CSM MACHER SH RM 112	BN CDR PANEL 0900-1015
0930	DOCTRINE/LL LTC TACKABERRY 0915-1015			LRPF MR ACKERMAN 1015-1130 SH RM 112	
1000	COMMANDANT'S STATE OF THE BRANCH 1015-1115	JRTC INSIGHTS LTC BENNETT 1015-1130	COMMAND PHOTOS 1100-1200	IMI DEMO 1130-1150 SH RM 112	MASTER GUNNER MR CRESPO 1015-1130
1030					
1100					
1130					
1200	LUNCH	LUNCH	LUNCH	LUNCH	LUNCH
1230					
1300	CG'S WELCOME 1300-1430	BDE/DIVARTY/BCD CDR PANEL COL ANDERSON COL MUNGIE COL KNOX 1300-1430	AIR GROUND INTEGRATION, ADAM BAE CW3 RICH HOPKINS HALL RM 227 1300-1530	HRC EPMD LTC TOMLINSON 1300-1415	JOINT FIRES MDTF LTC SINCLAIR 1300-1400
1330				NTC INSIGHTS LTC FOX SH RM 165 1415-1530	ARTILLERY TRAINING STRATEGY MR. PLANT 1400-1500
1400		CSM LEADERSHIP PANEL CSM McMURDY CSM GERMAN 1430-1600		FAPO LTC HALLORAN SH RM 165 1530-1630	REVIEW LSCO COE MR LANKFORD 1500-1600
1430	ARNG BRIEF COL PRITCHETT 1430-1530				
1500	CDID OVERVIEW MR MERRICK 1530-1630				
1530					
1600					
1630			FY 21 FA PCC 2G-F160		
1700			Class 501 1 FEB-12 FEB 21		
			Class 001 1 MAR-12 MAR 21		
1730		COMMANDANTS SOCIAL 1730-1930	Class 502 12 APR-23 APR 21		
			Class 002 10 MAY-21 MAY 21		
1800			Class 003 26 JUL-06 AUG 21		

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Field Artillery Proponent Office

The Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) accomplished the following three significant initiatives this quarter in support of the training, knowledge, and skills for each CMF 13 MOS. FAPO continues to process grade waivers based on those requirements in order to protect the integrity of the Field Artillery proponent. In order to support that integrity, the Supervised On-The-Job (SOJT) MFR was created to support the Army National Guard (ARNG). Throughout this quarter the SOJT has been a successful tool for ARNG to fill critical vacancies due to force structure changes.

To stay relevant with an ever changing environment, the FAPO maintains and updates the CMF 13 portion of DA PAM 611-21 and DA PAM 600-25 as needed. This past quarter, FAPO has made updates to the DA PAM 600-25 and submitted the document to TRADOC for insertion into MilSuite located at (<https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/smartbook-da-pam-600-25>). Updates were made to standardize language with leadership priorities and a significant number of changes were made to Chapter 4 including clarification of Key Development (KD) positions and requirements

for those positions—examples were inserted. These changes are also in an effort to support the operational force and strengthen areas of talent management.

FAPO is also reevaluating training available on the Army Credentialing Opportunities Online (COOL) website for CMF 13 NCOs located at (<https://www.cool.osd.mil/army/>). FAPO Career Managers conducted a formal assessment of their respective MOSs, AOCs, and ASIs to identify and nominate credentials. The education opportunities are accessible to Service Members in order to help obtain relevant professional or industry-recognized credentials (i.e., certifications and licenses), related to military training and skills. The Army COOL website also informs Soldiers of which credentials are worth promotion points, and which credentials are funded by the Army. The selection of Proponent-Recommended Credentials is in direct alignment with the U.S. Army Non-commissioned Officer Professional Development Guide.

MSG Roy J. Wilkowski
ARNG FA Proponent NCO
roy.j.wilkowski.mil@mail.mil

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HRC

Fellow Redlegs,

First I would like to take a moment and thank you for all of your Command emphasis in ensuring our Soldiers participation in the most recent ASK-EM Market. We had an 80 percent participation rate. Unfortunately, that means 20 percent of our Soldier's voices were not heard in regards to their next assignment. We hope to increase this participation in the next market beginning in Feb 2021 by continuing our STRATCOM initiatives here at the Field Artillery Branch, and increasing Command emphasis within the formations.

Soldiers in your formation whose YMAV (Year/Month Available to Move) falls within 2110 thru 2202 will be identified as "Market Movers." On January 6th those Soldiers received an email stating that they will be participating in EMC

(Enlisted Manning Cycle) 22-01; on 3 February the market will open, allowing Soldiers to preference their next duty location. It is important for Soldiers to understand that opting not to preference does not preclude them from being placed on assignment to support Army Readiness. Below is a schedule of our Enlisted Manning Cycles for further information.

Lastly, please continue to utilize your organic S1/G1 capabilities. They have the most accurate information and can assist with providing clarity as we here at HRC continue to make the largest change to enlisted soldier manning since our Nation ended conscription.

Thank you,
LTC Lazander Tomlinson
Chief, Field Artillery Branch
Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate



Enlisted Manning Cycle (EMC) Schedule



EMC CYCLE	START DATE	FINALIZE REQS FOR MARKET	MARKET OPENS	MARKET CLOSES	END DATE	REPORT MONTHS
★ EMC 21-01*	200902	201104	201111	201208	210323	2107 thru 2110
★ EMC 22-01**	201111	210119	210203	210330	210622	2110 thru 2202
EMC 22-02	210203	210413	210428	20210622	210914	2201 thru 2205
EMC 22-03	210428	210706	210721	210914	211207	2204 thru 2208
EMC 22-04***	210721	210928	211013	***211130	220329	2207 thru 2211
EMC 23-01***	211013	220118	220202	220329	220621	2210 thru 2302
EMC 23-02	220202	220412	220427	220621	220913	2301 thru 2305
EMC 23-03	220427	220705	220720	220913	221206	2304 thru 2308
EMC 23-04	220720	220927	221012	221206	230328	2307 thru 2311

Legend:

★ Current Cycle

- One-Month Overlap of Report Dates (Oct 2021)
- ** Transition to 4 EMCs, Legacy 21-03
- *** IPPS-A Release 3 brown-out will degrade HR Information System capabilities from 1 DEC 21 to JAN 22; 22-04 will execute a 7-week market.

Notes:

- Communication between Soldiers and career branches occurs for the first eight (8) weeks of the EMC. In addition, G1s/S1s should communicate readiness concerns with their respective account managers to ensure a common operating picture.
- High priority requisitions may be added in the first four weeks of the 8 week market. Participants will be notified of additions to their market.

Fires CDID

Army Capability Manger
(ACM), Brigade Combat
Teams- Fires (BCT-Fires)
700 Knox Hall
Fort Sill, OK 73503

ACM: COL Carl Poppe
Carl.a.poppe.mil@mail.mil

SME- 13B (Towed) user rep: SFC Kyle Gee
Kyle.r.gee.mil@mail.mil

SME- 13B (Self-propelled): SSG Wilfrido Lopez-
zgarica
Wilfrido.lopezgarica.mil@mail.mil

SME -13J (FDC): SFC Harvey Cornelius/ SSG
Joshua Brantley
Harvey.r.cornelius.mil@mail.mil /
Joshua.n.brantley.mil@mail.mil

SME- 91P (Self-Propelled mechanic): Scott
Mitcheltree
Scott.j.mitcheltree.mil@mail.mil

Call to inform:

Recent CTC rotations have highlighted the challenges associated with maintaining Precision Guided Munition (PGM) capability in FA Battalions where many arrive to start their rotation with limited PGM capable 155MM Howitzers.

ACM BCT Fires has identified that Technical Manuals (TM) for the 155mm howitzer fleets lack a standardized approach to assessing and reporting Digital and/or PGM mission capable status. This includes the M119A3 which uses much of the same 155mm PGM hardware to set inductive fuzes such as Multi-Option Fuze for Artillery (MOFA). We are working to address this.

ACM BCT Fires recommends PGM capability validation be integrated into a unit's regular Preventive Maintenance Checks and

Services (PMCS) and digital sustainment training. In accordance with the TM, the first step is a visual inspection of the cable and M1155A1 Enhanced Portable Inductive Artillery Fuze Setter (EPIAFS). Second, when the EPIAFS is connected and the howitzer initialized, it conducts a built-in test. Third, for 155MM units, conduct a PGM mission utilizing the XM97/1219 PGM test fuze simulator. The XM97/1219 performs a thorough diagnostics of the EPIAFS that helps support further troubleshooting. Using these steps will provide commanders the ability to recognize which howitzers are truly PGM capable. The XM97/1219 will complete fielding to active units in January 2021 and resume fielding to ARNG units that same month.

Howitzers or EPIAFS that are not PGM capable should be annotated during PMCS or Digital Sustainment Training. Damaged/inoperative items should be turned in for repair or replacement through Unit level maintenance.

Replacement stocks of EPIAFS are very limited, with wait times projected up to one year. Units preparing to deploy or for a CTC rotation need to identify deficiencies early and notify Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) (Point of contact is Samantha Safronoff, email Samantha.c.sfaronoff.civ@mail.mil) to be placed on the prioritized list. It is important that damaged/inoperative components be turned in to sustain the repair program and create the appropriate demand signal for production of replacement parts. As the repair/replacement program increases efficiency by this summer, the wait times should decrease. Composite M777A2/M119A3 Bns have the option of implementing controlled substitution of serviceable M1155A1 EPIAFS, and cables from M119A3s to M777A2s, if needed to maintain PGM capability.

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Fires CDID

Army Capability Manager Fires Cells-Targeting is the bridge between the user (Soldiers) and the Program Office concerning fielded capabilities. Our portfolio includes Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS), Centaur, Profiler, Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED)/Precision Fires-Dismounted (PF-D), Forward Observer System (FOS), Dismounted Fire Support Sensors (Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS), Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR), Mounted Fire Support Systems (BFIST, STRYKER FSV, M1200 Armored Knight) and Network integration for both Air Defense Artillery (ADA) and Field Artillery (FA). We gather user feedback about current capabilities which include software problems, MTOE issues, command and control integration, communication needs, Integrated Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM), and any other problems the field needs to help them be successful. Utilizing that information, we determine if there is a gap in our capability or a need for improvement. We then draft courses of action/recommendations to fill the gap and generate the required documentation. ACM FC-T has played a key role in recent years within our portfolio's capabilities development and force structure.

Recently, the JETS program conducted fielding to the Rangers (24 systems) in June 2020 and 3rd BCT/82nd (44 systems) November 2020. JETS provides a light and maneuverable precision targeting device for the dismounted platoon FO/JFO in support of maneuver operations. The LLDR provides overmatch range and precision accuracy, placing dismounted company Fire Support

teams outside the ranges of enemy direct fire systems against all threat formations. The Precision Fires-Dismounted (PF-D) Block I is currently fielded to 9 BCTs and PF-D Block II will begin fielding FY 22 with the technology merging Android Tactical Attack Kit (ATAK). PF-D is integrated with Nett Warrior software and housed on a common handheld commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) End User Device (EUD) with smart phone like technology. PF-D is the first PoR to converge into the Mobile-Handheld Computing Environment and postured to be first to converge into the Mounted Computing Environment with BLOCK 3.

ACM FC-T participates in emerging research and development of future capabilities to enable the seamless transition from concepts to materiel solutions. One future capability we are currently working is Multi-Domain User Sensor Architecture (MDUSA). MDUSA is an initiative by Product Manager Soldier Precision Targeting Devices (PdM SPTD), Night Vision Lab, and selected industry partner to pursue future technology for dismounted fire support sensors.

Army Capability Manger (ACM), Fires Cells-Targeting (FC-T)
700 Knox Hall
Fort Sill, OK 73503

ACM: COL Michael J. Kimball
michael.j.kimball.mil@mail.mil

ACM Deputy: Stephen K. Ford
stephen.k.ford.civ@mail.mil

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Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD)

Call to Inform:

Field Artillery Department, Curriculum Development (FAD-CD) We are currently seeking TRADOC resources to fund a Field Artillery Master Gunner Course. FORSCOM units are concerned with FA technical expertise. CTC Trends have identified shortfalls in Fire Mission processing, sensor to shooter delays, target location errors, digital system integration failures, and the inability to troubleshoot digital firing platforms. The Field Artillery branch lacks a comprehensive course that troubleshoots and trains the entire fire support system from sensor to shooter. FA Master Gunner is

intended to develop a cadre of Master Trainers with enhanced troubleshooting skills who are considered the operational forces subject matter experts who promote readiness on all FA System of Systems. The Field Artillery branch is made up of three major and separated components-each equally dependent on the other for mission execution. Graduates of this course are experts at integrating all three.

Operational Training Division (OTD) for DOTD is leading the effort on some critical programs. DOTD participated in the DE-M SHORAD discussion of the incremental capability development document (CCD) framework and New Equipment Training (NET) Training Support Package (TSP) requirements to support Institutional and Home Station Training. The Government/Industry team are applying an incremental, stair step approach to develop the appropriate training materials for operators and maintainers of the DE-M SHORAD platform. DOTD is working with PEO Missile and Space and the Transition Team to define requirements for developing a complete, detailed exportable Training Support Package that can be used to train one or more critical collective and supporting individual tasks and resources required to support unit training proficiency and readiness.

In November 2020, OTD participated in the Army Training Concept (ATC) for 2035

Science and Technology (S&T) Working group to develop, staff, and publish an update to the TP 525-8-2 Army Learning Concept for Training and Education 2020-2040, with ADA and FA requirement capabilities identified in the Army Training Concept (ATC) 2035 nested within MDO 1.5. S&T working groups will use the required capabilities in Appendix B to identify breakthrough technological innovations and scientific discoveries that support those capabilities. OTD will continue to participate in the bi-weekly WGs meeting IOT provide input to the development of the S&T Appendix B and align breakthrough technological innovations and scientific discoveries to the ADA and FA required capabilities identified in the ATC 2035.

Call to Attention:

Operational Training Division (OTD) at Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) request operational units provide critical feedback IOT inform and shape the IBCT Home Station Training (HST) strategy and the Field Artillery portfolio in Chapter 3 of DA Pam 350-38 title Standard in Training Ammunition Commission (STRAC). Operational Training Division (OTD) sent out an Operational Feedback sheet to every IBCT Field Artillery Battalion. This feedback is critical for OTD to ensure Field Artillery Battalion's STRAC is validated at the Army Muniton Requirements Working Group (AMRWG) and the Army Muniton Requirements Council of Coronals (AMRCoC) in spring of 2021.

Declassification of FA and ADA Battery T&EOs. The Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) Operational Training Division (OTD) provided the FA Commandant with a brief and discussion the requirements for de-classifying 18 Field Artillery Platoon Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EO). The DOTD team worked with the FCoE Foreign

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Disclosure Officer and DOTD Operations Security Manager in its T&EO analysis and has verified the Distribution Restriction codes and Foreign Disclosure ratings. We have determined that the following T&EOs can be reclassified to Unclassified- Distribution A (approved for public release-distribution is unlimited) with a Foreign Disclosure rating of FD1.

The following T&EOs have been approved to reclassified to Unclassified- Distribution A (approved for public release-distribution is unlimited) with a Foreign Disclosure rating of FD1. FA CMDT decision was made 5 NOV 2020.

06-PLT-6019	Store MLRS Ammunition
06-PLT-6016	Coordinate MLRS Battery Ammunition Resupply
06-PLT-6009	Perform the Transfer of Platoon Operations Center (POC) Control Functions
06-PLT-5424	Process Fire Missions
06-PLT-5012	Establish Firing Capability for a Paladin Platoon.
06-PLT-5008	Plan Survey Operations
06-PLT-4005	Coordinate Defense of the Ammunition Holding Area
06-PLT-3027	Perform Position Occupation for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
06-PLT-3026	Conduct a Towed Artillery Occupation
06-PLT-3004	Perform Reconnaissance Operations for HIMARS/MLRS Platoon Positions
06-PLT-3003	Perform Reconnaissance Operations for Self-Propelled (SP) Artillery Positions (PLT)
06-PLT-3002	Perform Reconnaissance Operations for Towed Artillery Positions (PLT)
06-PLT-1066	Control Cannon Firing Operations
06-PLT-1063	Establish an Operations Center
06-PLT-1038	Control a Field Artillery Unit Move (PLT)

MSG Martinez, Julio A.
 Senior Training Manager
 Directorate of Training & Doctrine
 (DOTD)
 US Army Fires Center of Excellence
 “Developing the Fires Force”
 FT Sill, OK 73503

The Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center (AMTC)

This quarter, the AMTC provides insight and discussion on the Army Targeting Enterprise (ATE) and the future of the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS). The AMTC supports the operational force as it prepares for Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and serves as the voice for Army targeting initiatives to the Joint Force.

Additionally, the AMTC provides six functional courses (listed below) on all things targeting to educate and develop the force to ensure the Army aligns with the Joint process. More than ever, future operations will require agile, adaptive leaders who understand Joint operations as the military transitions to Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).

Army Targeting Enterprise (ATE)

The HQDA G-3/5/7 recently signed the Army Targeting Enterprise (ATE) Directive. This directive codifies Army Targeting Enterprise membership and establishes an Army Targeting Committee (ATC), led by the HQDA G-3/5/7 and G-2, to design Army targeting processes, procedures, materials, and intelligence support to targeting based on ATE-wide inputs and DoD-level guidance. This is a significant step in solving Army targeting challenges and Army integration with Joint and Coalition Forces. The primary stakeholders in the ATE are; HQDA G3/5/7, HQDA G2, FORSCOM, INSCOM, TRADOC, COEs, AMTC, Compo 2/3 representation, ASCCs, and Corps. Below is a snapshot of key elements of the Directive.



Army Targeting Committee

What is it?

- Identified stakeholders (organizations, commands, and people) with equities in targeting and who support military operations with decision-quality targeting processes, procedures, material, and intelligence by their continued contributions.

Why do we need it?

- Evaluate emerging technology for relevance to targeting tasks (ex. Project Convergence)
- Arbitrate and resolve targeting related issues (through the Army Targeting Committee)
- Represent Army equities to the Joint community (via the Military Targeting Committee)

How do we get it?

Status:

- A DA policy directive to codify the ATE was signed by the DCS DA G3/5/7 and DAG2 on 18 Nov 20.
- The Army Targeting Committee Charter is also in draft; it will be presented to the ATC CoC/GOSC on or about 18 May 2021.

ATE update, provided by CW3 Aaron Sargent, CDE and WPN School Chief.

Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS)

In recent months, a significant discussion has surrounded the future development of Fires and Targeting automation software. Many of you may have heard that future versions of AFATDS would incorporate the product known as JADOCS. We can 100% confirm that JADOCS is not going away and that AFATDS and JADOCS will remain separate and distinct programs of record. At the AMTC, we work closely with the Army Capabilities Manager (ACM) Fires on a few initiatives to modernize the existing JADOCS software. The AMTC

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JADOCS...continued from Page 13

sees two main priorities: a training shortfall and a capability gap addressed by the Joint Sensor to Shooter Enhancement (JSSE) effort. Training shortfalls will address over arching targeting-related issues, including the Military Decision Making Process and “Key” Program of Instruction (POI) modifications to ensure targeting methodologies discussion during JADOCS training. JSSE’s 1st objective is to develop technologies aligning the TPG and JADOCS link16 capabilities into a unified user interface (UI). JSSE’s 2nd objective is twofold. The first can ingest T3D files for target weaponeering, mensuration, and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE). This ability would allow for JADOCS to read CJCSI 33701.01 target development standards. The second phase of OBT 2 is to be able to write back to the authoritative sources. The final initiative for JSSE will be interaction with software embedded in the Tactical Integrated Targeting Access Node (TITAN) called Synchronized High-Optempo Targeting. These initiatives will lay the groundwork for future system development by ACM Fires with user requirements from FORSCOM units, other CoEs, and the Joint Staff.

Additionally, the last Critical Task Site Selection Board identified two essential tasks as gaps in the 131A primary military education as Field Artillery Technicians- Employ JADOCS and Manage the JADOCS server. These tasks and the efforts to modernize the JADOCS software ensure the program is here to stay. These actions should indicate to senior leaders that fires operators must address the atrophy that has occurred over the years. As we address our skills and train to increase effectiveness and efficiency, digital sustainment training at echelon should include proficiency on JADOCS. In future editions, we will provide updates on the progress we are making concerning digital automation modernization.

JADOCS content provided by Mr. Jasbir S. Riat, Targeting Program Analyst.

AMTC Functional Courses

Joint Operational Fires and Effects (JOFEC) bridges the targeting knowledge gap, educating leaders from all services and multinational partners on the skills to employ Joint Fires and the Joint Targeting Process to achieve lethal and non-lethal effects.

POC: MAJ Stevenson, todd.j.stevenson.mil@mail.mil

POC: Mr. Coronado, elvis.coronado.ctr@mail.mil

Target Material Production (TMP) instructs Target Coordinate Mensuration (TCM) and production of Target Materials for entry into the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) as part of Advanced Target Development in the Joint Targeting Cycle.

POC: CW4 Armer, Samuel.f.armer2.mil@mail.mil

Joint Intermediate Target Development (JITD) focuses on teaching Intelligence Analysts the fundamentals of Basic and Intermediate Target Development to Joint standards for entry into the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB)

POC: Mr. Whitfield, larry.w.whitfield2.civ@mail.mil

Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) covers the fundamentals of determining precise target location and mitigating collateral damage using Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) for the employment of joint and organic munitions

POC: CW3 Sargent, Aaron.l.sargent.mil@mail.mil

Precision Fires Weaponeering Certification (WPN) trains fire support targeting cells and targeting staffs to conduct weaponeering in order to determine a supporting munition solution that will achieve target effects.

POC: CW3 Sargent, Aaron.l.sargent.mil@mail.mil

Target Mensuration Only (TMO) trains and certifies personnel on Target Coordinate Mensuration (TCM) to support the employment of

Continued on Page 15, See AMTC

AMTC...continued from Page 14


coordinate-seeking munitions during deliberate or dynamic targeting.

POC: SFC Benson, brock.l.benson.mil@mail.mil

Please contact the AMTC with any questions you have or assistance you require regarding the Army and Joint targeting at 580-442-1701.

Steve A. Wadleigh
SGM, AMTC
Steve.a.wadleigh.mil@mail.mil

David S. Lee
COL, FA
Director, AMTC
david.s.lee24.mil@mail.mil



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Vampire Team

Call to Correct:

By CPT Daniel Faughnan (Vampire 13)
SFC Joshua Rieves (Vampire 13B)

Firing Battery Survivability

The Army has learned many lessons through conducting Counter Insurgency (COIN) Operations in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) during the past 20 years. This focus on low-level conflict has caused a degradation of skills learned during the Cold War era. This includes the Field Artillery. In many ways, surviving in a large scale combat operations environment has become a less critical task, a pre-GWOT concern that fell into minimal use for many units. The lack of training on survivability tasks is concerning. Artillery units should be well rehearsed at surviving in a near-peer threat environment despite not knowing the exact conditions of the conflict. Fire support at-large will undoubtedly play a role in any future world conflict. When peer threats materialize, the Army will call upon and employ fires in support of combined arms maneuver to shape the analysis of the deep fight. This paper outlines the importance of survivability of the Field Artillery Battery through unit trends, Observer Coach/Trainer (OC/T) Observations, and Opposing Force (OPFOR) reactions while training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC).

Rotational training units (RTUs) come to JMRC for a variety of exercises, each with their own characteristics and mission sets. However, there are some commonalities between all rotations conducted at JMRC. Each rotation has a live, free thinking OPFOR. The OPFOR gives the rotational unit the opportunity to train against an enemy force that has more combat power and is hard to predict. During each rotation, 1-4 Infantry (Warrior) replicates units of varying size with two artillery battalions, the standard in Russian doctrine. Throughout the Force-on-force period, Warrior replicates all aspects of a field artillery battalion such as fire missions, radar acquisitions, and sustainment

operations. The greatest threats to a field artillery battery come from counterfire (battery acquired by enemy observer, radar, or unmanned aerial surveillance), air attack (fixed and rotary wing), and ground attack (SPF, mounted or dismounted troops, armor). Warrior is very effective at replicating these threats and using them to acquire and then harass, neutralize, or destroy the rotational unit artillery, usually beginning very early in the rotation. This results in the loss of combat power for the Rotational Brigade Combat Team. Ultimately, because of the proficiency of the Warrior Battalion, training units at JMRC struggle with the following areas related to firing Battery survivability; Reconnaissance, Selection, and Occupation of a Position (RSOP), dispersion, survivability move criteria, and countering the enemy radar threat.

Reconnaissance, Selection, and Occupation of a Position

Firing Battery survivability begins with well-executed reconnaissance and selection of a firing position. Deliberate planning using the battery commander's guidance for this should occur prior to the Advance Party (AP) departing. A ground reconnaissance is the preferred method since it provides more detail and any intelligence gathered is real-time. It allows the firing battery to pre-plan initial and subsequent positions for howitzers, the fire direction center (FDC), and battery trains (the battery's internal logistical element). Although current U.S. artillery weapon systems are GPS enabled and do not require preparation of a firing position, conducting an effective ground reconnaissance will reduce the amount of time spent identifying and establishing these points on arrival and will help the battery be in position ready to fire sooner. This is particularly helpful if a firing battery elects to use hide positions or if the terrain is difficult. If a ground recon cannot be conducted due to time constraints

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or enemy considerations, a map recon with any available satellite imagery or utilizing unmanned aerial surveillance assets can allow the unit to identify broad avenues of approach and give them a general idea of the terrain.

Prior to departure, the AP team should consider their vehicle and security makeup in relation to the anticipated enemy situation. Ground threats may call for a larger recon element to increase available weapons. Air threats may require a focus on vehicle mounted heavy machine guns or requesting an attached air defense element. An indirect fire threat could cause the commander to either send heavily armored vehicles or to keep the recon element small, fast, and maneuverable. The advance party team must consider mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) for each battery location. AP and battery leadership must perform adjacent unit coordination with nearby friendly units to reduce risk of fratricide. Disseminate friendly locations to the entire Battery and include unit locations in the defense plan. Contact any adjacent units to determine if defenses can be mutually supportive. Sending AP out well in advance of battery movement is optimal in order to accomplish all of this before Battery movement.

Terrain plays a large role in how the battery will be positioned. Open desert terrain with little vegetation will provide an open firing position with few site to crest issues, but provides almost no cover or concealment. Wide dispersion of battery elements and conducting survivability moves more often are effective tactics in this terrain. Densely wooded areas will provide greater cover and concealment, but can greatly reduce the usable areas within a firing position due to impassable terrain and site to crest issues. When selecting possible emplacement locations, one focus should be looking for spots that provide overhead concealment and terrain masking against threats of air and ground attack while still allowing the howitzer to have an open sector of fire. This includes considering

detection by assets such as unmanned aerial surveillance that gives the enemy the capability to spot a unit from high altitude with little chance of detection due to its small size and reduced audio signature (compared to traditional manned aircraft). The Battery commander can analyze the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and develop preliminary defensive guidance to mitigate some of these threats.

Dispersion

While the U.S. focuses on precision fires and specialty artillery munitions, most peer or near-peer threats place a greater emphasis on mass fires as a counterfire tactic. OPFOR at JMRC accurately replicates this during their fight against the RTU. A counterfire mission of 50 rockets or 80 DPICM are common OPFOR tactics. Dispersion is a survivability consideration OC/Ts often find underutilized. Placement of the Howitzers has often been within 50-100 meters of each other when indirect fire was considered the main threat. Inadequate dispersion causes an increase in the probability of casualties and losses of two or more howitzers within a Battery. Dispersing the battery across a firing point with at least 100 meters between guns in between is a better practice for the survivability of the firing unit when receiving indirect fires.

FDC placement in relation to Howitzers is often within 100 to 200 meters. Close proximity increases the likelihood the FDC will receive casualties and damage to equipment. FDC operation is crucial for maintaining firing capability within the Battery. Position FDCs further away from howitzers to minimize possible losses of assets needed in directing fires. Utilizing terrain and concealment further increases the FDC's survivability and capabilities. Placing the FDC in a wood line with higher elevation, utilizing trees for concealment of antennae, tends to increase communications range and provide more protection to the FDC. Collocating FDCs for POC / BOC operations can enhance information flow in BOC to POC

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changeovers but increases the probability of losing both FDC's due to indirect fires. FDC sections should train in separated POC / BOC operations to build trust and confidence in utilizing systems and Unit SOPs.

Survivability Move Criteria

ATP 3-09.50, Chapter 5, tells us that indirect fire (IDF) is the greatest threat to field artillery units. OC/T's at JMRC have observed a high number of casualties from OPFOR IDF assets. Doctrine recommends developing and exercising unit survivability criteria. During rotations, higher casualty rates have been sustained by the firing batteries that did not follow survivability move criteria. Whenever a unit is executing high volumes of fire or remains static in a position for an extended period of time, they increase the likelihood that enemy assets will acquire their position and conduct counterfire missions. The employment of effective survivability move criteria can reduce the amount of casualties and damaged equipment.

Artillery units move often. When they do, movement should be no less than a 300 to 500 meter distance from their previous area. The two methods of control for survivability moves are centralized and decentralized. Battery commanders should determine whether the FDC or the senior howitzer section chief is better suited to effectively control howitzer movement and placement. Some factors that should be considered when making this decision are mission time lines, the experience level of the section chiefs, terrain limitations, howitzer status and position tracking, and adjacent unit concerns.

There can be barriers for batteries that want to move as often as possible such as competition for land, nearby enemy elements, and higher headquarter requirements for remaining in place. The question comes to mind of, who is the deciding authority for movement? Commanders must exhaust every effort to locate suitable alternate positions. Battery survivability movement should be trained until it

is second nature. The Battery can then focus on other critical tasks, such as ammunition management and maintaining firing capability.

Higher Headquarters

Because of the status of the current fight and the need to have artillery in position ready to fire, higher echelons may issue guidance to the battery to remain in place to support the mission regardless of the indirect fire threat. As the unit continues to remain in its current location, the probability of it being targeted increases. If a battery commander or higher echelon anticipates remaining in a static position, they should plan ahead for coordination of assets to assist in hardening the position. Engineer assets are the preferable choice. The battery commander can also request additional Class IV materials.

When a battalion is designating position areas for artillery (PAAs), it is important to analyze the terrain in the areas being considered. They should take into account the amount of usable terrain as opposed to total terrain area within the position. The terrain at JMRC presents many challenges, with steep contours and many densely forested areas. Units that conduct careful terrain analysis when assigning PAAs provide their firing batteries more freedom to maneuver within these areas. This allows the battery to frequently move to alternate points within that PAA, with the commander's guidance.

The ability to mass fires as a Battalion at a decisive point in a battle requires sacrificing survivability to some degree. Massing fires has the potential to degrade firing capability due to enemy indirect fire the longer the Battalion remains static. Achieving a perfect balance between completing a mission and surviving the battery can certainly be a challenge. Howitzers moving often cannot maintain consistent firing capability. This obstacle is more severe depending on the particular weapon system. Self-propelled howitzers move and shoot faster than towed howitzers. Leapfrogging Platoons

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or operating in two gun teams assists in minimizing the time a Battery cannot support the Battalion with artillery.

Howitzer Types

Howitzer types are another factor for speed and ease of movement. The M109A6 Paladin and the new M109A7 PIM may seem better suited for operations than towed howitzers due to their maneuverability over cross country terrain, as well as their ability to emplace and displace very quickly. A self-propelled howitzer can fire and then immediately move out of an area. Paladins navigate muddy terrain better than M777 or M119 series howitzers. Paladins can move into a hide position or initiate roving maneuvers in the position area. Towed howitzers do not have the option to shoot and scoot, but may opt to tuck into a tree-line or among other vegetation with their prime movers, and then fire from there. The smaller M119 series towed howitzer falls between the Paladin and the M777 series towed howitzer with maneuverability. Overall, the Paladin is faster on rough terrain, more mobile, and can be IPRTF faster, but it has definite drawbacks. Paladin units require a much more robust support element due to much greater fuel requirements than towed howitzers. While M109 series howitzers are generally able to traverse uneven or muddy terrain easier than wheeled vehicles, they are limited by steep terrain or thick forests that have no clear avenue to travel through. The M119 and M777 series howitzers are able to be air assaulted into position quickly, although this capability is reduced when air superiority is in question. The M109A6/A7 should be utilized with their ease of movement and ability to quickly push into concealment kept in mind. The M777A2 and M119A3 take longer to occupy; but, when properly dispersed, they are easier to conceal when less vegetation is present. Units must take the advantages and limitations of their weapon system into consideration when planning for battery survivability.

Historical Perspective

In 1981, Lieutenant General (Retired) Keith Dayton published his report on the Soviet perspective on American and Russian field artillery survivability. The main point of his article is “If artillery can be located it can be attacked, and if it can be attacked it can be destroyed.” The Soviets knew the greatest threat to the field artillery is the field artillery and counter Battery efforts was the most important considerations in the fight. The ability of radar to locate the artillery is a monumental concern of both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. LTG Dayton emphasizes, even in 1981, that the Russians knew that American radars could determine the location of a firing unit within 20 to 30 seconds after firing and deliver counter-fire on their position within 3 to 4 minutes.

Conclusion

Firing battery survivability was a major concern nearly 40 years ago. Consider how intensely the Soviets responded to this concern and how their tactical and technical advancements allowed them to compete with American systems. The current capabilities of our adversaries increase the need for batteries to practice good survivability tactics. The combination of acquisition assets and manned and unmanned aerial assets on the battlefield means a battery’s location is known nearly immediately after firing. The firing battery should expect indirect fire in return. Knowing that the enemy can find a battery nearly instantly is concerning. As a result of the capabilities of our adversaries, the American firing battery must practice and perfect survivability tactics across the howitzer platforms. While the tactics differ for each platform, the overall end state remains the same. Batteries that effectively survive preserve combat power for maneuver commanders, enabling the successful completion of the mission.

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Wolf Team

RSOP with an Immediate Move Order

CPT Jordan C. Riggio, W11, Firing Battery Trainer, NTC

MSG Travis Nickel, W11A, Firing Battery Trainer, NTC

(U) OBSERVATION:

(U) When given an immediate move order, field artillery batteries do not conduct reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position (RSOP).

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) During the rotation, the Field Artillery Battalion ordered its batteries to conduct an immediate move of prepared artillery areas (PAAs). The Battery Commander and Fire Direction Center immediately issued the move order via voice and digital systems to the platoon leadership. The Platoons consolidated equipment and vehicles and then moved in a tactical formation to the next location without any reconnaissance or understanding of direction of travel, emergency occupation locations, or occupation location within the new PAAs. The Gunnery Sergeants moved with the Platoon, usually in the rear of the formation. The Battery Commander often moved with the Battery Trains. Batteries did not conduct proper RSOP when given an immediate move order.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) RSOP begins as a part of troop leading procedures and continues throughout the operation. RSOP does not need to wait until the Battalion issues a move order. Commanders must codify in tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) when RSOP may begin and outline what limitations Batteries have until issued a formal move order. Battery Commanders must conduct reconnaissance of any PAAs issued to them in the Battalion operations order. Absent a directed PAA, Battery Commanders must analyze their assigned primary and alternate targets and determine what PAAs will allow them to support the targets with their given ammunition. The Battery Commander may also delegate RSOP to the Gunnery Sergeant. Prior to any move order given, the Gunnery Sergeant should bound forward of the Battery or Platoon's position and complete RSOP tasks. If the Commander or Gunnery Sergeant have not completed RSOP when issued an immediate move order, the Battery must immediately send out a Gunnery Sergeant to begin reconnaissance as the Battery consolidates equipment and vehicles. At a minimum, the Gunnery Sergeant should recommend a route, determine PAA security, and establish initial positioning.

(U) DOCTRINE REFERENCES / TMs:

ATP 3-09.50 and ATP 3-09.70

LSCO and DESERT STORM

LSCO (Large-Scale Combat Operations) is a term you'll often hear in today's Army. The Army's new mantra is to organize, train, and equip to fight and defeat a peer/near-peer competitor (i.e.: Russia, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, or Iran) in battle in which corps and divisions, as opposed to brigades, are the tip of the spear. The Army therefore is moving away from a brigade combat team (BCT) focus, and it is trying to envision what future battlefields, particularly from a corps perspective, will look like. Joint (working with other services) and Combined (fighting alongside allied partners) operations across all domains of battle (land, air, sea, space, and cyber) will be tomorrow's order of the day, and FA will be absolutely necessary, though probably not sufficient, for victory. Maneuver commanders at EAB (echelons above brigade, or divisions and corps) will not have the freedom of action they need to win in LSCO if FA fails to provide long-range, persistent, and precision fires. Fortunately, the Army can look to history for models from which to build the LSCO force of the future, and the best ways to employ it in battle.


You're probably familiar with the basic storyline of the Gulf War, aka DESERT SHEILD/DESERT STORM, between August 1990-February 1991. DESERT STORM saw the Army's most recent, successful experience with LSCO and operations at EAB. Two corps—XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps—served as the Army's contribution to the multi-national Coalition's ground force component that liberated Kuwait. Coalition (primarily USAF and USN) air forces pummeled Saddam Hussein's army—his most-capable units were the vaunted Republican Guard divisions—in Kuwait and Iraq for nearly five weeks while US and allied ground forces marshaled in Saudi Arabia for the “ground war” phase of the campaign. Army maneuver forces made an “end run” through the desert around the Iraqi right flank, and in just over four days they compelled

the outmaneuvered Iraqi Army to withdraw from Kuwait.

That narrative overlooks the essential role of FA in the DESERT STORM, however. While XVIII Airborne Corps executed its high-speed end run on the Coalition left, VII Corps employed FA fires to keep the Iraqi army pinned in its positions. As soon as it became clear the Iraqis could and would not expose themselves to pivot and hit XVIII Airborne Corps's right flank as the corps rolled northward, VII Corps directed its fires on supporting US and United Kingdom armored and infantry divisions as they breached the Iraqi front lines. With near-perfect fires support from their FA formations, Coalition ground-maneuver forces pried the Iraqi army from its trenches. With nowhere to hide, and its prepared defenses now a death trap, the rout was on. After 100 hours of ground fighting, Coalition leaders called for a cease fire, and Saddam accepted it to save the remnants of his army and his Republican Guard.

As the Army looks to a LSCO-dominated future, you can expect DESERT STORM to occupy a large part of your professional military education (PME). In the meantime, you can get a leg up on both your PME and your professional development by reading histories of DESERT STORM. A good high-level overview of the Gulf War is Rick Atkinson's *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*. When you're ready for detailed analysis of LSCO and FA's role in it, you can read Steve Borque's *Jayhawk!: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War*. You can download *Jayhawk!* for free from the Army Center for Military History at https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-73-1/cmh-Pub_70-73-1.pdf. Also, you can always contact the FA Branch Command Historian, Dr. John Grenier, at john.e.grenier.civ@mail.mil if you have any other general history or FA history-related questions.

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





If Your Fires Plan Doesn't Create a Logistics Problem For Your S4, You Aren't Firing Enough Rounds



Casualties For 105mm, 122mm Artillery, and 120mm Mortar (HE)																		
ROUNDS	6	12	18	24	30	36	42	48	54	60	66	72	78	84	90	96	102	108
TARGET TYPE	CASUALTY ASSESSMENT																	
TRPS IN OPEN (PLT)	2	3	4	5	6	7	7	8	8	9	9	10	10	10	11	11	11	11
TRPS IN OPEN (CO)	4	6	12	18	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	32
TRPS DUG-IN NO OVERHEAD COVER (PLT)	-	-	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5
TRPS DUG-IN NO OVERHEAD COVER (CO)	-	1	3	4	5	6	7	8	8	9	9	10	11	11	12	13	14	15
TRPS DUG-IN WITH OVERHEAD COVER (PLT)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	3
TRPS DUG-IN WITH OVERHEAD COVER (CO)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5
WHEELED VEH MOB KILL	-	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
WHEELED VEH DEST	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	4
ARTILLERY TRACKED MOB KILL	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
ARTILLERY TRACKED DEST	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	2
ARTILLERY TOWED MOB KILL	-	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
ARTILLERY TOWED DEST	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-



TC 3-09.81 Figure 3-11. Dispersion Rectangle.




- ### Keys to Success
- Know the required number and type of munitions required to achieve the desired effect against the entirety of the enemy formation
 - Understand the Class V resupply and haul capacity throughout your formation
 - Clearly define CL V status reporting requirements
 - Aggressively forecast ammunition expenditures, resupply rates and haul capabilities across the Operations Synch Matrix & Enemy Event Template
- “Quantity has a quality all its own”**

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Counseling Toolkit Hotlink:

Reference: ATP 6-22.1, DA Form 4856

Doctrine

STAGE 1: IDENTIFY THE NEED FOR COUNSELING:

Performance Counseling:

Performance counseling is the review of a subordinate's duty performance during a specified period.

Professional growth counseling:

Professional growth counseling includes planning for the accomplishment of individual and professional goals. During the counseling, leader and subordinate conduct a review to identify and discuss the subordinate's strengths and weaknesses and to create an individual development plan that builds upon those strengths and compensates for (or eliminates) shortcomings.

Event Counseling:

- Specific instances of superior or substandard performance.
- Reception and integration counseling.
- Crisis counseling.
- Referral counseling.
- Promotion counseling.
- Transition counseling.
- Adverse separation counseling.

STAGE 2: PREPARE FOR COUNSELING:

Successful counseling requires preparation in the following areas:

- Select a suitable place.
- Schedule the time.
- Notify the subordinate well in advance.
- Outline the components of the counseling session.
- Organize information and draft a plan of action.
- Plan the counseling strategy.
- Establish the right atmosphere.

Counseling

STAGE 3: CONDUCT THE COUNSELING SESSION:

Army leaders use a balanced mix of formal and informal counseling and learn to take advantage of daily events to provide Soldiers and Army Civilians with feedback.

Even during informal counseling, leaders should address the four basic components of a counseling session:

- Open the session.
- Discuss the issues.
- Develop a plan of action.
- Record and close the session.

STAGE 4: FOLLOW-UP:

Leader Responsibilities:

The counseling process does not end with the initial counseling session. It continues throughout the implementation of the plan of action consistent with the observed results. Sometimes the initial plan of action will require modification to meet the desired outcomes. Leaders must consistently support their subordinates in implementing the plan of action by teaching, coaching, mentoring, or providing additional time, referrals and other appropriate resources. Additional measures may include more focused follow-up counseling, informing the chain of command, or taking more severe corrective measures if appropriate.

Assess the Plan of Action:

During assessment, the leader and the subordinate jointly determine if the desired results happened. They should determine the date for their initial assessment during the initial counseling session. The plan of action assessment provides useful information for future follow-up counseling sessions.

Organization & Functions

To overcome resistance in counseling, leaders can employ several techniques to redirect the subordinate:

Reconfirm the counseling session purpose—be specific and keep focused on the details (such as conditions, triggers, and outcomes) of the situation; refrain from any personal attacks on the subordinate.

Keep the discussion professional and balanced in tone—do not argue or place blame on any party.

Discuss the suspected resistance openly with the subordinate and respect his or her response.

Slow the tempo of the session—rely on pertinent open-ended questions to give the subordinate the appropriate time and ability to reveal information and be an active participant in the counseling session.

Focus on one specific behavior, its effect, and the consequences to minimize overwhelming the subordinate. It may be necessary to divide the session into multiple meetings to address each area adequately. Further, the leader should prioritize these discussions based on the needs of the individual and unit.

Tools and Products

Leaders conduct effective counseling sessions and improve their counseling skills when they follow these general guidelines:

Determine the subordinate's role in the situation and what has been done to resolve the issue. Focus attention on the subordinate. Listen to what is said and how it is said to understand what the subordinate says and feels.

Encourage the subordinate to take the initiative and speak aloud.

Remain objective; avoid confirming a subordinate's prejudices.

Display empathy when discussing the issue. Be receptive to the subordinate's emotions without feeling responsible.

Ask open-ended questions for relevant information; avoid interrogating the subordinate.

Listen more and talk less; avoid interrupting.

Keep personal experiences out of the counseling session.

Draw conclusions based on all available information, not just the subordinate's statement.

Enable the subordinate to help himself or herself.

Know what information to keep confidential and what to present to the chain of command, if necessary.

Active Listening

Key elements of active listening include:

Eye contact. Maintaining eye contact without staring helps show sincere interest. Occasional breaks of eye contact are normal and acceptable, while excessive breaks, paper shuffling, clockwatching, and repeated mobile telephone checks may indicate a lack of interest or concern.

Body posture. Being relaxed and comfortable will help put the subordinate at ease. However, an overly relaxed position or slouching may be interpreted as a lack of interest.

Head nods. Occasional nodding indicates attention and encourages the subordinate to continue.

Facial expressions. Keep facial expressions natural and relaxed to signal a sincere interest.
Verbal expressions. Refrain from talking too much and avoid interrupting. Let the subordinate do the talking, while keeping the discussion on the counseling subject.

Check for understanding. Paraphrase or summarize points back to the subordinate for confirmation; for example, "What I heard was...".

Nonverbal indicators of leader and subordinate attitude include: Interest, friendliness, and openness. Be aware that counselor actions must be context and situation specific. For example, leaning toward the subordinate may be considered as expressing interest or being aggressive—the counselor must be able to understand how the subordinate will interpret this action

Center for the Army Profession and Leadership



CAPL.ARMY.MIL Leadership & Leader Development Resources

<https://caccapl.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/web/repository/pdf-files/CAPL-team%20cohesion-adaptability-training-aid.pdf>



Building Cohesive & Adaptive Teams Small-Unit Leader Training Aid: This training aid is designed for small-unit leaders to supplement and maximize the value of the training and other work tasks that are already taking place in their unit.

<https://capl.army.mil/counterproductive-leadership/>



1 OCT 20

Counterproductive Leadership Resources: CAPL has developed self-study materials to equip learners with the knowledge and skills to identify when counterproductive leadership is occurring, assess why and when it occurs, and address it productively.

<https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/CommandersHandbook.pdf>



Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development: Provides commanders with an efficient and effective way to develop leaders.

<https://www.facebook.com/armyleaderexchange>



Army Leader Exchange (Alx): Enables Leadership development across the Army by providing Leadership Development Presentations, Self Development information, LPD Resources, LPD Program assessments, Unit Leadership Assessments and Historical References through Social Media presence.

<https://capl.army.mil/Educating-the-Force/>



Educating The Force: Video series with supporting resources for discussions on the Army Profession and Leader Development.



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